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ABSTRACT
WOODROW WILSON’S CONVERSION EXPERIENCE: THE PRESIDENT
AND THE FEDERAL WOMAN SUFFRAGE AMENDMENT
FEBRUARY 2012
BETH A. BEHN, B.S., UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Joyce Avrech Berkman
This study explores President Woodrow Wilson’s evolution between his 1912
presidential campaign and the mid-point of his second term from staunch opposition to a
federal woman suffrage amendment to an active advocate for the cause. Besides clearly
identifying the array of forces within and outside Congress that pressured Wilson and the
extent to which he was, in turn, able to influence Congress and voters, this study more
fully integrates the suffragists and anti-suffragists into American political history and
situates the issue of woman suffrage in the broader context of Wilson’s two
administrations. I argue that the National American Woman Suffrage Association, not
the National Woman’s Party, was decisive in Wilson’s conversion to the cause of the
federal amendment because its approach mirrored his own conservative vision of the
appropriate method of reform: win a broad consensus, develop a legitimate rationale, and
make the issue politically valuable. Additionally, I contend that Wilson did have a
significant role to play in the successful congressional passage and national ratification of
the 19th Amendment, though powerful currents of sectionalism, race, and economic
interests sometimes limited the extent of his influence.
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A deeper understanding of the final stages of the woman suffrage movement
holds relevance for our understanding of both Progressive Era America and our present
times. Observing Wilson treading the fragile line between executive interference and
reasonable influence provides great insight into Progressive Era conceptions of separation
of powers and presidential power and leadership. Furthermore, debates over woman
suffrage contributed to the larger late-19th and early-20th century debates over the
meaning of citizenship and the role of the state in an increasingly industrialized nation.
Enfranchising one-half the population marked a significant moment in our nation’s
history. This study deepens and enriches our understanding of the process by which that
momentous event came to pass.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

As Woodrow Wilson traveled the 1912 presidential campaign trail, he confided to
one of his staff members that he was “definitely and irreconcilably opposed to woman
suffrage; woman’s place was in the home, and the type of woman who took an active part
in the suffrage agitation was totally abhorrent to him.” 1 Just six years later, though,
halfway through his second term, he pleaded with the United States Senate to pass the
federal woman suffrage amendment. In the midst of a world war and with significant
mid-term elections looming just days away, Wilson took the unprecedented step of
personally injecting his voice into the Senate debate over woman suffrage. The future
direction of the nation rests on granting women the right to vote, he argued, because “we
shall need their moral sense to preserve what is right and fine and worthy in our system
of life as well as to discover just what it is that ought to be purified and reformed.
Without their counselings we shall only be half wise.” 2
What had transpired during the first six years of his presidency to bring about
such a dramatic change in Wilson’s position? How had the federal suffrage amendment
been elevated to an issue of such importance that the president felt compelled to
personally intervene with Congress on its behalf? Did Wilson’s support indicate a
principled shift on the issue or was it mere political expediency? This study seeks to
1

Frank P. Stockbridge, "How Woodrow Wilson Won His Nomination," Current History 20 (July
1924): 567.
2

Congress, Senate, President Woodrow Wilson’s message to the U.S. Senate urging passage of
the suffrage amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 65th Congress, 2nd sess., Congressional Record (30
September 1918), vol. 56, pt. 1, 10900-10901.

1

understand the array of forces that pressured Wilson and the extent to which he was, in
turn, able to influence Congress and voters. Its aim is to more fully integrate the
suffragists into American political history and to situate the issue of woman suffrage in
the broader context of Wilson’s two administrations. In doing so, this study has the
potential to enhance our understanding not just of Wilson and the woman suffrage
movement, but also of the nature of legislative change in our representative system and of
presidential power during the Progressive Era. Failure to fully understand the process by
which one-half of the population attained the franchise will – to use Wilson’s words leave us only “half wise.”
By focusing on Wilson’s relationship to woman suffrage, this study is designed to
both fill voids in the existing scholarship and to weigh in on key historiographical
debates. Historians of woman suffrage have devoted a great deal of attention to Wilson’s
relationship to the 19th Amendment. Women who personally participated in the suffrage
campaign authored the earliest histories, published in the decades immediately following
passage of the federal amendment. The manner in which these accounts described
Wilson’s role in securing the amendment depended on whether the authors had worked
with the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) or with the smaller
and more militant National Woman’s Party (NWP). Both groups agreed that Wilson
eventually became an advocate and that his support helped secure the necessary votes in
Congress and, later, in the state ratification campaigns. However, they disagreed sharply
on the cause of his conversion.
Those affiliated with NAWSA insisted that Wilson was won over to the cause by
their organization’s tireless campaigning along nonpartisan lines at both the state and

2

national level and by women’s home front service during World War I. 3 In contrast,
women affiliated with the NWP argued that, as a result of their campaign to “hold the
party in power responsible” and the publicity-generating militant tactics they employed,
Wilson recognized the urgency for passing the federal suffrage amendment under a
Democratic administration. Furthermore, NWP activists adamantly believed that
NAWSA abandoned the cause of suffrage during the war, focusing all of its efforts on
war service and leaving the NWP to shoulder the brunt of the suffrage work. 4
As the field of Women’s History emerged and grew during the last half of the 20th
century, a wide range of studies on the suffrage movement appeared. Most of these
ground-breaking works wrestled in some way with the relative effectiveness of the
NAWSA and NWP strategies. With the publication of Century of Struggle in 1959,
Eleanor Flexner launched what was to become the traditional interpretation of the
influence both the NWP and NAWSA had on the president. Flexner concludes that the
real contribution of the NWP was to bring the federal amendment back to a central
position in the suffrage movement through the work it performed between 1913 and
3

Early suffrage histories written by NAWSA members include Ida A. Husted Harper, ed. The
History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. 5, 1900-1920, (New York: Arno and the New York Times, 1969).
Originally published in 1922, Volume 5 of The History of Woman Suffrage was quickly followed by Carrie
Chapman Catt and Nellie Rogers Shuler, Woman Suffrage and Politics: The Inner Story of the Suffrage
Movement (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923). The pro-NAWSA position in both of these works
was later supported by Maud Wood Park, Front Door Lobby, ed. Edna Lamprey Stantial (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1960).
4

The first full history of the NWP, published in 1921, was Inez Hayes Irwin, The Story of the
Woman’s Party. It was republished in 1977 as Inez Hayes Irwin, The Story of Alice Paul and the National
Woman's Party (Fairfax, Virginia: Denlinger's Publishers, Ltd, 1977) . Additional first-hand NWP
accounts include Doris Stevens, Jailed for Freedom (New York: Liveright Publishing Company, 1920),
Caroline Katzenstein, Lifting the Curtain: The State and National Woman Suffrage Campaigns in
Pennsylvania as I Saw them (Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1955). Although these accounts make clear that the
participants were aware that woman suffrage had become entangled with other political objectives like
prohibition, progressive labor protection laws, and Southern voting qualifications designed to
disenfranchise potential black voters, they rarely connect Wilson’s actions on woman suffrage to those
other issues.
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1916. Beginning in January, 1917, however, the party began to use militant tactics that
included picketing in front of the White House, lighting bonfires in which Wilson’s
speeches about democracy were burned, and conducting hunger strikes after they had
been arrested. Flexner asserts that the militant phase of NWP activity probably did not
help the cause and certainly did not endear suffragists to Wilson. She concludes that
NAWSA, under the strict control of Carrie Chapman Catt and her moderate, nonpartisan
approach, found the most effective path to win over the president and eventually gain the
vote. 5 With minor changes in points of emphasis, subsequent scholars adopted Flexner’s
interpretation. 6
Importantly, Flexner notes that winning the support of the president was not the
only challenge suffragists faced. Even with his support, the suffrage amendment was
defeated twice in the Senate (first in October 1918 and again in February 1919) before
finally passing by the slim margin of two votes in June 1919 under a Republicancontrolled Congress. Flexner lists the multitude of other issues facing elected officials.
Southern representatives had to contend with constituents fearful that woman suffrage
threatened white supremacy. Select congressmen also faced pressure from the liquor and

5

Eleanor Flexner and Ellen Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in
the United States (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), 262-268.
6

See William L. O'Neill, Everyone was Brave: A History of Feminism in America (New York:
The New York Times Book Company, 1971) and Sidney R. Bland, "Techniques of Persuasion: The
National Woman's Party and Woman Suffrage, 1913-1919" (Ph.D. diss., George Washington University,
1972),. O’Neill argues that it was NAWSA’s gentler, persuasive approach that converted Wilson. He
criticizes the NWP for its policy of “holding the party in power responsible” and damaging the cause
through militant actions. O’Neill contends that the NWP was an embarrassment to both NAWSA and
Wilson by continuing to focus its attacks on him after he had already come out in support of suffrage. In an
exceptionally well-balanced study, Bland contends that the NWP increased enthusiasm for the federal
amendment and paved the way for more moderate reform. He sides with Flexner, though, in arguing that
the NWP’s period of greatest influence was from 1913-1916. Like O’Neill, Bland concludes that
campaigning against all Democrats in 1914 and 1916 was politically foolhardy and that the NWP tactics
after late-1917 were counterproductive.
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textile industries that feared woman voters would support reformist legislation such as
prohibition and protective child labor laws. 7 In pointing out the influence of these
outside factors on Congressmen, though, Flexner neglects to explicitly connect them to
Wilson’s decision to withhold or exert executive influence.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the traditional interpretation was challenged by
a number of new publications. This new generation of historians argued that the NWP
had received short shrift in the existing scholarship. They offered a revisionist
interpretation in which the political pressure wrought by the militant tactics of the NWP
received credit not only for converting Wilson, but also for forcing Congress to pass the
19th Amendment. In their view, NAWSA’s nonpartisan, persuasive approach had been
appropriate when women did not have any other tools available to them. But by 1914,
more than four million women (mostly in western states) had been enfranchised by their
states. As a result, a new approach was in order.
According to the revisionist version, the NWP rightly chose to use women’s
voting power to convince politicians from both parties that they must accede to the
suffragists’ demand for a federal amendment or face the consequences of inaction in
future elections. Additionally, revisionists argue, the picketing, arrests, and harsh
treatment suffered by NWP members at the hands of the Wilson Administration
generated enormous publicity and public sympathy for the militant suffragists. The NWP
was successful in pointing out the hypocrisy of a president committed to “making the
world safe for democracy” while denying democratic rights to women in his own nation.
While acknowledging a secondary role for the ongoing work of NAWSA, the revisionists
7

Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United
States, 286-297.
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assert that it was the NWP’s militance that eventually forced Wilson to support the
federal amendment in order to avoid continued embarrassment to his administration and
electoral damage for his party. 8
With the exception of some critical reviews, little new scholarship has appeared to
either rebuke or temper the revisionist version. 9 The heroic NWP narrative – in which
women stop pleading with men to “give” them the vote and instead use women’s political
power and militant tactics to “win” the right to vote – seemingly found a ready audience
among post-Second Wave Feminism scholars. The revisionist interpretation even found
its way into popular culture with the airing of a 2004 HBO film entitled “Iron Jawed
Angels.” Starring popular actresses Hilary Swank as the young, vibrant Alice Paul and
the older Angelica Huston as Carrie Chapman Catt, the film serves as a perfect
dramatization of the heroic pro-NWP narrative. 10 While providing a wide audience with

8

The revisionist version was first fully articulated in Christine A. Lunardini, From Equal Suffrage
to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 1910-1928 (New York: New York University
Press, 1986). Interestingly, in an earlier article co-authored with Thomas Knock, Lunardini offered an
assessment that was more in keeping with the traditional interpretation. See Christine A. Lunardini and
Thomas J. Knock, "Woodrow Wilson and Woman Suffrage: A New Look," Political Science Quarterly 95,
no. 4 (Winter 1981): 655-671. Other versions of the revisionist argument appear in Sara Hunter Graham,
"Woodrow Wilson, Alice Paul, and the Woman Suffrage Movement," Political Science Quarterly 98, no. 4
(Winter 1984): 665-768. , Sara Hunter Graham, Woman Suffrage and the New Democracy (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1996), Linda G. Ford, Iron-Jawed Angels: The Suffrage Militancy of the National
Woman's Party, 1912-1920 (New York: University Press of America, 1991), Susan D. Becker, The Origins
of the Equal Rights Amendment: American Feminism between the Wars (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1981), Katherine H. Adams and Michael L. Keene, Alice Paul and the American
Suffrage Campaign (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008) More than a decade before the emergence
of this new school of thought, Aileen Kraditor had indicated a bias toward the NWP approach in the
original 1965 publication of her seminal work, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920.
However, in the preface to the 1981 edition, she indicated that she had adopted a “more neutral approach”
toward the controversy between NAWSA and the NWP. See Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman
Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1981), vi-vii.
9

In fact, recent suffrage scholarship tends to cite the revisionists without even acknowledging that
the effectiveness of the competing NAWSA / NWP strategies is contested historiographical terrain. For
example, see Rebecca J. Mead, How the Vote was Won: Woman Suffrage in the Western United States,
1868-1914 (New York: New York University Press, 2004). In her analysis of the 1914 mid-term elections,
Mead relies heavily on Lunardini’s From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights.
10

Katja Von Garnier, Iron Jawed Angels, ed. HBO and Spring Creek Productions, 2004).
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at least some knowledge of the obstacles faced by suffragists, the film is unabashedly
biased toward the militants. 11
In both the traditional and revisionist interpretation, the bulk of the scholarly
disagreement centers on the competing influence of NAWSA and the NWP on Wilson’s
conversion. This analysis often comes at the expense of a more thorough examination of
the competing pressures on the president from other progressive reform movements,
Southerners determined to defend their entrenched racial hierarchy, and powerful
business interests. One notable exception to this trend is David Morgan’s Suffragists and
Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America. Morgan carefully examines
Wilson’s choices about when, where, and with whom to exert his influence in favor of
the federal suffrage amendment. He methodically places Wilson’s actions in the context
of sectional rivalries, economic realities, and party politics. 12 Published in 1972,
Morgan’s account does not enjoy the benefit of more recent scholarship on the goals of
the suffrage leaders or on Wilson’s state of mind during his second term in office.
Additionally, he wrongly discounts the importance of NAWSA’s active participation in
war service on Wilson’s decision to serve as an advocate for the 19th Amendment. Still,
Suffragists and Democrats represents the most comprehensive political history in the
existing suffrage literature.
11

In a review of the film in the Journal of American History, historian Carla Bittel laments, “Is
this what it takes to attract new audiences to women’s history?” While acknowledging that the film may be
useful for teaching students about history and popular culture, she concludes, “The challenge, then, remains
to promote interest in women’s history and still teach about who we think the suffragists were, rather than
who we want them to be.” See Carla Bittel, "Review of Iron Jawed Angels," Journal of American History
91, no. 3 (December 2004): 1131-1132. For a film on woman suffrage that takes a more scholarly
approach, see Ruth Pollak, One Woman One Vote (Alexandria, VA: PBS Video, 1995).
12

David Morgan, Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America
(Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1972). See especially Chapter 11: Liquor, Cotton, and
Suffrage, p. 155-178.
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While most suffrage historians have tended toward a myopic view of the Wilson
Administration, Wilson scholars have erred in the other direction. They have paid
relatively little attention to the way the suffrage campaign weighed in among the other
issues of Wilson’s Administration. Sadly, one could browse through shelves of
monographs on Wilson’s foreign and domestic policy and not realize that one-half of the
nation’s population gained the right to vote during his administration. 13 The presence of
an organized suffrage movement of more than two million women, not to mention more
than 700,000 organized anti-suffragists, is notably absent from these accounts. 14
Wilson’s primary biographer, Arthur S. Link, mentions the President’s interaction
with suffragists only a few times in his five-volume history of Wilson’s two terms. His
most extensive discussion concerns Wilson’s decision to vote in favor of the state
suffrage referendum in New Jersey in 1915 – a pronouncement that Link contends was
intimately tied to the President’s simultaneous choice to announce plans to remarry just a
little more than a year after the death of his first wife. While Wilson’s affirmative vote in
New Jersey was certainly significant, Link’s over-simplified explanation of the decision
fails to connect this action to the president’s broader experience with the suffrage
movement. 15 Wilson’s later advocacy of the federal suffrage amendment is almost

13

While the 19th Amendment was a significant step toward greater democracy, it is important to
note that although it technically enfranchised all women, millions of African-American women living in
southern states were excluded from voting for another fifty years as a result of state constitutions that
prohibited almost all African-Americans – male and female - from exercising their voting rights.
14

For example, presidential historian Lewis Gould’s assessment of Wilson’s domestic
accomplishments does not even mention woman suffrage. Lewis L. Gould, The Modern American
Presidency (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 41.
15

Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1964), 1-14.
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entirely absent from Link’s account. Other biographies do not devote much more time to
the suffrage issue than does Link. 16
Much scholarly work has been done on Wilson’s relationship to progressive
legislation, but suffrage is usually excluded from those investigations in favor of a focus
on economic reforms. Historians and political scientists have thoroughly debated
Wilson’s move toward progressivism in advance of the 1916 presidential election. The
debate centers on whether Wilson was simply a political opportunist – pandering to the
labor movement and to progressive voters that he desperately needed in order win reelection – or whether his shift indicated an actual transformation in his thinking about the
role of the federal government in an increasingly urban-industrial nation. 17 Intertwined
16

For example, see Kendrick Clements, The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1992), Daniel D. Stid, The President as Statesman: Woodrow Wilson and the
Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), Arthur Walworth, Woodrow Wilson, 3d ed.
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978). More personal biographies such as A. Heckscher,
Woodrow Wilson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991) and Phyllis L. Levin, Edith and Woodrow:
The Wilson White House (New York: Scribner, 2001) mention Wilson’s wives’ distaste for women’s
political participation and, later, the actions of the NWP. However, neither author devotes more than a few
sentences to Wilson’s reaction to suffrage pressure. His interaction with Congress on the issue is
completely absent from these accounts. In two more recent biographies, the authors do specifically address
Wilson’s relationship to the woman suffrage campaign, but there is little analysis of his conversion. See
John Milton Cooper Jr., Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 411-415. ,
Kendrick Clements and Eric A. Cheezum, Woodrow Wilson (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 119-122.
Cooper devotes only four pages of his 600 page biography to Wilson’s action on woman suffrage.
17

Link claims that the president’s newfound commitment to “advanced progressivism” was born
out of his belief that the Democrats must stay in power in order to guide the nation through the challenges
of industrialization and urbanization. According to Link, Wilson had “broad political principles” but was
not “an inflexible dogmatist.” In order to win re-election, he was willing to transform himself into “a new
political creature.” See Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York:
Harper and Row, 1954), 224. and Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916, 321-323. The
“advanced progressivism” to which Link refers includes Wilson’s nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to the
Supreme Court, his support of the rural credits, workmen’s compensation, and child labor bills, his backing
of the LaFollette Seaman’s Act, and support for the principle of woman suffrage. See Link, Woodrow
Wilson and the Progressive Era, 250. For accounts that portray Wilson as even more conservative, see
Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (New
York: The Free Press, 1963), 205-211. , James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 19001918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 162-166. Some scholars have challenged Link’s interpretation of
Wilson’s 1916 shift. The challengers argue that Wilson’s positions in 1912 showed an openness to the type
of legislation that he ultimately supported in 1916. Without denying the importance of electoral politics,
they assert that Wilson’s shift was more evolutionary than Link and his adherents allow. See Stephen B.
Wood, Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era: Child Labor and the Law (Boston: Beacon Press,

9

throughout this debate is the impact of the First World War and the role that Wilson
viewed for himself and for the United States in determining the nature of the post-war
world order. 18 Despite this wealth of research and analysis on Wilson’s progressive shift,
particular consideration of his transformation on the issue of woman suffrage is largely
absent from these accounts.
One additional void in the existing scholarship is a thorough analysis of antisuffragists’ entreaties toward the president. A number of solid works on the antisuffragists received publication in the last two decades, contributing to both the existing
literature on women’s political activism at the turn of the century and to Progressive Era
politics and society, in general. With specific respect to the relationship of antisuffragists to Wilson, though, significant questions remain. 19

1968), 89. , Marshall E. Dimock, "Woodrow Wilson as Legislative Leader," The Journal of Politics 19, no.
1 (February 1957): 124. , Richard L. Watson, "Woodrow Wilson and His Interpreters, 1947-1957," The
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 44, no. 2 (September 1957): 217-219. , Walworth, Woodrow Wilson,
288.
18

N. Gordon Levin argues that Wilson’s domestic and foreign policies were driven primarily by
his desire to attain a “peaceful liberal capitalist world order under international law, safe both from
traditional imperialism and revolutionary socialism.” See N. Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World
Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). Quote
from p. vii. The importance of the war to Wilson’s decision-making as early as 1915 is also emphasized by
Richard E. Abrams, "Woodrow Wilson and the Southern Congressmen, 1913-1916," The Journal of
Southern History 22, no. 4 (November 1956): 437. and, more recently, Alan Dawley, Changing the World:
American Progressives in War and Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 121-123.
19

For the most comprehensive works on the anti-suffragists, see Anne M. Benjamin, A History of
the Anti-Suffrage Movement in the United States from 1895-1920: Women Against Equality (Lewiston,
U.K.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), Thomas J. Jablonsky, The Home, Heaven, and Mother Party:
Female Anti-Suffragists in the United States, 1868-1920 (Brooklyn: Carlson Publishing, 1994), Jane
Jerome Camhi, Women Against Women: American Anti-Suffragism, 1880-1920 (Brooklyn: Carlson
Publishing, 1994) and Susan E. Marshall, Splintered Sisterhood: Gender and Class in the Campaign
Against Women Suffrage (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1997). For a community study that
examines an earlier period of anti-suffrage activity, see Joyce C. Follet, "Gender and Community: Kenosha,
Wisconsin, 1835-1913" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1991),. Benjamin’s work is almost
entirely narrative with minimal analysis, but she does carefully chronicle Wilson’s slide toward the prosuffrage camp and suggests that this caused great frustration among the anti-suffragists. The three latter
works offer greater analysis of the anti-suffrage movement’s ideology, membership, strategy and tactics,
alliances, and impact. However, none offer a focused examination of the movement’s relationship to

10

One notable exception to the Wilson scholarship described above is a piece by
Victoria Bissell Brown published in 2008 in a superb collection of essays entitled
Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson. Noting the same historiographical voids, Brown urges
Wilson scholars in particular to take woman suffrage more seriously. She calls for
recognition of the fact that the president’s evolving stance on this issue tells us a great
deal about, “his leadership style, his negotiation of political principle and political
practicality, his management of the South and race, and his identification with the social
justice agenda of the era’s progressives – not to mention his assumptions about the
female half of the human race and his relationships with the leaders of the divided
woman suffrage movement.” 20 Brown’s brief but powerful essay is a call for a more
integrated narrative of Wilson and woman suffrage – a call that the remainder of my
work attempts to answer.
This study, then, is an attempt to at least partially fill the suffrage movement void
in the existing Wilson scholarship while also providing a broader picture of Wilson’s
political conversion to the body of suffrage history. It is designed to build on the
foundation described above by incorporating both the suffrage and Wilson scholarship of
Wilson or his response to the anti-suffragists’ entreaties. As stated previously, the existing Wilson
scholarship largely ignores the anti-suffragists.
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evolution as a party leader, chief executive, and social justice progressive.” Quote from p. 130. Brown’s
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embraced the fact of white female suffrage and moved on to treat it like every other political fact;
something to be leveraged, controlled, and exploited.” Quote from p. 154.
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the last three decades. I argue that suffrage became an issue of tremendous political
value during Wilson’s second term. Not out of a sense of justice or any wholesale
feminist conversion, but out of knowledge of political reality, Wilson came to support the
federal amendment. The degree to which he grew to personally regard women as
deserving members of the franchise is difficult to discern. 21 Regardless of the extent of
his private conversion, though, his public support of the principle of suffrage was key in
several crucial ways: 1) He lent assistance in various state referenda, thereby increasing
the number of Congressmen from suffrage states and improving the chances of successful
passage for the federal amendment; 2) He played a role in creating a separate House
committee on woman suffrage that removed a large legislative hurdle for the suffragists;
and 3) He secured the votes of several legislators through personal appeals, including the
one crucial vote needed to push the federal amendment through the Senate in June 1919.
There were limits to Wilson’s capacity to influence events within his own party
and in Congress as a whole. Included in this study is a thorough examination of his
inability to secure the needed two votes in the Senate during the October 1918 and
February 1919 Senate debates. I explain the manner in which the federal suffrage
amendment created enemies among Southern Democrats, the liquor industry, and the
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textile industry. These enemies had an impact on the president. He was least willing to
push those members of his own party whom he knew faced constituents panicked about
threats to white supremacy. Wilson was also aware that some Congressmen could not
vote in favor of suffrage without losing the support of industry leaders back home who
feared that women voters would do just as many suffragists promised – end child labor,
limit working hours, and usher in national prohibition. To see suffrage as one of many
competing priorities on Wilson’s agenda to maintain party unity and retain Democratic
control of the White House and Congress is to place it in a new light.
Alongside this exploration of the ability of the president to persuade Congress, I
assess the impact of the various factions that pushed and pulled at Wilson over the
suffrage issue. While crediting the NWP with revitalizing the campaign for the federal
amendment, I develop the argument that ultimately the NAWSA strategy was infinitely
more successful at gaining the president’s support than that of the NWP. In taking a
more critical stand against the NWP than even historians of the traditional interpretation
school, I explain why the policy of “holding the party in power” was ineffective in both
the 1914 and 1916 elections. A close examination of Wilson’s correspondence reveals
that his most-trusted advisors told him not to worry about women in the West becoming
single-issue voters and abandoning the Democrats. The election results indicate that
Wilson’s advisors were right.
Furthermore, the militant tactics employed by the NWP beginning in 1917 hurt the
cause of suffrage more than they furthered it. By appearing to be disloyal during
wartime, the militant pickets damaged the image of the suffrage movement just as the
president was beginning to become more supportive of the cause. The argument made by
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the NWP leaders was that the publicity they were generating would force the president to
act. However, the overwhelming majority of the correspondence from NWP members all
over the country back to the NWP headquarters indicates that publicity, if it existed at all,
was mostly negative in local papers. A tiny minority of Americans protested the
violation of the pickets’ civil rights. A vast majority, many of whom were ardent
suffrage supporters, believed that attacking a president who was trying to conduct a war
was reprehensible.
The NAWSA strategy, on the other hand, made the president an ally to the cause.
Catt’s decision to remain nonpartisan and to support the war strengthened Wilson’s hand
as he prevailed upon members of Congress and the general public to reward women’s
war service and aid his goal of “making the world safe for democracy” by granting full
democratic rights in the United States. NAWSA’s disavowal of the NWP and active
campaign to distinguish itself from its more militant and partisan sisters succeeded in
bringing the president and his cabinet more closely in line with the NAWSA leadership.
Catt, in fact, fostered a personal and political relationship with Wilson that was vital to
gaining his support for the federal amendment. The failure of NAWSA’s leaders to
protest the violation of their fellow suffragists’ civil rights certainly needs to be
recognized and condemned. Ultimately, though, NAWSA’s decision to distance itself
from the NWP and to continue to work on winning state suffrage referenda in addition to
pursuing the federal amendment paid big dividends with the president, members of
Congress, and the general public.
This argument is a clear refutation of the revisionist interpretation. It may be
disappointing to those who long for a more heroic narrative to accept the fact that the
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NAWSA strategy was more effective than the NWP’s confrontational militance. But it is
more important that we understand what actually happened than to bend the historical
reality to fulfill a vision of what some would like the truth to be. With the nation at war
and “100 percent Americanism” being the watchword, the pickets were viewed by most
people as a detriment to their cause. Further, some opponents of suffrage in the Senate
used the actions of the NWP as an excuse to continue to oppose the federal amendment.
To deny these facts – as distasteful as they may be – is to do an injustice to the historical
record.
In order to contextualize the final phase of the suffrage campaign during Wilson’s
second term, the second chapter reviews key events leading up to and including Wilson’s
first term in the White House. This review includes an examination of the evolution of
Wilson’s stance on women in politics from his earliest days as a young professor at the
all-female Bryn Mawr College to his years as America’s president. Wilson’s negative
attitude toward teaching female students about politics and his disgruntlement at having
to work under a woman, Bryn Mawr President M. Carey Thomas, help to show the
depths of his opposition to an increased public role for women during that stage of his
life. His attitude did not appear to change during his subsequent academic career, nor
during his time as governor of New Jersey.
Additionally, this chapter places the suffrage movement into the broad spectrum of
the women’s movement of the late-19th and early-20th century. It includes a thorough
discussion of the divisions that existed within the women’s movement and how those
divisions often spilled over into the suffrage movement. For example, during its 1896
national convention, NAWSA struggled mightily with developing an organizational
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stance on Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s highly controversial The Woman’s Bible, eventually
voting to disavow any responsibility for or association with the work. While a minority
within NAWSA welcomed Stanton’s critique of organized religion’s role in subjugating
women, a majority of suffragists feared alienating support for their cause by embracing
Stanton’s radicalism. 22 This type of controversy repeated itself over and over as
suffragists attempted to deal with socialism, pacifism, nativism, prohibition, marriage
reform, and perhaps most importantly, sectionalism. A desire to foster sectional
reconciliation and to respect “states’ rights” is largely what explains NAWSA’s
important decision in 1893 to focus on state referenda rather than a federal amendment.
Therefore, along with its detailing of the ethnocentrism and social class biases of many
suffragists, this chapter includes a discussion of the racism of white suffragists and the
manner in which they, more often than not, sacrificed the principle of universal suffrage
for the expedient attainment of white woman suffrage.
The third chapter recounts the gradual growth in the number of suffrage states.
Regional differences figure prominently. By the end of 1914, almost every western state
and territory had enfranchised women, but suffragists in the East and South were yet to
win a single victory. This chapter explains the regional nature of both support and
opposition to suffrage. One of the results of the regional opposition to a federal suffrage
amendment was the introduction of the confusing and controversial Shafroth-Palmer
Amendment in March 1914. 23 Simultaneously supporting the original federal suffrage
22
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amendment and the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment up until December 1915 led NAWSA
into confusion and disarray that was not resolved until Catt assumed the presidency in
December 1915. This coincided with the emergence of a militant insurgency within
NAWSA, led by Alice Paul. Paul and her co-chair of NAWSA’s Congressional
Committee, Lucy Burns, represented a younger generation of suffragists, frustrated with
the conservatism of the National and intent on making passage of the federal amendment
the organization’s singular focus. Disagreements between traditional NAWSA leaders
and Paul’s insurgents culminated with the definitive split between NAWSA and the NWP
in late 1914. An exploration of this divide and its impact on the 1914 mid-term elections
makes up the final section of the second chapter.
Wilson’s conversion from a states’ rights supporter to an advocate of the federal
amendment occurred between the Democratic National Convention in June 1916 and the
vote on the amendment in the House in January 1918. The significant events that took
place in between serve as the basis of the analysis in chapters three, four, and five.
Chapter three charts Wilson’s actions with regard to woman suffrage in advance of his
1916 re-election campaign. Additionally, it analyzes the diverse strategies employed by
NAWSA and the NWP as they followed divergent paths toward attaining the federal
suffrage amendment. Chapter four focuses specifically on the 1916 campaign and
election, to include a comparative analysis of Wilson’s changed stance on child labor and
8-hour day legislation. Heading into the election, Wilson recognized the need to make a
bow toward progressive voters whom he had offended during the previous two years.
His opposition to rural credits, refusal to grant the AFL immunity from the Sherman Act,
Secondly, it could gain the support of Senators who opposed suffrage on the principle of states’ rights
because it contained no provisions for federal enforcement and the voters of each individual state would
still make the decision on suffrage.

17

approval of racial segregation in federal service, and refusal to support the Palmer Child
Labor bill had alienated progressives of every stripe and from every section of the
country. Wilson’s need to win back some of those voters played a major role in his
decision to appear both pro-suffrage and pro-labor in the months leading up to the
November 1916 election. Yet, he also needed to stay true to the conservatives within his
own party, particularly those from the South. This chapter reveals the president treading
carefully through a re-election campaign. Catt astutely recognized Wilson’s dilemma.
She crafted a strategy designed to win presidential support that took his difficult political
position into full account. NAWSA, the NWP, and the Wilson Administration all
developed different interpretations of the 1916 election results. A discussion of this postelection analysis – and its impact on the strategies adopted by each group for 1917 comprises the final portion of chapter four.
The aftermath of the 1916 election, to include the NWP’s decision to launch more
militant tactics and the NAWSA decision to distance itself from the NWP and work in
support of the war effort, serves as the focus of the fifth chapter. The president’s primary
focus during 1917 was U.S. entry into the war. Suffrage histories sometimes
miscalculate the relative importance of their subject. Wilson’s attitude toward suffrage
during 1917 will be placed into context with the larger issues he faced – issues that had
the potential to affect the entire world. To the extent that he did involve himself with
suffragists, he usually did so in concert with Catt’s vision for securing the federal
amendment and in spite of the hostile actions of the NWP. Wilson and Catt’s vision for
the proper suffrage strategy changed over the course of 1917 as events unfolded, but their
vision evolved together, through constant and careful correspondence. Chapter five
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illuminates the process by which Catt and Wilson developed a joint vision for a suffrage
victory.
The sixth chapter outlines the opponents of woman suffrage. It examines the basis of
opposition and the lobbying strategies of the cotton textile and liquor industry
representatives, with particular attention to their attempts to influence Wilson. Many
southern white supremacists opposed a federal suffrage amendment for fear that it would
re-open the question of voter eligibility in the South. In the two decades surrounding the
turn of the century, almost every southern state had succeeded in amending its state
constitution in order to disenfranchise black citizens. A federal woman suffrage
amendment, which would include enforcement provisions, threatened to overturn white
political supremacy in the South. Sadly, southern suffragists chose to defend their
movement from racist attacks by claiming that black women could be disenfranchised
just as easily as black men. Part of chapter six examines the nature of this debate in the
South. This section also explains the ideology, membership, strategy and tactics,
alliances, and impact of the anti-suffragists, with particular attention to how they
attempted to stop the president’s slide toward the suffrage camp and his response to their
entreaties. 24 Additionally, I chart the impact of the Catholic Church’s opposition to
suffrage and the methods employed by anti-suffragists to utilize prominent clergy
members as part of their campaign strategy.
From January 1918 until its final passage in the Senate in June 1919, Wilson actively
campaigned for the federal amendment. Chapter seven examines his specific actions and
the reaction of those he tried to influence. It explores the manner in which suffrage
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competed with other political priorities and played a critical role in the Republican
victories in the 1918 mid-term elections. Additionally, it explains why Wilson was
unable to obtain the two votes necessary to shepherd the amendment through the Senate
while Congress was still controlled by his party – a party whose Southern members
privileged maintenance of white supremacy above the pleas of their party’s leader.
The ratification process lasted from June 1919 to August 1920. It became, in many
ways, a race between the two political parties to see which one could claim they had
helped the cause the most, thereby winning the votes of women in the 1920 Presidential
and Congressional elections. Although Wilson was actively involved in trying to speed
ratification, his was but one voice among many as suffragists battled local interests and
prejudices in each individual state. Further, the fight for ratification largely coincided
with the period in which a stroke left the president severely impaired and largely absent
from active governing for more than six months. In that this study is principally
concerned with Wilson’s ability to influence Congress, the ratification process is only
briefly examined.
The concluding chapter reiterates the arguments made here – that Wilson did have
a significant role to play in the successful passage of the 19th Amendment, but that more
powerful currents like sectionalism, race, and economic interests sometimes limited the
extent of his influence. Ultimately, Wilson was won over to the cause of the federal
amendment by NAWSA because its approach mirrored his own conservative vision of
the appropriate method of reform: win a broad consensus, develop a legitimate rationale,
and make the issue politically valuable.
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A deeper understanding of the final stages of the woman suffrage movement
holds relevance for our understanding of both Progressive Era America and our present
times. Observing Wilson treading the fragile line between executive interference and
reasonable influence provides us with great insight to Progressive Era conceptions of
separation of powers and presidential power and leadership. Debates over woman
suffrage contributed to the larger late-19th and early-20th century debates over the
meaning of citizenship and the role of the state in an increasingly industrialized nation.
Enfranchising one-half of the population marked a significant moment in our nation’s
history. It is important that we fully and accurately understand the process by which that
momentous event came to pass. In our contemporary political environment, when
politicians accused of “flip-flopping” are routinely crucified by their political opponents,
understanding the ability of past political figures to change their stance on an issue seems
even more pressing. Furthermore, there are groups of Americans today still seeking full
citizenship and access to the fruits of liberty. For them, this study has the potential to
serve as a template for how a group of their predecessors learned to operate within the
political system and achieve victory for a noble cause.
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CHAPTER 2
WILSON’S FIRST TERM

Near the end of a long session of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee
on Woman Suffrage in December 1915, NAWSA President Carrie Chapman Catt
testified to the committee, “I have discovered that when a man believes in woman
suffrage it is a national question and when he does not believe in it he says it is a question
for the states.” 25 At the time of Catt’s testimony, President Woodrow Wilson represented
the non-believers. He supported woman suffrage only as an issue to be decided by the
voters of each state. On the same day that Catt testified to the House Committee,
President Wilson gave an interview to the New York Times in which he restated his
position on the issue. Pointing to the fact that he voted in favor of the state amendment in
his home state in New Jersey in October of that year, Wilson said he believed suffrage
was an issue to be decided by the voters of each state. He conceded, however, that he
would take the idea of a federal amendment into consideration. 26 This concession was a
significant step forward for a man who had expressed strong opposition to woman
suffrage in any form only a few years before.
This chapter outlines Wilson’s early evolution on the question of woman suffrage.
It explains how and why his position softened when he transitioned from a state governor
to a national political figure and charts the evasive tactics he employed during his first
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two years in office. Also included in this chapter is a report on the volatile state of the
suffrage movement as Wilson assumed the presidency.
As early as 1885, Wilson wrote to his soon-to-be wife, Ellen Axson, that he did
not approve of the notions floating around society that women should be liberated from
the bonds of family to lead independent lives or become involved in the public sphere.
Wilson believed that family was the bedrock of society and that increased political rights
for women would alter the precious balance within families. Ellen totally supported his
ideas about women’s place in the home and in society. 27 Having been raised in a
traditional, southern family in which gender roles were clearly defined and differentiated,
Wilson developed similarly traditional views on the ideal of womanhood. Upon his
mother’s death in 1888, he remembered her in a letter to his wife: “My mother, with her
sweet womanliness, her purity, her intelligence, prepared me for a wife . . . love of the
best womanhood came to me and entered my heart through her apron-strings.” 28
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After completing graduate work at John Hopkins University in 1885, Wilson
began his first teaching assignment at Bryn Mawr College, a recently founded women’s
college in Pennsylvania. The college president, M. Carey Thomas, was an ardent
supporter of women’s rights and increased educational opportunities for women. Ellen
was troubled that Wilson had to answer to a woman, and Wilson confided to a friend that
Thomas represented to him that which he most detested – “advanced women.” 29
Nonetheless, Wilson needed a job. His first choice for employment – Princeton – did not
have any open positions. Plus, his primary goal was to write, and he believed the Bryn
Mawr position would allow him time to work on his own scholarship. 30
Wilson’s years at Bryn Mawr were difficult for him and for those with whom he
worked precisely because of his view that higher education was largely wasted on the
minds of young women. As the head of the History Department, Wilson taught courses
on Ancient Greece and Rome as well as on European History and American politics. He
also gave informal talks on current affairs and constitutional development. The young
professor was extremely popular among the undergraduate students who attended his
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lectures, but the feelings were not mutual. 31 Wilson confided his sentiments about the
students to his diary, writing “Lecturing to young women of the present generation on the
history and principles of politics is about as appropriate and profitable as would be
lecturing to stone masons on the evolution of fashion in dress.” 32
Wilson was assigned a graduate fellow for each of his three years on the Bryn
Mawr faculty. Writing to a Wilson biographer in 1926, one of his graduate students
recalled that Wilson was ill-suited for teaching women because he assumed that their
minds were somehow different than men’s. She thought it was unfortunate for both
Wilson and his students that he never made an effort to find out whether his assumptions
were true. 33 Regardless, Wilson abruptly left Bryn Mawr in 1888 after a contract dispute
with the college. He accepted a position at Wesleyan University in Connecticut,
confiding to a friend, “I have long been hungry for a class of men.” 34
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His views on the inappropriateness of women’s interest in politics changed little
over the next two decades. He ran for governor of New Jersey in 1910 at the behest of
the state’s Democratic Party bosses, but quickly established his independence from those
same bosses once he attained the party’s nomination. In a direct challenge to the machine
politicians, he campaigned on a platform centered on progressive change to include
increased regulation of railroads and public utilities, a stringent corrupt practices act, and
direct nomination of candidates. New Jersey was a state that, according to Link, was
“ruled by an oligarchical alliance of corporations and politicians and completely
dominated by big business and bossism.” 35 But even New Jersey could not escape the
tidal wave of progressivism that swept across the nation in the early 20th century. The
temper of the state’s voters was clearly in line with the reform sentiments Wilson
expressed. He won the election by 50,000 votes in a state that had elected a Republican
by more than 80,000 votes just two years before. True to his progressive promises,
Wilson threw his weight behind a number of reform bills in his first year in office to
include direct nomination of candidates for office, clean elections, workmen’s
compensation, and public utility regulation. 36 He did not, however, support the fledgling
woman suffrage movement in his state.
As Governor-elect, Wilson offered no reply to a January 1911 letter from the New
Jersey Woman’s Suffrage Association. The association’s leaders complimented him on
the “fearless and courageous manner” in which he was handling the state’s problems.
They explained to Wilson that they did not ask for the vote in order to cure all “existing
35

Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House, 135.

36

For a detailed account of Wilson’s 1910 gubernatorial campaign and his first year in office, see
David Hirst, Woodrow Wilson, Reform Governor: A Documentary Narrative (Princeton, NJ: Van
Norstrand, 1965).

26

evils.” Rather, “We ask it simply in the name of right and justice.” 37 The new governor
did respond, however, to a letter from a Vermont newspaper editor who asked his
position on equal suffrage. Wilson wrote, “I must say very frankly that my personal
judgment is strongly against it. I believe that the social changes it would involve would
not justify the gains that would be accomplished by it.” 38 This was the last time Wilson
offered such a concrete statement of his personal opinion. With an eye on running for the
White House, his position began to soften as he faced a national audience.
Over the next year and a half, Wilson developed a two-pronged strategy for
dealing with the question of woman suffrage. First, he argued that – as a presidential
candidate - he did not need to address the issue because it was not a national question.
Rather, it was a question for the voters of each state to decide. Secondly, he altered his
personal opinion from complete opposition to undecided. This newly-refined stance
allowed him to simultaneously placate women voters in the West and to avoid offending
the staunch states’ rights southern Democrats who comprised his political base. As the
1912 election drew closer, he articulated this new position to the Democratic Governor of
Massachusetts who wrote to solicit Wilson’s opinion on woman suffrage. Since this
newly-refined stance would remain Wilson’s position for most of his first term in office,
his letter to Governor Foss is worth quoting at length:
I am very much obliged to you for your considerate and candid letter of
yesterday. I may say to you very frankly that I do not think that it would
be best to bring the woman suffrage question into the national campaign,
so far as we are concerned. It is not a national question but a state
question. So far as it is a state question, I am heartily in favor of its
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thorough discussion and shall never be jealous of its submission to a
popular vote. My own judgment in the matter is in an uncertain balance, I
mean my judgment as a voting citizen. 39
In one form or another, Wilson repeated this position to anyone who sought to know his
stance during the 1912 campaign. 40
Popular opinion was not with the suffragists in New Jersey or any other states east
of the Mississippi in 1912, but Wilson did spend time in western states where women had
been enfranchised via state constitutional amendments. According to Frank Stockbridge,
the director of publicity for Wilson’s 1912 presidential campaign, the future president
was horrified by the idea of women voters.

As Stockbridge reported in a 1924

reminiscence, Wilson “was definitely and irreconcilably opposed to woman suffrage;
woman’s place was in the home, and the type of woman who took an active part in the
suffrage agitation was totally abhorrent to him.” 41 However, Wilson could not escape the
question as he campaigned in the West. Stockbridge explained that Wilson decided to
adopt a states’ rights stance during the campaign in order to effectively “dodge the issue.”
The refined position that Wilson adopted as a presidential candidate reflected his
political acumen. The base of the Democratic Party was the South. In the two decades
preceding the 1912 campaign, southern Democrats had completed their campaign to
disenfranchise black voters via state constitutional amendments that effectively made the
39
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15th Amendment null and void. 42 The same Southern Democrats who led the charge for
black disenfranchisement were also the most outspoken opponents of a federal woman
suffrage amendment. For them, such an amendment posed a threat to the racial and
political hierarchy they had worked so hard to create. They opposed anything that might
involve federal regulation of who was or – more importantly – who was not allowed to
vote in the South. 43 Wilson’s states’ rights stance was designed to please his political
base. However, he recognized that the southern wing of the party alone could not propel
him to victory.
The second part of Wilson’s refined stance – claiming that he was personally
undecided on the issue – allowed him to reach out to pro-suffrage voters in the North and
the West. This became even more important when both the Bull Moose Progressive
Party under Theodore Roosevelt and the Socialist Party under Eugene Debs came out in
support of woman suffrage. 44 At an August 1912 meeting with the prominent journalist
Oswald Garrison Villard, Wilson confessed that he knew Roosevelt’s support for woman
suffrage would aid his opponent in the suffrage states. However, he expressed his belief
to Villard that Roosevelt had taken up this position merely to win votes – a move that
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Wilson was not willing to make. He explained, “You certainly cannot change now unless
you are converted, without putting yourself in Roosevelt’s class.” 45
In a theme that was to repeat itself in the 1916 campaign, Wilson’s advisors gave
him reason to believe that he did not need to pander on the suffrage issue in order to win
the support of women voters. His campaign manager, William McCombs, wrote to him
in August to report on a meeting with Mrs. J. Borden Harriman – a prominent New York
reformer and suffragist. According to McAdoo, Harriman had committed herself to
Wilson’s campaign, despite the Democratic candidate’s failure to endorse woman
suffrage. The campaign manager informed his boss, “I send you this [news] as an
indication that the ladies are falling in line for you as well.” 46 So, the candidate headed
into the 1912 election with the belief that he had placated his base in the South by
adopting a states’ rights stance. He was convinced, too, that by softening his personal
position on the issue, he had not alienated pro-suffrage women.
Wilson’s victory in 1912 was dominant in terms of the electoral vote. He won
435 electoral votes as compared with 88 votes for Roosevelt, and eight votes for the
incumbent Republican William Taft. The ascension of a Democratic president was
accompanied by the election of a Democratic House and Senate. The popular vote,
however, revealed that Wilson did not have the mandate that the electoral vote indicated.
Wilson received just over six million votes while Roosevelt garnered more than four
million, Taft secured nearly three and half million, and the Socialist candidate, Eugene V.
45
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Debs, captured another 900,000. All together, the other candidates received three million
more popular votes than Wilson. The president-elect recognized that the Democrats were
not the dominant party in the nation and that they were only guaranteed a two-year hold
on the House of Representatives. His first term, then, had to be focused on those issues
he considered key provisions of his “New Freedom” campaign platform – tariff and
currency reform. 47 Changes in the status of the woman suffrage campaign over the next
several years would also force the new President to alter his position for the 1916
election.
The two decades preceding Wilson’s first term had been extremely difficult for
the suffrage movement. Almost no progress had been made on securing a federal
amendment, and, despite numerous state campaigns, only nine states had granted women
the right to vote by the end of 1913. Under the guidance of Susan B. Anthony during the
early 1890s, NAWSA had focused its efforts on securing a constitutional amendment that
would grant suffrage at the national level. In 1893, however, the organization decided
instead to seek amendments of state constitutions. In effect, the movement for a federal
amendment was abandoned. 48
One of the chief reasons for this shift in focus was the issue of race in southern
states. As discussed above, between 1890 and 1910, all twelve southern states succeeded
in disenfranchising black male voters who had been granted suffrage through the 15th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution at the end of the Civil War. They completed this
task through an elaborate set of literacy and property qualifications and use of a poll tax.

47

Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House, 524-525.

48

Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United
States, 212-213.

31

When those tools also resulted in the exclusion of many poor, white voters, southern
politicians created flimsy loopholes about “good character” and “understanding” that
allowed whites to vote, but still excluded blacks. White supremacy was guaranteed in the
South so long as the states were allowed to establish electoral qualifications and conduct
elections. 49
A federal woman suffrage amendment threatened this system because it granted
Congress power to enforce the provisions of the amendment. To white southerners, the
enforcement clause of the amendment evoked negative memories of Reconstruction when
federal troops were stationed in the South in order to enforce the voting rights of black
men. The fact that black women could just as handily be disenfranchised as black men
did little to assuage their fears. The specter of federal intervention into voting practices
in the South made discussion of a federal amendment impossible for southern
politicians. 50 Using “states’ rights” as a thinly veiled disguise for preserving white
supremacy, they eschewed any association with suffrage sympathies. The only hope, or
so it seemed to NAWSA at the dawn of the twentieth century, was to work for state
referenda.
It is important to take a moment here to review the records of both NAWSA and
the NWP on the issue of black voting rights. The record is less than complimentary for
either organization. As numerous historians have pointed out, time and time again white
suffragists from both national organizations abandoned their black counterparts if a
coalition of the two groups threatened the chances for white women gaining the right to
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vote. 51 Often, suffrage leaders found themselves in the awkward position of promising
southern white men that enfranchising women would not threaten white political
supremacy because black women could be barred from the polls in the same manner that
black men had been disenfranchised.
On the extreme were women like Kate Gordon of Louisiana who was as much of a
white supremacist as any of her male counterparts. Gordon, an ardent states’ rights
suffragist, broke with NAWSA when Catt began to focus the organization on the federal
amendment. 52 During the ratification campaign, she went so far as to join forces with the
anti-suffragists and work to prevent ratification in Louisiana and Mississippi. 53
Fortunately, few southern suffragists followed Gordon into the ranks of the “anti’s.”
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Historian Suzanne Lebsock, in a case study of Virginia suffragists, argues that Gordon is
actually atypical of white southern suffragists. Lebsock asserts that white women who
became involved in the suffrage movement were not primarily motivated by a desire to
preserve the racial hierarchy in the South. She concedes that most southern suffragists
failed to disavow white supremacy, but goes on to demonstrate that they also did not
embrace that ideology. 54 Still, even those that remained within NAWSA and the NWP
took an accomodationist position on the issue of black voting rights in the South.
In addition to divisions over race, the unity of the suffrage movement was also
fractured by the nativist tendencies and social class biases of many of its leaders.
Historians have shown that suffrage leaders were drawn almost exclusively from the
ranks of the middle and upper classes of American society. 55 In a study focused on
NAWSA’s evolution from the late 19th century to the final suffrage victory in 1920, Sara
Hunter Graham explains how the organization transformed itself from a radical group to
one representing middle-class respectability. According to Graham, Catt led the charge
during the first decade of the 20th century to bring elite women into the organization:
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Suffrage leaders recognized the problem of diverse ideologies housed
under one shaky roof, and they endeavored to maintain unity at the
expense of principle. In a period of low membership totals and financial
woes, association leaders chose a path of moderation in an effort to boost
the organization’s numbers without an ideological split. Elite women had
the resources and prestige to rescue the movement from oblivion; if
principle was to be the cost of salvation, then many suffragists were
willing to pay the price. 56

While critical of many aspects of NAWSA’s transformation into an “eminently safe
program for middle-class club meetings,” Graham does point out that – in terms of
membership numbers – the strategy worked. NAWSA increased its membership from
12,000 in 1906 to 117,000 by 1910. 57
Not all women were willing to stand by and watch as NAWSA became an
organization dominated by white, native-born, middle-class clubwomen. Harriot Stanton
Blatch, daughter of suffrage pioneer Elizabeth Cady Stanton, was one who rejected and
resented Catt’s strategy. Blatch founded a number of parallel suffrage organizations in
New York whose goal it was to bridge the gap between working class and professional
women. The most notable of these organizations was the Equality League of SelfSupporting Women. Founded in 1907, the Equality League courted any woman who
earned her own living – whether that living was earned by an immigrant woman on the
factory floor or by a native-born, college-educated professional woman. 58 The Equality
League achieved many of its aims, but its impact was primarily limited to New York
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State. On the national scale, the movement by 1910 was largely dominated by relatively
conservative, elite women who argued for the vote both in terms of natural rights and in
terms of how woman suffrage would benefit society. This fact was to have important
implications for the eventual NAWSA / NWP split.
With NAWSA’s new focus on state campaigns beginning in 1893, women had
been granted full suffrage in four western states by 1896. However, between 1896 and
1910, NAWSA failed to win any new suffrage states. In that 14-year span, only six state
referenda were held. Between 1910 and 1913, six more states granted women full
suffrage, but the cumulative electoral votes of all nine suffrage states only totaled 74 out
of a possible 531. As a result of this slow rate of progress a rift had developed within
NAWSA over the appropriate strategy to secure woman suffrage. In 1912, two young
women, recently returned from working with the militant suffragists in England, asked
NAWSA President Dr. Anna Howard Shaw to appoint them to NAWSA’s Congressional
Committee. Alice Paul and Lucy Burns hoped to revive the defunct committee whose
purpose it was to press for a federal amendment. Rather than fighting the suffrage battle
state-by-state, Paul and Burns hoped to win one sweeping victory at the national level.
Alice Paul was born into a Quaker family in Moorestown, New Jersey in 1885.
She graduated from Swarthmore College in 1905, received an MA at the University of
Pennsylvania two years later, and a Ph.D. from the same in 1912. Between her MA and
Ph.D. work in America, Paul spent more than two years in England as a graduate student
in sociology and economics at the University of London. During her time in England,
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she became involved with the Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU) of London
and also met Lucy Burns, another American studying abroad. 59
Burns, the fourth of eight children born into an Irish-Catholic family in Brooklyn,
was a 1902 graduate of Vassar College. She briefly worked as a high school teacher
before beginning graduate work at Yale. In 1906, she moved to Germany to intensively
study foreign languages at the University of Berlin and, later, at the University of Bonn.
After three years in Germany, Burns transferred to Oxford University in England for
additional graduate work and became involved in the English militant suffrage
movement. 60
Both women participated in British suffrage activity, were arrested for their actions,
and served time in British jails. They became familiar with militant tactics such as
showing up to protest and heckle members of Parliament at different speaking
engagements, organizing suffrage parades, and participating in hunger strikes while in
jail. They also became familiar with the political strategy employed by the WSPU of
“holding the party in power responsible” for passing suffrage legislation. 61
Under the British parliamentary system, one party could be held responsible and
ousted from power for failure to pass specific legislation. Although the American system
of government differed, Paul and Burns came to believe that since the Democrats held the
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presidency and a majority in Congress, that party should push through a federal suffrage
amendment. If it failed to do so, it should have to face the consequences of being
campaigned against by the suffragists in states where women had secured the right to
vote.
Paul was appointed chair of NAWSA’s Congressional Committee when she was just
27 years old. She brought her experience from England, youthful energy, tremendous
organizational skills, and persuasive powers to the task of securing a federal amendment.
Prior to her arrival, the Congressional Committee was in a stagnant state. As a result of
the lack of emphasis from the NAWSA leadership, the federal amendment had never
been voted on in the House and had only been voted on once by the Senate in 1887. It
had not had a committee report since 1896 and had not been debated in Congress since
1887. 62 Paul also brought the immense talents, experience, and energy of Lucy Burns
who was appointed as her vice-chair. 63 These two women immediately infused the
campaign with a sense of purpose and direction never seen before. Their first major
accomplishment was planning, organizing, and executing a suffrage parade in
Washington, D.C. on the day before Wilson’s inauguration in March 1913.
Nearly 8,000 women from all over the country participated in the parade that moved
from the Capitol, up Pennsylvania Avenue, and ended at the Hall of the Daughters of the
62
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American Revolution. Toward the end of the parade route, rowdy members of the crowd
began to press forward and some physically attacked the marchers. Marchers had their
suffrage banners ripped from their hands. Several were knocked to the ground and
trampled by the crowd. The police failed to intervene in a timely manner, and a
detachment of soldiers from nearby Fort Meyers had to be dispatched to settle the
disturbance. Two days after the parade, the Senate passed two resolutions demanding an
investigation into the police department’s failure to safeguard the marchers. 64 Paul’s
suffrage parade, coupled with the intense lobbying of members of Congress that she
initiated, abruptly awakened politicians from both sides of the aisle to NAWSA’s desire
for a federal amendment.
Shortly after her appointment as chair of the Congressional Committee, Paul
formed a parallel organization called the Congressional Union (CU) to support the
activities of the Committee. The CU was primarily designed to aid the Committee with
fundraising, although by November it was publishing its own journal – The Suffragist –
and beginning to chart an independent course toward attaining the federal amendment.
Eventually, this parallel organization would bring Paul into conflict with some of
NAWSA’s older leaders. In early 1913, though, conflict did not appear inevitable. In
fact, the work that Paul’s Congressional Committee performed in 1913 seemed to be well
received by most NAWSA leaders and members.
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The editor of the NAWSA organ Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, Alice
Stone Blackwell, repeatedly praised the Committee’s work throughout 1913. In reporting
on the preparations for the March 1913 parade, Blackwell opined, “Too much cannot be
said of [Paul’s] spirit and ability.” 65 At year’s end, Blackwell featured Paul’s
organization on the journal’s front page under the headline, “Congressional Union Makes
Fine Showing.” The article went on to say that when the CU presented its report to
NAWSA’s annual convention, “the convention received the report with enthusiastic
applause, giving three cheers while the whole Convention rose to its feet to show its
appreciation.” 66 Based on Blackwell’s reporting, relations between the CU and NAWSA
appeared to be good. Tensions were brewing, though.
Accepted only as an auxiliary to NAWSA but under the direction of a NAWSA
officer (Paul), the CU took actions that seemingly violated fundamental tenets of the
National’s policy. These actions led to sharp dissension within NAWSA and eventually
to a split among the organization’s members. As Catt explained in an article written three
years after the split, “A break with the National occurred because [Paul and the CU]
refused to accede to certain established rules of the Association.” 67 She went on to list
the infractions which included using NAWSA funds for CU activities, conducting work
in individual states without coordinating with NAWSA state officers, and campaigning
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against Democratic candidates in western states. The conflict came to a head at the end
of the December 1913 NAWSA convention where the charges were debated at length.
Following the convention, NAWSA’s executive council demanded that Paul eliminate
any conflicts of interest by resigning her position as head of the Congressional Union.
When she refused, they requested her resignation as chair of the Congressional
Committee, which she provided.
Historians and historical actors alike disagree over some of the underlying causes of
the rift. Alice Paul biographer Christine Lunardini argues that the NAWSA leadership
generally accepted Paul’s melding of Congressional Committee and Congressional Union
funds. The real source of the conflict, she contends, was Catt’s jealousy of Paul’s status
as a rising star coupled with disagreement over tactics. The CU plan to “hold the party in
power responsible” – outlined by Lucy Burns during the December 1913 NAWSA
Convention – smacked of partisan politics and upset many of NAWSA’s old guard. 68
Historian Linda Ford takes Lunardini’s argument one step further. Rather than a fight
over money or membership, Ford asserts that the conflict was really about competing
versions of feminism: “The CU stood for a militancy, an aggressive unapologetically
egalitarian, feminist style, which NAWSA members could not countenance.” 69 Given,
the work that Catt and others had done over the preceding two decades to make the
suffrage movement acceptable to mainstream American society, Ford is undoubtedly
correct that NAWSA leaders worried that the CU’s militance would damage NAWSA’s
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carefully cultivated image. The correspondence among the suffrage leaders also supports
the idea that issues deeper than financial record-keeping were at the heart of the dispute.
Paul denied most of the charges Catt levied in her 1916 “The Winning Policy”
article. In an extensive set of correspondence through intermediaries, Catt and Paul
argued over minute details such as what type of stationary the CU used to raise funds and
whether or not CU officials cooperated or worked independently with NAWSA officials
in various states during 1913. 70 Their letters suggest that financial and administrative
concerns may have been a cover for deeper philosophical and generational issues. While
Catt’s 1916 article focuses on the lack of political wisdom in Paul’s “holding the party in
power responsible” plan, an interesting letter from Harriet Stanton Blatch suggests that
the generational issue may have been even more important than political strategy.
Like the dynamic duo leading the Congressional Union, Blatch was also a veteran of
the British suffrage campaign. She had assisted Paul and Burns with their preparation for
the 1913 suffrage parade in Washington, D.C. and generally supported their enthusiastic
work for the federal amendment. After the tumultuous 1913 NAWSA convention, Blatch
wrote to Burns, “I was distressed, but not amazed, to read the news in regard to the action
of the National Association, in reference to Miss Paul’s chairmanship . . . I say I was not
surprised because again and again I have seen vigorous young women come forward,
only to be rapped on the head by the so-called leaders of our movement.” 71 Clearly, the
rift between NAWSA and the CU was at least in part a turf war between suffrage
veterans and younger women with less patience for the long haul of state campaigns.
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Whatever the reasons for the split, nothing could heal the growing divide. In the
first few months of 1914, representatives of the Congressional Union met with NAWSA
leaders in an attempt to keep the groups from developing into rival organizations, but
disagreements over strategy prevented any such rapprochement. Blackwell ran an
editorial in the May 14th edition of the Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News pleading for
cooperation between the two organizations. 72 Her efforts were in vain. The
Congressional Union, in flagrant violation of NAWSA’s non-partisan policy, campaigned
against all Democratic candidates in the western states during the midterm elections of
1914 and announced their plans to campaign against Wilson and the national Democratic
slate in the elections of 1916. After one final failed attempt at reconciliation in December
1915, the two organizations severed all ties. 73
Paul’s replacement as head of NAWSA’s Congressional Committee, Ruth Hanna
McCormick, further muddled the already cloudy suffrage picture by bringing about the
introduction of an additional suffrage-related amendment to the Constitution in March
1914. An experienced suffragist from Illinois, McCormick discerned that gaining
suffrage by the state initiative method was much more palatable to the majority of
Congressmen than a federal amendment. Working with Senator William Shafroth of
Colorado and Representative A. Mitchell Palmer of Pennsylvania, McCormick and her
committee tried to meet the tastes of the majority of Congressmen by developing a new
suffrage constitutional amendment. 74
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The Shafroth-Palmer Amendment required that if eight percent of voters in any state
signed an initiative petition requesting a referendum on woman suffrage, the state then
must submit the question of suffrage to the voters. This new variation offered relief from
two major problems facing suffragists. First, it held the potential to force a vote in states
that had so far managed to defeat campaigns for state referenda. Secondly, it could gain
the support of Senators who opposed suffrage on the principle of states’ rights because it
contained no provisions for federal enforcement and the voters of each individual state
would still make the decision on suffrage. 75
Opponents of the new amendment believed the measure was difficult to
understand and only prolonged an already difficult process. Even if the bill passed both
houses of Congress and was ratified by three-fourths of the states, a battle to win state
referenda would still have to be fought in each non-suffrage state. Shaw was flooded
with angry letters from NAWSA members all over the country after the new amendment
was introduced. She responded with a blanket letter to all NAWSA members that
indicated just how directionless NAWSA was in the final years of her presidency. She
wrote, “The National Association is not abandoning the old Constitutional amendment. It
worked for it all this winter until it was voted down by a majority, which showed there
was no hope whatever of passing it . . . While we are pushing the new amendment we are
also pushing the old amendment, and it is hoped that the new one will help the old one
and it was introduced for that purpose.” 76 She went on to blame the Congressional Union
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for any confusion over the matter, claiming that the CU was trying to gain support for
their organization by giving “the impression that we have forsaken the old amendment,
which is absolutely false.” 77
For the remainder of that year and well into the next, NAWSA simultaneously
supported the traditional federal amendment and the Shafroth-Palmer amendment. It was
not until the December 1915 NAWSA convention that the latter was officially
disavowed, although little work had been done on its behalf for the last half of that year.
The confusion within the National’s ranks only fueled the fire of the CU as they headed
west to campaign against Democrats in the 1914 mid-term elections. As Burns explained
to Blatch, “It seems to me foolish to propose that we should undertake the tremendous
labor of getting the Constitution of the United States amended and, at the end of that
work, have gained nothing except the right to submit the question to the electors, which,
by a little intelligent and concentrated labor, we can do already. The procedure combines
all the difficulties of state and national work in one.” 78
The CU campaigned against all Democrats, suffrage supporters or not, in Western
states during 1914. They urged enfranchised women to withdraw their support from the
Democratic Party until it complied with their demands to enfranchise all women through
support of a federal amendment. Their frustration with the Democrats was
understandable. As previously described, Wilson’s two major goals during his first term
were reducing tariffs and reforming the banking system. The legislative sessions of 1913
were devoted to these causes and, using all the tools of persuasion available to his office,
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Wilson was able to pull together the support of western and southern Democrats to pass
both measures. 79 Woman suffrage was an issue that he continuously avoided in 1913 by
claiming that his administration was too busy with New Freedom legislation to give the
matter serious consideration.
Wilson could not completely ignore the suffragists, though. Throughout 1913,
Paul was relentless in bringing deputations of women to ask for his support of the federal
amendment. Just days after his inauguration, Paul led a group of five women to meet
with the new President. In a blatant lie, he told the women that he had never given the
issue of woman suffrage much thought. He went on to say that there were too many
other pressing issues for him to concern himself with woman suffrage, but asked that the
suffragists not think that he was against them just because he could not presently take up
their cause. 80 Undaunted, Paul arranged for two more deputations to visit Wilson in
March 1913. She also applied pressure on the Democrat-controlled Congress. Through
the aggressive efforts of NAWSA’s Congressional Committee under Paul’s leadership,
the amendment was reported out of the committee in the Senate in June 1913 for the first
time since 1896, although Senate Democrats blocked an actual vote on the measure. It
was reported with a favorable majority again in 1914 and was headed to a vote in the full
Senate when the Democrats caucused in February. The Senate Democrats published their
position that suffrage was an issue to be decided by individual states – a position that
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Wilson supported. 81 When the vote came in the Senate on March 19, the amendment was
defeated by a count of 35 in favor and 34 opposed (11 votes short of the required twothirds). Democrats cast the majority of negative votes. 82
Paul continued to pressure Wilson. She arranged for a delegation of women from
Wilson’s home state of New Jersey to meet with the President in November to ask him to
announce his support for the federal amendment during his annual message to Congress
in December. 83 Wilson’s refusal to even mention suffrage in his address was enough to
draw the ire of the usually patient NAWSA leaders. NAWSA President Anna Howard
Shaw demanded a meeting with the President in the days following his address. In a
rather confrontational meeting by NAWSA standards, Shaw rejected Wilson’s assertion
that he could not stand up for suffrage because he was the spokesman of a party that was
not in favor of the measure. She pointed out to the President that he should be the
spokesman for his country, rather than for his party. She also highlighted the number of
states controlled by Democratic legislatures in which suffrage measures had passed. 84
The President’s evasive tactics continued into the following year. He told a
deputation of working women in February 1914 that – although his personal opinion was
still undecided – he was bound by the will of his party. When leaders of the General
Federation of Women’s Clubs presented him with their organization’s resolution in favor
81

Morgan, Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America, 79-80.

82

The exact party breakdown is as follows: Republicans – 21 for and 12 against; Democrats – 14
for and 22 against. “Suffrage Loses in Senate Vote,” New York Times, March 20, 1914, 1.
83

“Wilson Heartens Jersey Women,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, November 22, 1913.

84

“Wilson Not Free to Advise Suffrage,” New York Times, December 9, 1913, 9. See also “Takes
President on Own Ground,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, December 20, 1913. In the same issue,
Blackwell’s editorial expressed exasperation with Wilson’s ambivalence toward woman suffrage. “Wilson
Versus Wilson,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, December 20, 1913.

47

of woman suffrage in June 1914, he again refused to support a constitutional amendment
and instead encouraged the women to take their fight to the states. 85
Armed with ample evidence of Democratic obstruction and presidential inaction,
the CU attempted to raise the consciousness of women voters in the West during the 1914
mid-terms. They sent at least two organizers to each state in which women had won the
vote. In these states, the CU organizers educated women voters about the federal
amendment and the failures of the Democrats. They urged women voters to vote against
all Democrats, regardless of the candidate’s individual position on woman suffrage.
Central to their campaign was the belief that women would behave as single-issue voters.
As the election results showed, however, this was a faulty assumption. Democrats
maintained control of both the House and the Senate, although their majorities were
significantly reduced.
Despite CU claims to the contrary, this reduction was not related to suffrage
agitation. Most election analysts agreed that the chief cause of Democratic setbacks was
the decline of the Progressive Party and the return of many former members to the
Republican Party. Setbacks notwithstanding, White House spokesmen released
statements claiming victory for the Democratic Party because they had increased their
strength in the Midwest and Pacific Coast in a year during which they had enacted
unpopular tariff reform. 86
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So what was the net effect of the CU activity in the 1914 elections? There is no
evidence that CU agitators were, in fact, able to swing a significant number of women
voters against the Democrats. They did succeed in angering western Democratic
candidates – particularly those who were pro-suffrage and still found suffragists
campaigning against them. 87 To their credit, though, this anger may have had some
positive outcomes. Their small presence, if somewhat ineffective in swinging votes in
1914, forced the Democrats to consider what angry suffragists might be able to do to the
party in 1916, given two more years to organize. 88 Nonetheless, there were drawbacks to
the CU strategy. Their agitation may have contributed to the defeat of several key state
suffrage campaigns in 1914.
Seven states voted on woman suffrage in 1914, but only the Montana and Nevada
campaigns were successful. At the same time and in the same places that NAWSA State
Associations urged voters from all parties to support the suffrage referendum, CU
members actively worked against all Democrats and labeled that party an enemy to
suffrage. NAWSA members openly blamed the CU for their defeat in North Dakota and
Nebraska. 89 The president of the Ohio State Woman Suffrage Association, who
generally supported the work of the CU, wrote to Paul three times during the first week
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of October to indicate the amount of damage being done in her state by CU activity in the
West. She provided Paul with direct quotes from the Mayor and Postmaster of Cleveland
who had withdrawn their support for suffrage in Ohio because of the CU and warned, “I
honestly and truly think that your campaign against the Democratic party in the
enfranchised states is hurting the Ohio campaign.” 90 Ohio was one of the five state
referenda to fail during 1914.
Furthermore, the CU campaigns infuriated NAWSA leaders and a significant
portion of the rank and file. One of the underlying premises of the CU was that that the
NAWSA political approach was too passive. This premise offended NAWSA leaders
who continually argued that Paul and her followers failed to take into account the wider
view that NAWSA took on the 1914 elections. As explained above, the National’s state
organizations were fighting to win referenda in seven different states in 1914. NAWSA
had engaged in careful planning for these campaigns for years in some cases.
Additionally, NAWSA was not as politically passive on a national scale as CU leaders
charged. Just two months before the 1914 election, Shaw published NAWSA’s “Black
List.” It contained the names of nine senators and nine congressmen – Republicans and
Democrats - picked by the organization for defeat as a result of their unwavering
opposition to the federal amendment. In a statement accompanying the release of the list,
NAWSA appealed to all suffragists to “concentrate their influence to defeat for reelection the men named.” 91
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Worried about the negative impact of the CU, Shaw sent a letter to pro-suffrage
Senator Charles Thomas of Colorado disowning Paul and the CU. Per Shaw’s request,
Thomas read the letter on the floor of the Senate. It stated, in part:
As I wrote to you some time since, the National Congressional Union,
under the direction of Miss Paul, does not in any way represent the
National Suffrage Association. There is no relation whatever between the
two groups . . . While I fully recognize that individual women and local
societies have an equal right with all others to be heard, I also feel it my
duty to state that none of these represent the organized suffragists of the
country. So that whenever any individual or any representative of the
Congressional Union in Washington makes any appeal to the Senate, or to
yourself as chairman of the Senate committee, it is not to be understood as
an appeal from the organized suffragists of the nation. Nor when any
threat is made of an attack upon the Democratic party is it to be considered
as coming from the organized suffragists of the nation.” 92
From her perch as NAWSA’s lead editorialist, Blackwell tried to remain open to the CU
strategy in her coverage of the 1914 elections, although she was convinced that
NAWSA’s continued focus on state campaigns was essential to eventually securing a
federal amendment. After the 1914 election, she completely rejected the policy of
holding the party in power responsible. 93 Likewise, the general NAWSA membership
demonstrated its displeasure with the CU strategy by adopting the following resolution at
NAWSA’s December 1914 convention: “Be it resolved that [NAWSA] be absolutely
opposed to holding any political party responsible for the opinions and acts of its
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individual members, or holding any individual responsible for the majority action of his
party on suffrage.” 94
An impartial observer of the woman suffrage movement from 1914-1915 would
find the situation greatly confusing. Two different groups that seemed to be working in
exact opposite directions represented the movement. The larger of the two groups,
NAWSA, was simultaneously supporting the traditional federal suffrage amendment and
the cumbersome Shafroth-Palmer bill, while still trying to win victories in a number of
state referenda campaigns. Meanwhile, the CU was urging the abandonment of state
campaigns, pouring all its energies into the traditional federal amendment, and
campaigning against all western Democrats (even those who supported suffrage) in order
to “hold the party in power responsible.” Political leaders from both parties could, and
did, play the groups off one another and used the confusion of the movement as an
excuse to not take a definitive stand on the issue. This was clearly the case with the
President.
Wilson could safely hide behind the party position on a federal amendment for
most of 1913 and 1914, but events of the following year made it clear that his position
would have to be slightly amended if he hoped to win the support of progressives in the
1916 election. As the next chapter details, the fall and winter of 1915 were critical
months for both Wilson and the suffrage movement. The President found himself in need
of progressive support heading into the 1916 election and the suffrage movement, still
divided over the NAWSA/CU rift and the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment, faced referenda
campaigns in four key states – New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts.
Between October and December, the movement experienced a roller-coaster effect.
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Suffragists lost all four of the state campaigns, but won more votes than many people
expected in several of the states. Furthermore, they secured crucial support when Wilson
voted in favor of the amendment as a private citizen of the state of New Jersey. Most
importantly, NAWSA’s path took a decisive turn when it met in convention in December
1915, dropped the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment, and elected Carrie Chapman Catt as the
new president.
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CHAPTER 3
PRELUDE TO THE 1916 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

In his 1913 inaugural address, President Wilson raised the hopes and expectations
of progressive reformers across the nation. 95 While heralding America’s industrial
achievements, he also acknowledged the associated human costs of massive and rapid
industrialization. In words that resonated with proponents of reform, he advocated
perfecting “the means by which government may be put at the service of humanity, in
safeguarding the health of the nation.” 96 Yet little in the first two and a half years of
Wilson’s presidency lived up to this soaring rhetoric. Despite legislative victories with
tariff and banking reform, the president’s opposition to rural credits, refusal to grant the
American Federation of Labor immunity from the Sherman Act, approval of racial
segregation in federal service, and refusal to support the Palmer Child Labor bill had
disappointed and alienated progressives of every stripe and from every section of the
country. 97
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These next two chapters serve as an in-depth examination of Wilson’s 1916 reelection strategy – a strategy based largely on winning back progressive voters and that,
ultimately, led to his victory over the Republican challenger, Charles Evan Hughes. This
first chapter charts Wilson’s actions with regard to woman suffrage in advance of his
1916 re-election campaign. Additionally, it analyzes the diverse strategies employed by
NAWSA and the NWP as they followed differing paths toward attaining the federal
suffrage amendment. In turn, chapter four places Wilson’s actions with regards to woman
suffrage into the broader context of the 1916 campaign.
One of the first actions that Wilson took to win back progressive voters was to
vote in favor of the suffrage referendum in his home state of New Jersey in October
1915. The vote in New Jersey became a battleground for pro and anti-suffragists as each
side hoped to use the president’s decision to its advantage in the public relations war.
The White House was flooded with letters from both sides of the debate imploring him to
support the cause in their favor. A letter from Caroline Cruvey just a few weeks before
the vote typifies the more than 100 letters Wilson received from anti-suffragists in New
Jersey alone, not to mention the correspondence from interested parties throughout the
country. Cruvey wrote:
As one of the majority, (as I believe), of women opposed to Female
Suffrage, I beg you will not cast your vote with its great influence, on the
affirmative side of “votes for women”. I can see no adequate gain coming
from the admission of women into the political arena compensating for the
added expense which will follow, and for the loss of interest in home and
family life which will surely result . . . There are no “rights” to be
advanced by our votes, for the laws are in our favor as regards our persons
and property. The emotional nature of our sex sadly unfits us for
participation in politics and its hot-bed of passions. Won’t you, by your
vote, leave us a little longer in the quiet of our homes where most of us
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love to be, with time to rear our children well, and care for our husbands
and grown sons with undivided interest? 98
Despite this compelling appeal and hundreds like it, Wilson announced his decision to
vote in favor of the amendment on October 6, 1915.
In a statement issued to the press, he explained the rationale behind his decision.
The statement demonstrated the tentative nature of his support for women’s voting rights.
He insisted that he was voting as a private citizen of New Jersey and not as the leader of
the Democratic Party. Furthermore, he reiterated his opposition to a federal suffrage
amendment saying, “I believe that [suffrage] should be settled by the States and not by
the National Government and that in no circumstances should it be made a party
question, and my view has grown stronger at every turn of the agitation.” 99
The motivation behind Wilson’s affirmative vote in New Jersey has been an issue
of debate among historians. Link contends that events in Wilson’s personal life
contributed to his decision. When Wilson’s first wife died in August 1914, he was nearly
overcome with grief. 100 Seven months later, however, he met Edith Bolling Galt who
was to become his second wife. Link asserts that women voters in the Western states
were upset about Wilson’s quick courtship with Galt so soon after his wife’s death and
that Wilson’s affirmative vote in New Jersey was an attempt to pacify those indignant
women voters who would play a significant role in the 1916 election. 101
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Link’s analysis of the significance of Wilson’s impending marriage on his
decision to vote for suffrage in New Jersey is overstated. 102 The memoirs of Wilson’s
Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, reveal that many senior Democratic leaders
were indeed worried about offending women voters in the West if the President married
Galt before the 1916 election. Available evidence, though, indicates that the President
did not share their concerns. Daniels was asked by a number of Democrats to approach
the President and warn him of the political liabilities of a hasty remarriage. His negative
response to the request is worth quoting in full:
Having been called [to the post of Secretary of the Navy] by President Wilson I did
not feel inclined to exchange it for the difficult and, perhaps, dangerous high and
exalted position of Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of
Cupid on a mission in which neither my heart nor my head was enlisted and in the
performance of which my official head might suffer decapitation . . . Wilson was not
warned. They were married before Christmas and two things followed: (1) Wilson
was reelected, proving that political prognosticators are not always right; and (2)
they lived happily together and Mrs. Wilson’s charm and sound wisdom made her
greatly beloved and admired. 103
While many may take issue with Daniels’ characterization of Galt as charming and wise,
his account of this episode erodes support for Link’s theory that Wilson’s advisors were
willing to broach the topic of the political ramifications of remarriage with their boss.
Daniels’ contention that women voters were not put off by the president’s remarriage is
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well supported by both the election results (Wilson swept the West in 1916) and Galt’s
memoirs of the same time period.
Galt recalled tremendous support from people all over the country after Wilson
announced their marriage plans. The couple immediately began to receive congratulatory
telegrams from friends and strangers. They received a standing ovation when they were
announced to the crowd at a Red Sox-Phillies baseball game the day after their
engagement announcement and another ovation the following month when they attended
the annual Army-Navy football game. Galt further recalled that she and the President
received a large nugget of gold from the people of California – a state that had granted
women full suffrage in 1911- as an engagement gift. 104 Daniels’ and Galt’s testimony
indicate that the president’s decision to vote for suffrage in New Jersey was not likely
connected to fear of his remarriage offending women voters in the Western states.
Additional contrary evidence from contemporary sources comes from Alice Stone
Blackwell. In the pages of the Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, Blackwell asserted
that “the President’s conversion was not due to the influence of [his engagement to] Mrs.
Galt.” Blackwell cited an interview between Wilson and Nevada suffragist Anne Martin
in December 1914, during which the president congratulated Martin on the success of the
Nevada suffrage referendum. According to Martin, Wilson implied that he favored
woman suffrage – so long as it was attained by the state method. Blackwell pointed out
that this conversation took place almost ten months before his engagement to Galt. 105
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Wilson had been hinting to the suffragists that he would support their cause in
New Jersey for nearly a year before the actual referendum. In fact, he and his personal
secretary, Joseph Tumulty, strung suffrage leaders along throughout 1915. NAWSA
President Anna Howard Shaw met with the President in January 1915 – shortly after the
vote on the federal amendment in the House of Representatives. Shaw reported that,
“The President gave no expression of opinion to the women, but the delegation came
away with the distinct belief that he would very shortly come out with a favorable
statement.” 106 Her prediction of an early commitment from Wilson was misplaced. In
May, Tumulty told two suffrage leaders from Pennsylvania that the President would
announce his position on the New Jersey referendum in time for it to have its effect in the
elections in the four states where suffrage was to be voted on in the fall. 107 Suffragists
were still patiently waiting in July when Tumulty released another statement regarding
the President’s position. This time, Wilson’s secretary told suffragists to expect a public
announcement by the President “within the next few weeks.” 108 In fact, Wilson made no
such announcement until October 6th – a mere 13 days before the New Jersey vote and
only a month before the elections in Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts.
It is not entirely clear why Wilson chose to wait until the last minute to announce
his support for suffrage in New Jersey. However, the evidence suggests that he chose to
use most of 1915 to test the waters of public opinion and reaction within his own party.
The January 1915 House vote on the federal amendment demonstrated that Democrats
106
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opposed suffrage – at least in the form of a federal amendment – by a margin of two to
one. 109 Furthermore, polls from New Jersey indicated that – claims of the suffragists
notwithstanding - the measure did not have widespread support in the state and would
probably fail. So there was some political risk involved for the president as he
contemplated what action to take in his home state.
Ultimately, Wilson’s affirmative vote on the New Jersey referendum reflected a
mix of his shifting personal position and political expedience. 110 The potentially negative
impact of his engagement announcement was a minor concern, at best, compared to his
need to attract progressive voters. His vote was a move aimed to please suffragists in the
East and women voters in the West, as well as progressive elements of the electorate
from across the country that had been alienated by some of his actions in 1914 and 1915.
It had the additional advantage of not alienating southern Democrats because it in no way
committed Wilson to support the dreaded federal amendment. In fact, as his statement to
the press reveals, he went out of his way to make it clear that his vote in New Jersey only
reaffirmed his support of a states’ rights approach to voter qualifications.
Despite their long wait, suffragists were elated upon hearing the announcement
that the president would vote in favor of suffrage. From her post as the Chair of the
Empire State Suffrage Campaign in New York, Catt immediately sent a telegram to the
White House on the day of his announcement saying, “On behalf of a million women in
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New York State who have declared they want the ballot, please accept my gratitude for
your announcement that you will vote for the woman suffrage amendment in New
Jersey.” 111 Catt hoped that the president’s actions in New Jersey would positively
influence voters in New York – a hope that went unfulfilled in the 1915 suffrage
campaign in the Empire State.
The New Jersey referendum was defeated by a count of 184,400 to 133,200 – a
margin of almost 3 to 2. 112 Wilson’s vote did not push suffrage to victory in
Pennsylvania or Massachusetts, either. Still, it was symbolically important for the
movement. NAWSA never failed from that day forward to point out that the president
supported suffrage, at least in principle, because of his affirmative vote in New Jersey.
His endorsement aided them in their ongoing fight with anti-suffragists who – up to that
point – had claimed Wilson as an ally to their cause. 113
The Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News featured pictures and stories of
Wilson’s actions for three weeks in October 1915. In addition to trumpeting Wilson’s
support, the journal also listed all of the members of Wilson’s cabinet who announced
plans to support suffrage referenda in the upcoming elections. 114 Similarly, The Woman
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Voter, a journal published by the NAWSA-affiliated Woman Suffrage Party of New
York, attempted to use the president’s vote in New Jersey as an endorsement for the
upcoming referendum in New York. Woman Suffrage Party Chairman Mary Garrett Hay
wrote to the voters of her state, “If you do not judge our movement upon its merits, judge
it by its friends. The President of the United States and members of his Cabinet will vote
for suffrage in their respective campaign states.” 115
Not all suffrage journals celebrated the president’s actions, though. The CU –
totally focused on the federal amendment – saw little use for Wilson’s states’ rights
support for suffrage. By fall of the following year, it was using the president’s vote in
New Jersey as a weapon against him in his 1916 re-election campaign. The front page of
the CU journal, The Suffragist, declared:
Woodrow Wilson, a private citizen cast one vote for woman suffrage in
New Jersey where its defeat was certain. The Vote of Mr. Wilson of
Princeton did not bring woman suffrage one step nearer. New Jersey went
against suffrage. Mr. Wilson’s precinct went against suffrage. [He] has
used all his power to defeat national woman suffrage. In Congress, where
the chances for the success of woman suffrage were good he opposed it
with the whole power of his party machine. Mr. Wilson knows it is well
nigh impossible to amend more than twenty state constitutions. He knows
that the state-by-state method of obtaining suffrage is a virtual denial of
suffrage. Women voters – Do not send to the White House a man who
opposes political freedom for women. Vote against President Wilson and
the Democratic candidates for Congress. 116
Despite the negative CU reaction and the loss of all four suffrage referenda in 1915,
NAWSA leaders saw a number of silver linings.
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Taking a longer view than their counterparts in the CU, Catt and company found the
results in Pennsylvania encouraging. With the exception of Philadelphia, suffrage had
won a majority in all the large industrial areas. The margin of defeat was only seven
percent, with 80% of the opposition votes coming from Philadelphia. However, both
New Jersey and Pennsylvania had state constitutions that mandated a five-year waiting
period for resubmission of defeated amendments, so near-term hopes in both states were
diminished despite the close election returns. 117
Massachusetts, home of the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage,
only gained 35.5 percent of the total vote in favor of the amendment. New York, though,
showed the most promise for a future near-term victory. Despite the suffrage amendment
losing by nearly 200,000 votes, voters in many industrial areas had begun to support
suffrage, and the state’s suffrage leaders were confident that they could win the next time
around. New York required a two-year wait between amendment votes, but suffrage
leaders announced the start of their 1917 campaign on the night of their 1915 defeat. 118
NAWSA’s fortunes took another positive turn when the organization met in
convention in December 1915 and elected Catt as its new leader. Catt’s election as
President of NAWSA was actually the second time that she assumed that post. It marked
another milestone in her life, which had largely been devoted to increasing women’s
rights since her initial engagement with the suffrage movement in Iowa in 1885. Born in
Ripon, Wisconsin in 1859, Catt moved with her family to Charles City, Iowa in 1866.
She was one of seven women to enter Iowa State Agricultural College (now Iowa State
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University) in 1877. Following her graduation in 1880, she taught high school in Mason
City for three years before being promoted to the position of Superintendent of Schools in
1883. 119
Following her marriage to Leo Chapman in 1885, Catt resigned her position as
school superintendent and served as her husband’s co-editor of the Mason City
newspaper. Leo Chapman died from typhoid fever in 1886 just a few months after the
couple had moved from Iowa to San Francisco. At the age of 27, Catt was widowed,
unemployed, and living alone in a new city. She took up free-lance journalism for a few
years before returning to Iowa in 1887 and beginning work as a public lecturer. Shortly
after her return to her home state, she rejoined the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association,
becoming a paid lecturer in 1889.
In a move that surprised many of her suffrage comrades, Carrie married George
Catt in 1890. The couple had first met at Iowa State during their undergraduate years and
became reacquainted during Carrie’s time in San Francisco. George Catt was an engineer
who spent a great deal of his time at work sites in Washington state and California. To
the immense pleasure of the Iowa suffragists, Carrie’s marriage did not end her work for
their movement. She and her new husband made an agreement that he would work and
earn money to support them and that she would continue with her reform work, even if
that meant they would have to spend a great deal of time apart from one another. 120
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In the same year that she remarried, Catt first entered into the limelight of
NAWSA by giving a speech at the National Convention. She impressed the leaders of
the National, including Susan B. Anthony, who later hand-picked her to lead the
successful 1893 state suffrage campaign in Colorado, to serve as Chair of the
Organization Committee from 1895-1899, and to succeed her as NAWSA’s president in
1900. Catt subsequently served four one-year terms. Her tenure was marked positively
by the formation of the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA), but negatively
by repeated failure to secure any victories in state suffrage campaigns. Frustrated by the
lack of progress, increasingly interested in her work with the IWSA, and concerned about
George Catt’s failing health, Carrie Catt resigned the NAWSA presidency in 1904. 121
Following George’s death in 1905, Catt immersed herself in work with IWSA.
Her longtime lieutenant from their early NAWSA days, Mary (Mollie) Garret Hay, came
to live with her and join in international suffrage work. For the remainder of Hay’s life,
she and Catt lived and worked together. 122 From 1905-1913, the bulk of Catt’s energy
was devoted to work with IWSA. Following a major suffrage victory in Illinois in 1913,
however, she agreed to serve as chair of the Empire State Campaign Committee in New
York. As explained above, NAWSA leaders hoped to capitalize on the momentum of the
Illinois win by gaining victories in several Eastern states in 1915. For the next two years,
Catt worked tirelessly on the New York state suffrage campaign. Although unsuccessful
in winning the referendum, Catt’s popularity and prestige within NAWSA soared as a
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result of her leadership of the campaign. It was in the wake of the New York defeat that
she reluctantly agreed to serve again as NAWSA’s president. 123
Catt faced a daunting task as she accepted the reigns of NAWSA in December
1915. The organization was deeply divided over the decision to simultaneously pursue
the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment and the traditional federal suffrage amendment.
Despite the silver linings described above, suffragists’ spirits were dampened by their
failure to win any of the four state referenda in 1915. Furthermore, Catt’s predecessor,
Anna Howard Shaw, was an amazing orator, but a poor administrator. Dissent within the
organization ran high. 124 Finally, the CU insurgency presented a serious problem for
NAWSA as it attempted to maintain its nonpartisan status and to continue to pursue
action at both the state and federal level.
Catt knew that the organization needed a clear focus and direction that included
educating the public and key politicians alike about the differences between the National
and the CU. While still at her post as chair of the New York suffrage campaign she was
sensitive to the need for distance from the CU. She wrote to Jane Addams in January
1915 expressing her desire to steer clear of any organization that involved the CU
because she did not want her name or NAWSA linked with that group. Addams had
requested that she attend a conference in Washington, D.C. with several other women’s
groups to discuss the formation of a peace organization. Initially, Catt agreed to attend –
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only later discovering that the CU was hosting the conference. She immediately wrote to
Addams, reneging on her agreement to attend the conference.
She explained in the letter that she held no personal animosity toward the CU, but
its leaders continued to pursue an anti-Democratic campaign when the suffrage
amendment was pending in eleven states and depended for success on Democratic votes.
Catt told Addams, “As Chairman of the New York Campaign Committee, I must not
allow myself to be placed where I seem to sanction that policy.” 125 Even as a state level
representative of NAWSA, Catt recognized the potential damage her association with the
CU could have for the National. She carried that level of recognition with her into the
NAWSA front office.
The historical record indicates that her fears about public confusion were well
founded. Not even the president, a fairly astute and informed political player, was able to
match suffrage leaders’ names with the organizations they represented. In July 1916,
Catt and Mrs. Frank M. Roessing, chair of NAWSA’s Congressional Committee,
requested to meet with Wilson. The President’s personal secretary, Joseph Tumulty,
communicated the request to him via a memorandum. In a hand-written note at the
bottom of the memo, Wilson asked, “Are these ladies of the ‘Congressional Union’
variety?” 126 Tumulty replied with a note explaining the difference between the two
groups, pointing out that Roessing and Catt represented the more “conservative”
organization that did not approve of the anti-Democrat stance of the CU. He also
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informed the president that Catt was scheduled to address the Democratic State
Convention in West Virginia the following week, which helped to distinguish her from
the rival organization. 127
After reading Tumulty’s explanation, Wilson, satisfied that he was not meeting
with the enemy, wrote on the memorandum, “Okay Tuesday at 2 pm – office.” 128 It is
significant to note Wilson’s confusion in mid-1916. Clearly he was aware of the CU’s
agitation against his party and was reluctant to grant leaders of that organization an
audience. If his ability to distinguish between the two groups were not changed, he might
have continued to associate the federal amendment only with the CU. Over the next
several months, Catt initiated a public relations campaign that left no doubt in the
president’s mind that NAWSA, too, supported the federal amendment but would pursue it
in a manner that did not threaten him or the Democratic Party.
Paul and her comrades in the CU took a markedly different approach to the
President. In the first few months of 1916, the CU solidified its strategy for making
suffrage an issue in the fall election. In February, Blatch expressed optimism to Paul that
the threat of women voters abandoning the Democrats in the West was forcing the
Democratic leadership to be more responsive to the issue. She explained that she had
written to the heads of both political parties in all the Western states requesting a hearing
with them on behalf of the CU. To Paul she confided, “I think it is interesting that the
Democratic Committees are replying so much more readily. Evidently, the
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Congressional Union has filled them with some fear.” 129 Fueled by this sort of optimism,
Paul called a meeting of the CU National Advisory Council in early April to focus efforts
in the West and make the threat of women voters even more credible.
In a memo written at the meeting’s conclusion, the chair of the Advisory Council
summarized the proceedings. She explained that the council had decided to form a
National Woman’s Party (NWP). The basis of this new party would be to place suffrage
above allegiance to any other political party. Enfranchised women of the West would be
urged to join the NWP and use their voting power to press for immediate passage of the
federal amendment. The council also decided to hold a formal founding convention for
the new party in Chicago in June 1916 to coincide with both the Republican and
Progressive Party National Conventions. 130 Paul sent letters to CU leaders in each of the
Western states reiterating the new strategy and urging them to attend the convention in
Chicago. She used the letters to amplify her strategy, reasoning, “We hope that if the
political leaders see the women voters are forming an independent party they will regard
the suffrage question as a more serious one than they have considered it in the past.” 131
One of Paul’s lieutenants, Mary Beard, attempted to explain the CU strategy to
suffragists in New York by publishing an article in The Woman Voter. Her article
provides further insight into the political thinking of CU leaders. Beard derided state
suffrage campaigns and insisted that suffrage organizations (namely NAWSA) that tried
to engage in both state and federal work would always be ineffective. She wrote:
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Each successive failure to win in a campaign state increases the obstacles
in the way of a Federal amendment. State work does not, therefore,
inevitably promote a Federal amendment. Of course, in the future,
victorious states would help the Federal amendment, but Federal work in
that case always waits for state success to precede it and does not
accompany state work. An organization that believes that more states are
essential to the securing of a National amendment can work but halfheartedly for that amendment. 132
Beard went on to contrast the NAWSA approach of asking for the vote with the NWP’s
strategy of using the votes of women to demand full suffrage: “Disenfranchised women
do not have to argue, plead or cajole if enfranchised women will but vote under the
slogan: ‘SUFFRAGE FIRST!’” This concluding phrase became the NWP’s mantra in the
1916 campaign.
On June 7, Blatch gave the keynote speech at the Chicago convention. She
demanded that the enfranchised women of the nation take a stand against the Democrats
unless they passed the federal amendment:
I know that we have never had a greater instance of the control over
legislation by the Party in power than at the present time. I know that the
Party in power today, the dominant Party - my Party – controls the White
House, controls the Senate, and controls the House of Representatives; and
you know what that means. They control every committee in the House of
Representatives and in the Senate. They determine legislation. Now you
and I are voters in the Suffrage states, controlling ninety-one of the
electoral votes, controlling one-fourth of the United States Senate and onesixth of the House of Representatives. Are we going to sleep? Are we
going to sentimentalize? Are we going to run after this Party or that
Party? Or are we going to stand for the biggest principle that any group of
enfranchised people have ever been called upon to stand for? 133
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Blatch went on to claim that the Woman’s Party would deliver 500,000 votes against the
Democratic Party in the 1916 election unless it pledged its support to the federal
amendment.
In the days that followed, the Progressives and Republicans held their national
conventions. Suffrage was an issue of debate for both parties. In the end, the rapidly
shrinking and increasingly politically insignificant Progressive Party endorsed the federal
amendment. The Republicans took a more moderate stance, urging the extension of
suffrage but recognizing the right of each state to settle the question for itself. In his
acceptance of the Republican Presidential nomination in August, Charles Evan Hughes
went a step further, offering his personal endorsement of the federal suffrage amendment.
Nevertheless, in early June it appeared that the Progressives favored a federal amendment
while Republicans only supported a states’ rights version of suffrage. The attention of all
suffragists then turned to the Democratic National Convention in St. Louis, which was
held the following week (June 14-16).
When the Democrats adopted a plank similar to the Republicans, endorsing
suffrage only as an issue to be decided by the states, the NWP earnestly began
campaigning against all Democrats in the western states. 134 An overwhelming amount of
evidence points to the conclusion that this strategy was based on three faulty assumptions
and that it did little to further the cause of suffrage. The first major assumption that failed
the Woman’s Party was that women would behave as single-issue voters, willing to place
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suffrage for women in other parts of the country above any other concerns. Secondly,
they falsely believed that women voters would view Wilson as anti-suffrage because he
was the head of the Democratic Party and a federal amendment had not been passed
during his first term. Finally, they were overly confident that a majority of people would
understand their strategy of campaigning against all Democrats even if individual
Democratic candidates supported suffrage.
In reality, women voters were concerned with a wide range of issues in the 1916
election. Wilson’s affirmative vote in New Jersey and willingness at the St. Louis
Convention to support the suffrage plank, limited though it was, convinced many voters
that he was actually an advocate for the cause. A tiny minority abandoned their
traditional party allegiance to join the Woman’s Party, while a vast majority, suffragists
and anti-suffragists alike, were convinced that the campaign against all Democrats
damaged the suffrage movement.
One of the best illustrations of women’s refusal to behave as single-issue voters
comes from a set of correspondence between Alva Belmont and a number of western
women voters. Belmont served as the Chairman of the NWP’s Campaign Fund
Committee during the 1916 election year. In September, she sent a letter to 20,000
women voters asking them to donate money in an attempt to raise $500,000 for the
upcoming campaign. Her letter explained that the NWP needed additional funds because,
“Mr. Wilson and his party have steadfastly opposed the woman suffrage amendment in
Congress. The Woman’s Party is campaigning, therefore, in the states where women
vote, against Mr. Wilson and the Democratic Congressional candidates.” 135 She received
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hundreds of responses, overwhelmingly negative. A snapshot of the letters back to
Belmont illustrates the posture of women in the West.
A woman in Kansas responded that knowing that the Republican candidate
supported a federal suffrage amendment was not enough to cause her to vote for him.
She wrote, “The women of Kansas have the suffrage and it is valuable to them only as it
is used to gain for themselves or humanity the things most desired. We are anxious to
know [Hughes’] attitude on a number of questions; vis: Child Labor law, Universal
compulsory military service, taxes on income, inheritances and munitions.” 136 She went
on to express skepticism that Hughes’ interest in suffrage extended beyond his near-term
desire to be elected. She questioned Belmont, “Has all this enthusiasm for woman
suffrage been awakened merely to get votes – women’s votes – to help make himself
President . . . His election would in no way advance the suffrage cause and on the other
hand defeat much very necessary legislation. 137
A woman who described herself as an “earnest advocate of women’s suffrage”
sent a similar response to Belmont. She was even more specific about Wilson’s appeal
over Hughes. In refusing to donate any funds to the NWP, she explained that Wilson
“had done so much for our country. A man who has stood by the wage earning people. I
think the woman’s suffrage party in campaigning against Mr. Wilson is all wrong. And
you will find in the end that you have gained nothing.” 138 She further added her belief
that Wilson’s support of the states’ rights stance of the Democratic Party did not mean
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that he personally did not support a federal amendment. This letter indicates two
important points. First, it demonstrates that the writer believed Wilson’s support of
workers was more significant than his party’s failure to secure a federal suffrage
amendment – further proof that the belief in suffrage as an issue women would weigh
more heavily than all others was false. Secondly, it shows that Wilson had successfully
used his party’s adherence to states’ rights as a protective barrier for his personal views.
Despite the fact that he had never wavered from the party’s position that suffrage was an
issue to be decided by the states, many women remained hopeful that because he was in
favor of the principle of suffrage, he was not personally opposed to a federal amendment.
A respondent from Oregon blasted Belmont and the NWP for their strategy,
echoing the belief that Hughes only supported the federal amendment in order to gain
votes and that he knew the bill would first have to gain the support of two-thirds of
Congress before he would ever have to deal with it. She pointed out that the suffrage
amendment had lingered in Congress for twenty years under Republican administrations
and that the amendment had come further under Wilson than any of his Republican
predecessors. In a sharp rebuke of the entire NWP strategy, she wrote,
In this state the majority of the women are standing for Wilson and the suffrage
cause has lost many of its best workers because of the foolishness of the
congressional union [sic] and the woman’s party in trying to throw the Oregon
women’s vote to Hughes. You are definitely injuring the cause of suffrage among
Oregon women. We will never again work together as we did before the split which
you and your followers have forced upon us. You are causing the same split in other
states and therefore you have given suffrage the greatest setback that it could be
given. It will take at least ten years of hard work by the saner women to overcome
the blow you have given suffrage in trying to force your candidate for president upon
us.” 139
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This woman represented the views of those who not only continued to support Wilson but
also were distraught over the damage being caused by the NWP’s assault on the
Democratic Party.
In an almost identical letter, Mrs. W.F. LeSueur from Arizona contradicted all
three of the assumptions on which the NWP’s strategy was based. She wrote, “President
Wilson can and will get suffrage for women quicker, than would his opponent. In my
opinion he has accomplished more in the last three and half years than has the
Republicans in twenty years [sic]. I do not think that Mr. Hughes would be equal to the
big questions now confronting, and that will confront our nation.” 140 LeSueur’s letter
demonstrates that the “big questions” facing the United States weighed more heavily on
the minds of many voters than did suffrage. Additionally, her response indicates the
belief held by many that Wilson was actually an advocate for suffrage and to campaign
against him and the other Democrats would only hurt the movement.
The fact that so many women in the West credited Wilson with progress on the
federal amendment while deriding the efforts of the CU is ironic. In reality, the CU was
largely responsible for reinvigorating the movement for a federal amendment. The work
it performed while still affiliated with NAWSA’s Congressional Committee in 1913 and
later as an independent organization in 1914-1915 brought attention and action on the
amendment in Congress. Still, perception proved more powerful than reality. In 1916, it
cannot be denied that many women voters perceived Wilson to be an advocate for the
federal amendment. Further, they failed to see the ways in which the CU’s work had
helped the cause.
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The replies to Belmont’s request for financial aid are not the only sources of
evidence that an overwhelming majority of western women rejected the NWP’s strategy,
although their actual words are perhaps the strongest testimony. Subsequent
correspondence suggests that Belmont’s September 1916 plea for donations to the cause
went largely unanswered. Less than four months after her call for funds, she was forced
to send another letter to previous contributors asking for financial assistance. She wrote,
“Our treasury is empty and our work is seriously crippled for lack of funds.” 141 The
women she had solicited in September apparently spoke with both their pens and their
checkbooks. The NWP’s membership numbers are even more compelling. In early
1917, the number of women from suffrage states that had joined the Woman’s Party was
only 14,277 – a far cry from the 500,000 voters that Blatch had promised in June 1916. 142
Part of the problem for the NWP resided with the fact that Paul’s strategy, though
defensible if given proper scrutiny and full hearing, seemed counterintuitive to most
voters who quickly dismissed it without a full hearing. Paul’s explanation of the strategy
to one of the leaders of the Woman’s Party in Colorado, illustrates this point. She wrote,
“Our interest, of course, is in securing the passage of the amendment and not in securing
the election of Hughes, but it is vital to the success of the amendment, I think, that we
secure the defeat of Wilson and the election of Hughes.” 143 Paul had a hard time
convincing people that she was not interested in electing Hughes – only defeating
Wilson; with only a subtle difference in purpose, the propositions were one and the same.
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Additionally, Paul’s method of measuring the success of the movement differed
from that of most people who believed supporters should be won over rather than
coerced. She went on in the same letter to the supporter in Colorado to justify her
methods:
It seems to us that we gain more publicity by our campaign of opposition than we
could by one of support. In Colorado two years ago . . . we succeeded in making
such an impression upon the campaign and obtaining so much publicity for our fight
against [U.S. Senator] Thomas that even now, two years later, he is still making
speeches in the United States Senate denouncing our campaign against him. Had
[NWP members] simply gone in as speakers supporting Mr. Thomas’ opponent, they
could not possibly, I believe, have created the furor in the state in which they did by
their policy of attacking Thomas and pointing out the reasons for not having him
returned to Washington. 144
The problem with Paul’s assessment is that Thomas was a pro-suffrage Senator who had
worked to secure suffrage for women in Colorado and voted in favor of the federal
amendment repeatedly in the U.S. Senate. Paul considered the NWP’s campaign against
Thomas a success, despite the fact that they had been working against a long-time
suffrage supporter and that he was re-elected despite their efforts to defeat him. This type
of “success” was not attractive to the vast majority of voters.
In some ways, the NWP’s 1916 campaign strategy only made the suffrage battle
more difficult. After Wilson was re-elected and the Democrats maintained control of the
House and Senate, the Republicans owed the NWP nothing since the women’s vote had
not carried them to victory. Furthermore, many Democratic suffrage supporters backed
away from the cause because they were made to feel as if it conflicted with their party
loyalty. Most importantly, much-needed Democratic support in Congress had been
alienated by the NWP’s campaigns in the West. NWP member Maud Younger reported
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in January 1917 that Representative Hayden of Arizona, a long-time suffrage supporter in
the House, had rejected her request to delay a vote on the federal amendment that would
surely end in its defeat. Hayden had told her that if the NWP was in favor of delaying the
vote, then he was in favor of rushing it, even if it meant defeat for the amendment. He
explained that he was in favor of anything the NWP opposed because they had fought
against him in his last campaign. 145 If this was the type of response the NWP generated
from Congressmen who supported suffrage, they stood little chance of winning the votes
of those who opposed the amendment.
NAWSA activities in 1916 reflected the beliefs of its leader, Catt, just as much as
the CU/NWP activities reflected the leadership of Alice Paul. The four major tenets of
Catt’s strategy in 1916 were increased organization, a renewed focus on the federal
amendment, remaining steadfast to the policy of nonpartisanship, and distinguishing
NAWSA from the CU. All of this was part of Catt’s long-term vision: win more states in
order to increase the number of Congressmen from suffrage states, thereby enhancing the
prospects for passing the federal amendment and for achieving a quick ratification. She
recognized that this strategy meant several more years of work for the suffrage
movement, as opposed to the quick fix promised by the western strategy of the NWP.
She explained to NAWSA members:
But let me implore you not to imagine a Federal Amendment an easy
process of enfranchisement. There is no quick, short cut to our liberty.
The federal amendment means a simultaneous campaign in 48 states. It
demands organization in every precinct; activity, agitation, education in
every corner . . . Nothing less than this nation-wide, vigilant, unceasing
campaigning will win the ratification. 146
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To Catt, the NWP promises were a mirage. Throughout 1916, she hammered away at
NAWSA’s state associations to improve their internal organization in preparation for
state referenda and, later, the ratification fight.
During her opening comments as the newly elected President of NAWSA, Catt
told the assembled representatives that the watchword for 1916 would be organization:
“Whether for Congressional or State work, the only solid foundation is organization; and
if you have in your State a thorough and far-reaching organization, you can switch it on
short notice to any piece of work, State or Federal, that needs to be done.” 147 Just a few
months later, she announced the formation of NAWSA’s Department of Organization.
The new Department’s mission was to “give lessons in organization” to state associations
so that “every state which has not already done so shall transform its plan of organization
into that which makes the political unit the basis of organization.” 148
To fully understand Catt’s emphasis on and use of the term “organization,” one
must have a sense of Catt’s experience as a suffragist over the preceding two decades. In
the absence of a strong national headquarters and a coordinated national plan, each state
association had followed its own path. State leaders often ignored the advice of the
NAWSA Executive Council, either squandering resources in campaigns that were
doomed to fail or failing to capitalize on opportunities in states where concerted
campaigns might have resulted in victory. Further, some state leaders were reluctant to
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move beyond voter education to voter mobilization. Having spent time at both the
national and state level, Catt was painfully aware of the need for a stronger central
authority in NAWSA. As a corollary, she demanded that all state associations bow to the
dictates of that central authority, even if that meant seeing funds raised in their states used
for a campaign in another state or agreeing to abandon their state campaigns if the
national leaders determined their states did not have much chance of success. 149
Alongside this increased focus on organization, Catt placed additional emphasis
on the plan for attaining the federal amendment. Although her own political calculations
may have eventually led her to independently make this transition, the activity of the CU
/ NWP certainly hastened her journey. Early in 1916, she confided to another NAWSA
leader, “It seems to me that the National Association is losing its Federal Amendment
zealots to the Congressional Union merely because we do not work on that job hard
enough . . . If [NAWSA] should once do it, there is no knowing what might happen.” 150
Propelled to greater action by its rival organization and the increased chance of success
because of new suffrage states, NAWSA, under Catt’s leadership, worked harder for the
federal amendment than it had since the late 19th century. 151 In the mind of most
NAWSA leaders, a key to winning the federal amendment and ratification would be the
maintenance of NAWSA’s nonpartisan status.
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In the first years of her presidency, Catt found herself not only defending the
policy of non-partisanship to the public, but also fending off partisan overtures from close
friends and members of her own organization. So what was it about NAWSA’s
traditional policy that drove Catt to defend it with such vehemence? She answered that
question in numerous articles, letters, and interviews by claiming that holding the party in
power responsible simply would not work to secure suffrage for all women. 152 It was not
a personal issue for the always-pragmatic Catt. Rather, she simply did not believe it was
an approach that could succeed. With constitutional rules requiring a vote of two-thirds
of the national legislature in order to send an amendment to the states for ratification, the
amendment necessarily required bipartisan support. State ratification, as well, required
bipartisan action. Therefore, suffragists could not afford to draw the hostility of either
party.
Despite what seemed blatantly obvious to Catt as the correct path for NAWSA,
women whom she respected and worked with occasionally challenged the National’s
traditional policy. In July 1916, Catt received a letter from the President of Bryn Mawr
College, M. Cary Thomas. Thomas, an active suffragist and a long-time national leader
of the battle for greater educational opportunities for women, wrote only a few weeks
after both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions had adopted a suffrage
plank for their party platforms, but during which neither endorsed the federal amendment.
Thomas suggested that Catt meet with the Republican presidential candidate, Charles
Evan Hughes, and urge him to publicly support the federal amendment and promise to try
and get Congress to pass it if he were elected. NAWSA should offer their pledge of
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support to Hughes in the upcoming election unless the Democrats passed a federal
amendment in the final session of the 1916 Congress.
Thomas went on to suggest that Catt then meet with President Wilson and explain
her plan to support Hughes in the upcoming election unless the Democrats pushed the
federal amendment through in the next two months. She felt that the fear of losing the
election in the fall would force Wilson to rally his party and push the amendment through
Congress. Even if it did not, all the nation’s suffragists (CU, NAWSA, Progressives)
would be united in their support of Hughes and the Republican ticket, and, following
their election to office, “the federal amendment will at last be passed especially as the
Republican congressmen who have been campaigned for by women will feel a sense of
obligation to them such as they have never yet felt.” 153 Thomas’ letter had genuine
appeal. She predicted a reunification of suffrage forces under one banner supporting
Hughes and success for the federal amendment. Catt was not swayed.
Even after Hughes was convinced by the CU to come out in support of national
suffrage in his July 15, 1916 nomination acceptance speech, Catt refused to give him
NAWSA’s endorsement. She continued to speak of suffrage as inevitable because of its
bipartisan appeal. In an article written after Hughes’ announcement in July but before the
November elections, she reiterated her non-partisan approach, assuring voters that no
national party opposed suffrage: “The two dominant parties in their suffrage planks
recommended that the question should be settled by the States, but neither declared
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against the Federal method. Mr. Charles E. Hughes, the Republican candidate, has
openly declared for the Federal Amendment. Mr. Wilson, at this time, does not yet
endorse it, but many democrats in Congress have not only spoken and voted for it, but are
earnest advocates of it.” 154 Wilson’s later actions in his second term indicated that by
refusing to endorse Hughes over Wilson, Catt endeared herself and NAWSA to the
president.
Thomas was not the only one urging Catt to reconsider her non-partisan path. At
the NAWSA Atlantic City Convention in September 1916, one of the delegates made a
motion that NAWSA support only those candidates who had spoken out in favor of the
federal amendment – namely Hughes. The motion attracted many of the women who
were frustrated with the slow rate of progress and saw a partisan approach leading to
quicker victory. Catt spoke in opposition to the proposal and was supported by her
predecessor, Dr. Anna Howard Shaw. After two hours of debate, the motion was
defeated, and the delegates passed a subsequent resolution to initiate a vigorous publicity
campaign to make clear the association had indeed decided to maintain its non-partisan
policy. 155
Despite challenges from within and outside the organization, Catt navigated
NAWSA through the tempting waters of partisan politics. President Wilson’s reaction to
her dedication to this principle can be measured by his increasing responsiveness to her
requests for support. After his successful re-election in the fall of 1916 by a close margin
of 276 electoral votes against 255 for Hughes, Catt was able to repeatedly call on the
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President for support in state campaigns as well as the federal amendment campaign – a
dynamic to be explored in-depth in the following chapters.
Catt’s other main 1916 goal – distinguishing NAWSA from the CU – was a focal
point of the emergency NAWSA National Convention she called in Atlantic City, New
Jersey in September 1916. At the convention, she revealed her “Winning Plan” for
securing the federal amendment. In her presidential address, she informed the audience
that the suffrage movement was in a state of crisis. Arguing the futility of securing
suffrage for all women of the country by the state method and the necessity of the federal
amendment, she exhorted NAWSA to continue to campaign for state suffrage in states
likely to accept an amendment, but not to waste efforts in states with an obstinate
electorate or constitutional constructions that made securing amendments almost
impossible. In all cases, the organization would work to influence legislators to vote in
favor of the federal amendment. Repeatedly, she stressed organizational efficiency and
unity of effort. 156
The beauty of Catt’s “Winning Plan” is two-fold. First, it recognized the
necessity of winning more state referenda in order to eventually secure a federal
amendment. Catt was well aware that congressmen were more apt to vote for a federal
amendment if they came from suffrage states. The results of the 1915 vote on the federal
amendment in the House of Representatives proved this point. The roll call showed that
96% of congressmen from suffrage states voted in favor of the amendment, as compared
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to 37% from non-suffrage states. 157 To abandon the campaign in states with large
congressional delegations such as New York would not only erase the years of work that
had been poured into those campaigns, but also spell defeat for the federal amendment.
Additionally, keeping state suffrage organizations alive would provide the framework
necessary for the eventual ratification campaign that would have to be fought once the
federal amendment passed Congress.
Shortly after issuing her call to NAWSA members to attend the Atlantic City
convention, Catt invited the president to address the assemblage at their closing session.
The president replied in a personal letter to Catt that he would accept the invitation
barring any schedule conflicts, adding a sentence at the end of the letter, “I sincerely wish
to come.” 158 The evidence suggests that Catt saw Wilson’s presence in Atlantic City as a
way to accomplish two goals. She hoped his appearance before the convention could be
used in the public relations campaign. Even if he did not come out in support of the
federal amendment, his mere presence at the national convention of an organization with
that end as its stated goal could be interpreted to show his decreasing resistance to such a
measure. Additionally, she hoped his exposure to a theater full of dedicated, orderly
suffragists would help facilitate his complete conversion to the ranks of the believers – in
other words, an advocate for the federal amendment.
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As expected, the president did not speak explicitly in favor of the federal
amendment during his address. Neither did he, though, insist that suffrage be attained
through the state method. In a marked departure from his past statements, he professed
his support for the principle of suffrage without clearly stating his preference for the issue
to be settled by the states. Wilson said, “We feel the tide [of the suffrage movement]; we
rejoice in the strength of it, and we shall not quarrel in the long run as to the method of
it.” 159 Wilson’s shift in position was not an unconscious action or a slip of the tongue.
Later correspondence indicates that he intended his remarks at Atlantic City to represent
his openness to a federal amendment heading into the 1916 election. Responding to a
request in October from the Writers Equal Suffrage League for a statement of his
position, Wilson directed his secretary to provide the league with a copy of his Atlantic
City speech. 160
Reminiscing several years later, Catt expressed her belief that it was that night in
Atlantic City when Wilson “yielded to the momentum of the movement which was
rapidly reaching its climax in his administration. [The convention was] the very hour
when conversion to the principle became with him conversion to an obligation to join the
campaign.” 161 When Wilson looked out over the audience in Atlantic City, he saw
exactly what Catt wanted him to see – orderly women that cheered him before and after
his speech and who contrasted sharply with the image he held of CU agitators. This
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positive image, she believed, catalyzed Wilson’s conversion to the NAWSA cause of a
federal suffrage amendment.
Just two months later, Catt decided to increase the intensity of the public relations
campaign aimed at distinguishing between NAWSA and the CU. NAWSA press
secretary Rose Young wrote to her in November 1916 requesting that she write some
articles to be used in conjunction with personality stories, cartoons, and news items in
order to “get the National American so dominantly featured in relation to the federal
amendment that there won’t be any room on the map for the C.U. to get a grip on popular
imagination again.” 162 Catt, concurring with Young’s proposal, composed a letter that
Young released to the press. Young indicated on the press release that Catt had written
the letter in answer to three questions: 1) Why the Congressional Union came into
existence 2) Why it advanced a policy contrary to that of the National American Woman
Suffrage Association and 3) What the differences are between the two groups.
Catt effectively used the letter to answer those questions. She explained how the
mixing of the Congressional Committee responsibilities with the Congressional Union
and the violations of NAWSA principles had led to Paul’s decision to part ways with the
National. Furthermore, she provided a detailed explanation of the CU policies of holding
the party in power responsible and abandoning state suffrage campaigns in favor of a
singular focus on the federal amendment. In contrast, she explained, “The National looks
to both parties for support of the Federal Amendment and to intensive organization and
vigorous activity within the states, to secure the ratification of the Federal Amendment;
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and the National would also secure the vote by suffrage referenda whenever possible.” 163
Stressing NAWSA’s non-partisan approach, focus on the federal amendment, and
continued work at the state level, Catt clearly explained the differences between the two
organizations. She concluded the letter with her personal assessment of the
ineffectiveness of the CU policy of holding the party in power responsible.
By the end of 1916, NAWSA had succeeded in getting both major parties to
include suffrage planks in their national platforms. Like their counterparts in the NWP,
they would have much preferred a plank endorsing the federal amendment, but in that
they were committed to work at both the state and national level, they chose to see the
states’ rights planks as a positive step. Through an aggressive publicity campaign,
NAWSA leaders had educated a large number of Americans about the difference between
NAWSA and the CU. More importantly, they had educated the president. Wilson was
convinced enough of NAWSA’s goodwill to speak at its national convention. He did not
endorse a federal amendment, but his language indicated a new openness to national
suffrage. His mere presence at the convention was a public relations plume in NAWSA’s
hat that they used repeatedly during the final three years of the campaign.
Woman suffrage was but one of many issues facing Wilson during his 1916 reelection bid. His reaction to pressure from suffragists, as well as his attempt to win over
progressive voters by supporting important pro-labor legislation, serves as the subject of
the next chapter. Additionally, this chapter details the post-election analysis conducted
by NAWSA, the NWP, and Wilson’s Administration. Different interpretations of the

163

Catt, “The Winning Policy,” p. 3. NAWSA Records, Box 82, Reel 59.

88

1916 results – accompanied by the increasing prospect of US intervention into the war in
Europe - led to new strategies by all three groups in 1917.
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CHAPTER 4
WILSON’S PROGRESSIVE TURN AND THE 1916 ELECTION

One of the most important things to note when examining Wilson’s approach to
the 1916 election is that the issue of woman suffrage was, at best, a minor concern. The
issues that dominated the campaign were America’s potential involvement in the war in
Europe and where the two major political parties would fall on a broad range of
progressive issues. Wilson’s campaign strategy evolved immensely during the course of
1916, but by the time the election arrived in November, his platform can best be
summarized as peace, prosperity, and progressivism. This chapter reveals Wilson
treading carefully through the months leading up to the election, balancing his need to
win back progressive voters with his need to placate the conservatives within his own
party, particularly those from the South. While the preceding chapter detailed the
president’s successful maneuvers to appear pro-suffrage in advance of the 1916 election,
this chapter examines his equally successful attempt to cast himself and his party as prolabor. Specifically, it conducts a comparative analysis between Wilson’s evolving stance
on woman suffrage and his changed position on two key labor issues: restricting child
labor and supporting an eight-hour workday. This chapter concludes with an assessment
of how various groups interpreted the results of the 1916 election. Recognizing that
NAWSA, the NWP, and the Wilson administration understood the election results in
different ways helps to explain the new strategies employed by each group in 1917.
A close examination of Wilson’s decision to support both the Keating-Owen
Child Labor Bill and the Adamson Act, which granted railroad workers an eight-hour
day, is illuminating for understanding his conversion to the federal woman suffrage
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amendment in a number of ways. But at the outset of this analysis it is important to note
key differences between Wilson’s approach to labor legislation as compared to the issue
of woman suffrage. Unlike his views on woman suffrage, Wilson had supported the
principle of protective legislation for child workers and limited hours for workers for
most of his public life. 164 Additionally, Wilson tended to see the government’s role with
regard to economic issues in a much different light than he did social issues. As a
number of his biographers have noted, he was reluctant to act as decisively on the latter
as opposed to the former. 165 Despite these differences, though, Wilson’s increasingly
supportive stance on labor legislation and willingness to move away from a strict states’
rights position does bear important similarities to his slide toward support for woman
suffrage.
Specific similarities to the suffrage battle include the fact that his support for the
Keating-Owen Child Labor Act and the Adamson Act marked a sharp reversal of his
position on these specific pieces of legislation. His shift indicated a new openness to
national solutions for social justice issues. Further, a look at his executive
correspondence regarding labor reveals that Wilson’s advisors were adamant that he
needed to bolster his political support among progressives if he had any hope of being
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reelected in 1916 – even if that meant disappointing more conservative members of his
own party, especially from the South. This fact bears strongly on his actions with regard
to woman suffrage. Portentously, the battle over the child labor bill reveals significant
cracks within the supposedly monolithic South.
Additionally, evidence in this chapter shows that Wilson was willing to listen to
and follow the counsel of his advisory team. 166 He followed closely the entreaties of
those close to him who urged his support of both the child labor and 8-hour day bills.
Similarly, the president paid heed to those within his inner circle who urged him to take a
moderately pro-suffrage stance by supporting a states’ rights suffrage plank in the 1916
Democratic platform, but stopping short of endorsing the federal amendment. Finally,
both of these legislative battles culminated with Wilson’s personal intervention with
members of Congress. His willingness to exert executive influence with legislators
foreshadows his actions with Congress on behalf of the federal woman suffrage
amendment during his second term. Looming over all of the domestic issues in 1916,
though, was the raging war in Europe. Wilson’s desire to influence the outcome of that
conflict colored all of his calculations.
On the international stage, Wilson charted a bold course for the country.
Recognizing that, like him, most Americans were opposed to U.S. military intervention in
the war and deeply divided over the causes of the fighting in Europe, he developed a plan
for a mediated peace. First outlined in a speech on May 27, 1916, Wilson set forth his
vision to end U.S. isolation by taking the lead in a negotiated peace agreement among the
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warring nations of Europe and then committing the nation to participation in a postwar
association of nations that would maintain peace in the future. His plan offended
isolationists but pleased a majority of Americans who enthusiastically supported the
campaign slogan: “He kept us out of war.” 167 Although an emphasis on nonintervention
would seem to be a shift from Wilson’s fierce defense of American rights on the seas and
his preparedness campaign of 1915, Link argues convincingly that Wilson’s peace stance
was based on much more than political expedience. Over the course of 1916, Wilson had
grown both increasingly frustrated with the Allies and distrustful of Great Britain. He
clearly recognized the political value of taking a stand for peace. However, Link argues,
his transition to “a leading champion of nonintervention was facilitated by developments
both at home and abroad.” 168
Domestically, Wilson worked to regain ground with progressive voters. Several
factors contributed to his belief that such action was necessary. First off, he and his
advisors had carefully studied the election returns from 1912. They were keenly aware
that Wilson’s victory owed more to the split between the Republican Party and
Roosevelt’s Bull Moose insurgency than to any issue championed by the Democrats. 169
They were also cognizant of the fact that, although he did not score any points in the
Electoral College, the Socialist candidate, Eugene Debs, had won nearly a million votes
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representing 6% of the popular vote. 170 In addition, many of the president’s actions
during the first three years of his administration had further alienated progressives.
Specifically, they opposed his military preparedness program and his approval of racial
segregation in federal service. They were further discouraged by his failure to grant the
American Federation of Labor immunity under the Sherman Act and to support woman
suffrage, child labor legislation, and rural credits. 171 As early as November 1914, leading
progressive journalists such as Hebert Croly of the The New Republic expressed
dissatisfaction with Wilson’s conservativism. 172 As Link argues, “It was obvious that
[Wilson and the Democrats] would have to reverse themselves and enact these and other
measures if they were to persuade independents, Progressives, and midwestern farmers
that they led a great national party that had struck the shackles of state rights and laissezfaire dogma.” 173
Labor leaders joined with Croly in critiquing Wilson’s failure to live up to many
of his promises from the 1912 campaign. Late in the 1912 election cycle, Wilson had
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linked up with one of the nation’s rising legal scholars and political reformers, Louis
Brandeis, and developed a plan to combat the Progressive Party’s goal of branding him as
anti-labor. 174 As noted labor historian Phillip Foner has documented, Brandeis
encouraged Wilson and the Democrats to take a position that would, “couple the right to
organize with the need for social legislation wherever it was required to protect labor
from the overwhelming power of industry.” 175 Wilson began emphasizing these
principles in the final two months of the campaign, appearing pro-labor enough to win
the public endorsement of the American Federation of Labor President Samuel Gompers
just a week before voters went to the polls. 176 But with that endorsement came
expectations of specific gains for labor – expectations that the Wilson administration
failed to meet during the first three years of his administration. 177
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As the 1916 election neared, the issue of restricting child labor emerged as an
opportunity for Wilson to begin his amends to progressives and labor leaders alike. The
leading reform organization for restricting child labor during the Progressive Era was the
National Child Labor Committee (NCLC). When originally formed in 1904, the NCLC
specifically disavowed federal legislation, preferring to press for reform through the
states. Over the next decade, their methods met with great success in almost all parts of
the country. 178 Problems persisted, though. Powerful mill owners in the southern
manufacturing states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama had
successfully blocked the passage of meaningful child labor legislation. Additionally, the
tremendous variation in state laws and uneven enforcement gave industries incentive to
move to states with more lenient regulation. The combined difficulties of disunity in
state legislation and southern recalcitrance led the NCLC to develop and support a federal
child labor bill in 1913. 179
The NCLC-supported Palmer-Owen Bill, introduced in Congress in 1914, relied
on the principle that the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution gave Congress the
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power to prohibit child labor. 180 For most states, the bill’s provisions were less restrictive
than the legislation already in place at the state level. For the southern mill owners
whose states had no such laws, though, it was anathema. 181 Nonetheless, it passed in the
house by a vote of 233-43 in February, 1915. But passage in the senate was blocked by a
conservative third-term Democrat representing the interests of the southern mill owners,
Senator Lee Overman of North Carolina who employed obstructionist tactics such that
the bill died without ever coming to a vote when Congress adjourned on March 4,
1915. 182
The bill was reintroduced at the next session of congress as the Keating-Owen
bill. 183 It quickly sped through the house and passed in January 1916 by a vote of 34346. In the senate, Overman again managed to block the measure. When the Democrats
met in caucus in July, the southern opponents of the bill threatened to filibuster and
obstruct key pieces of legislation if the child labor bill came up for a vote. 184 It was at
this point that Wilson made his important decision to intervene and pressure the members
of his own party. On the morning of July 18, he traveled from the White House to the
180
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capital for a meeting with Democratic senate leaders with the express purpose of
convincing the members of his own party to pass the Keating-Owen Bill. Following the
president’s meeting with the senate Democrats in which he connected passage of this bill
with the party’s overall image heading into the 1916 election, the obstructionists relented
and the bill came up for debate the following day. It passed by a vote of 52-12 on August
8 and Wilson signed it into law on September 1, 1916. 185 It was immediately challenged
by a lawsuit and, despite nearly two years of effectively reducing the number of child
laborers, the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart in 1918. 186
Wilson’s support of the Keating-Owen Bill marked a reversal of his previous
position regarding a federal child labor measure. Even before taking office in 1913,
Wilson made it clear to reformers that, as much as he sympathized with the cause, he felt
that federal legislation to limit child labor that was based on congressional power over
interstate commerce exceeded constitutional boundaries. 187 He reiterated this position to
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NCLC leaders when they asked him for support of the Palmer-Owen Bill in early 1914,
telling them that “such legislation could not be upheld and, if passed, would open the
door to unlimited federal regulation.” 188 Nonetheless, he maintained a public silence on
the topic as the bill moved through the House in 1915 and stalled in the Senate that
spring. When it was reintroduced as the Keating-Owen bill in 1916, he again refrained
from public comment until it stalled in the Senate for a second time and then made his
decision to intervene.
Wilson’s journey to the capitol on that July morning in 1916 was a clear departure
from his previous stance on federal regulation of child labor through the commerce
clause of the Constitution. His decision a month later in August to support a federal
eight-hour day law for railroad workers (the Adamson Act) involved an equally dramatic
reversal. The railroad crisis in the summer of 1916 was not the first time that Wilson had
become personally involved in disputes between the railroad brotherhoods and railroad
owners. 189 Twice previously in his first term, he had intervened in labor negotiations in
order to prevent a strike. 190 But his actions concerning the Adamson Act are especially
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significant in that the crisis culminated with the president demanding federal legislation
to protect a particular class – a position that he argued strongly against in his 1912
campaign. Further, Wilson’s support of the eight-hour day for railroad workers became a
major issue in the 1916 campaign. While earning him remarkable support from
progressives, labor leaders, and workers, it also was a point on which his Republican
opponent centered his attacks in the final months of the campaign.
The specific events that led up to Wilson’s intervention on behalf of the
brotherhoods in August 1916 are well known. 191 A quick summary is as follows: In June
1916, the brotherhoods demanded an eight-hour day for their members, along with no
reduction in wages and time and a half for overtime work. The owners rejected this
demand, prompting the brotherhoods to vote overwhelmingly in favor of a general strike
to begin on Labor Day (September 4, 1916). The Board of Mediation met with both
groups in early August, but could not bring agreement. When the board president
informed Wilson that negotiations would probably fail, Wilson requested to meet with
representatives from the brotherhoods and the owners at the White House. 192
As the conference at the White House began on August 14, three weeks before the
strike deadline, the president proposed a compromise. He urged the owners to grant the
eight-hour day, but also asked the brotherhoods to delay a final decision on punitive
overtime pay until a federal commission could be appointed to study the entire railroad
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problem and then make a recommendation. The brotherhoods accepted this compromise
on August 18, but the owners’ representatives did not. Wilson then summoned the actual
presidents of the railroads to Washington. Simultaneously, he directed congressional
leaders to begin work on legislation that would codify his compromise proposal in case
he was unable to persuade the railroad presidents to voluntarily accept it. In a series of
meetings from August 18-21, the president was unable to prevail over the railroad
presidents. 193
In the waning days of August, Wilson decided that he had no recourse but to call
for congress to act in order to prevent a strike. He met with senate Democrats on August
28 to lay out his position and then took the extraordinary step of addressing a joint
session of congress on the following day. He asked for legislation that represented the
basic tenets of the compromise he had proposed to the brotherhoods and the owners, but
that also included measures to facilitate arbitration in future conflicts. Although he did
not explicitly blame the railroad owners for the impasse, he implied that they – more so
than the Brotherhoods – were the obstacle to a solution that did not involve government
intervention. 194
Following the president’s address, the Commerce Committee immediately
resumed work on the specifics of the legislation. The final form of the bill did not
include the rate increase and antistrike provisions that Wilson had requested, but it did
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comply with the President’s request in almost every other way. Named for the
Commerce Committee Chairman, Senator W.C. Adamson of Georgia, the Adamson Act
passed the House by a vote of 239-56 on September 1 and passed in the Senate on the
following day by a vote of 43-28. Voting in the Senate was highly partisan with all but
two Democrats voting in favor of the measure and all but one Republican (Senator La
Follette) in opposition. In the House, all but three Democrats supported the bill and,
while a slim majority of Republicans voted against it, 53 joined the Democrats by voting
aye. 195 Wilson signed the bill in a ceremony on his personal railcar at Union Station on
September 3. He gave each of the four signing pens to the chiefs of the Four
Brotherhoods who promptly cancelled plans for the Labor Day strike. 196
So, in a span of just three days in early September and with only two months left
before the 1916 election, President Wilson signed into law two pieces of legislation that
increased the regulatory power of the federal government far beyond the boundaries of
his 1912 “New Freedom” platform. Both the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act and the
Adamson Act seemed to signal a major reorientation in the President’s thinking about the
power of government to legislate social justice through federal action. Understandably, a
number of scholars have addressed the important question of this dramatic shift.
Wilson’s primary biographer, Arthur Link, argues that Wilson was a qualified
liberal with doubts about intervention in the economy when he was elected to his first
term in 1912. Comparing Wilson’s “New Freedom” with Theodore Roosevelt’s “New
195
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Nationalism,” Link contends that Wilson wanted the federal government to destroy
special privileges and any barriers to individual potential. Much of the rhetoric from both
men was aimed at large corporations which they believed unfairly limited competition.
But for Wilson, labor unions and progressive reformers also sought policies that, in his
thinking, stifled individualism. He labeled the Progressive Party’s social welfare and
reform program “paternalistic.” 197 According to Link, the president explicitly extended
the meaning of the New Freedom doctrine of “special privileges to none” to oppose
protective labor legislation of all kinds, claiming that it favored a particular class of
citizens at the expense of others. 198
So, who was the Woodrow Wilson of 1916 who suddenly supported protective
labor legislation? According to Link, he was a man facing re-election and desperately in
need of progressive support. Link explains:
Those observers who predicted the President would adhere stubbornly to New
Freedom concepts did not well understand Woodrow Wilson. He had broad
political principles, to be sure; but he was not an inflexible dogmatist on methods
or details. As he thought the Democratic Party offered the only hope of
constructive, progressive change, he believed his party’s most important task was
to stay in power. Nowhere did he come out and say that his desire to maintain the
Democrats in power was responsible for the commitment he made to advanced
progressivism in 1916. Yet he became almost a new political creature, and under
his leadership a Democratic Congress enacted the most sweeping and significant
progressive legislation in the history of the country up to that time. 199
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compensation, and child labor bills, his backing of the Lafollette Seaman’s Act, and
support for the principle of woman suffrage. As a result of these moves, nearly every
social justice plank of the 1912 Progressive Party platform had been enacted by the
Wilson Administration by the eve of the 1916 election.
In placing all of the key social reform legislation of late 1916 into the single
category of “advanced progressivism,” Link glosses over key differences in the level of
public support for the various measures and the degree to which Wilson’s support marked
a shift in his personal principles. 200 Link does acknowledge that the President’s shift
toward nationalistic solutions began early in his first term, noting that Wilson “was, quite
simply, at a point of metamorphosis in his thinking about legislative policy, and the
political exigencies only hastened his change.” 201 For Link, then, Wilson’s progressive
turn resulted from a convergence of his new thinking about national solutions combined
with the dictates of electoral politics.
On the specific issue of a federal child labor bill, Link’s account contains no hint
of whether the president was concerned with alienating the southern Democrats who
opposed the measure or whether he had any correspondence with them prior to his direct
intervention in July. It also omits any discussion of Wilson’s concern with whether or
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not the measure would pass the test of constitutionality that it was sure to face. Similarly,
Link’s re-telling of the President’s involvement with the Adamson Act is devoid of
specific analysis outside of the political ground to be gained by Democratic support for
the measure. 202
In a work focused specifically on child labor legislation, Stephen B. Wood
directly challenges Link’s interpretation of Wilson’s conversion. 203 While
acknowledging that political considerations were surely part of the equation, he sees the
President as undergoing a transformation in thinking about the constitutionality of federal
intervention into the economy throughout his first term in office. Wood further points
out that Link “largely ignores the rapid shift in public attitudes about the constitutional
issues between 1907 and 1916 . . . and the fact that both radical agrarian and conservative
states’ rights Democrats enthusiastically supported the Keating-Owen Bill.” 204 Wood’s
analysis of Wilson’s political thought conflicts with that offered by most historians of the
Progressive Era who tend to see the president as, at best, a reluctant reformer. 205 Wood,
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though, portrays the president as willing to use the power of the federal government to
intervene in the economy from the beginning of his 1912 campaign. 206 Rather than
seeing Wilson’s success in pushing the Keating-Owen Bill through the Senate as a shift
away from New Freedom principles, Wood argues that it was a fulfillment of the
president’s consistent vision to humanize industrial life in America. 207
Wood’s interpretation is supported by historian Kendrick Clements’ more recent
biography of Wilson. Unlike Woods, Clements engages with historians who have
trumpeted the conservative Wilson interpretation and, unlike Link, he considers the
motivation behind Wilson’s support of each one of the pieces of “advanced
progressivism” individually. In the case of both the Keating-Owen Bill and the Adamson
Act, he concedes that Wilson’s support for these measures was primarily driven by his
desire to win reelection. 208 However, he argues, the fact that the shift may have been
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motivated by political concerns does not necessarily make it unprincipled. 209 Clements
examines a wide array of Wilson’s writings on the role of government in promoting the
general welfare and concludes, “As a responsible political leader [Wilson believed] it was
therefore his duty to change his positions in response to changing public demands. To
change with the times was to be consistent with principle, not to abandon it.” 210 While
conceding the importance of electoral politics, Clements also believes Wilson’s shift was
in keeping with his constantly evolving stand on the potential of government to legislate
in order to meet the public’s needs. 211
Labor historians, too, have given considerable attention to the both the reason for
and the impact of Wilson’s rather remarkable transformation in 1916. In his sweeping
history of the labor movement published in 1982, Phillip Foner disputes Link’s grouping
of the Adamson Act with measures such as child labor and woman suffrage. In the case
of the Adamson Act, Foner says that political considerations of the upcoming presidential
election certainly played a role, but they were “not the prime motive for Wilson’s action
– the serious damage a railroad strike would inflict on the nation’s economy and the
Wilson preparedness program was a significant factor influencing his thinking.” 212 But
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in the case of a federal child labor bill and woman suffrage, he contends that Wilson’s
reversal was driven by the political exigencies of the 1916 election. 213
A more cynical view of Wilson’s motives appears in a later Foner work that he
co-authored with David Roediger. Writing in 1989, Roediger and Foner note Wilson’s
political finesse with both the Keating-Owen Bill and the Adamson Act. In both cases,
they argue, Wilson was able to make himself appear pro-labor without ever taking an
unequivocal stand for federal action. They note that, although Wilson spoke of the eighthour day as if it should be applied across all industries, the legislation he supported only
made it applicable for children and certain railroad workers. Unconvinced of Wilson’s
complete conversion, they write, “Both the Adamson Act and the Keating-Owen Child
Labor Law illustrate Wilson’s political skill and the ambiguity of federal commitment to
shorter hours.” 214 Understood in this way, Wilson’s support for the Adamson Act, in
particular, can be seen as having much the same effect as his vote in favor of the state
suffrage measure in New Jersey in 1915. Roediger and Foner join with most historians in
noting that, actual limitations notwithstanding, “organized labor seized [the Adamson
Act] as a presidential seal of approval for eight hours.” 215 Just as suffragists used the
President’s vote in New Jersey to argue that he had been won over to the cause (and to
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argue, by extension, that others should follow his lead), so too did labor advocates tout
Wilson’s support for the principle of the eight-hour day in future battles.
Other labor historians concur with Roediger and Foner about the primacy of
political considerations for Wilson. Disagreements mostly center on who did the most to
convince him of the political importance of supporting pro-labor measures. In her history
of the American Federation of Labor, Julie Greene argues that Frank Walsh, chairman of
the Commission on Industrial Relations, played a decisive role. Called by Wilson to the
White House in late August, Walsh convinced the president that the eight-hour day was
just and that large number of workers’ votes would swing toward the Democrats were he
to take the side of the brotherhoods in the railroad crisis. 216 As part of her overall
argument about the importance of Midwestern and Southern agrarian interests, Elizabeth
Sanders argues that it was this peripheral agrarian coalition – more than the leaders of
organized labor or progressive reformers – who provided the votes in Congress that
Wilson needed in order to enact key labor legislation. 217 Despite this difference in
emphasis, both Sanders and Greene note the irony of the fact that winning the eight-hour
day – seen by many as a major labor victory – was not a measure that the AFL had
worked for nor actively supported since it involved intervention by the state. 218
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Finally, there are those historians who choose not to dwell on the details of
Wilson’s evolving principles on domestic legislation in favor of stressing his concern
with foreign affairs. With varying points of emphasis, these historians argue that Wilson
was willing to act the political chameleon in 1916 because he firmly believed that
America had to take the lead in reshaping the international political order - and that only
he and the Democratic Party understood how this ought to be done. Further, he had no
faith in Hughes or other Republican leaders to grasp the significance of this mission. 219
For these historians, Wilson was willing to make almost any compromise on the domestic
front in order to ensure he remained in power to lead America on its mission to save the
world.
A historiographical void lies between those who claim that Wilson’s motives in
supporting the Keating-Owen Bill and the Adamson Act were primarily political and the
assertions of others that the President’s support was consistent with his changing
understanding of the power and potential of the federal government to curb the harshness
of life in an industrialized nation. 220 This chapter attempts to fill part of that void with a
more thorough examination of Wilson’s interaction with the reformers who lobbied for
the bills, the interest groups that opposed them, and the members of his own party in the
Senate who were clearly divided on the issues. It also uses Wilson’s experience with
219
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both the advocates and opponents of protective labor legislation as a way to help
contextualize his decisions with regard to woman suffrage. His increasing openness to
national solutions in the form of federal legislation in 1916 had important implications
for his attitude toward the federal woman suffrage amendment in the following year.

The issue of restricting child labor was not new to Wilson when he assumed the
presidency in 1913. It was, rather, an issue he had confronted early and often in his
public career. As Governor-elect of New Jersey in December, 1910, he voiced his
support for a state child labor law during a speech to the senior class of Princeton
University. 221 During his brief administration in New Jersey, he helped shepherd a
“Messenger Boy Bill” through the state legislature in 1911 and later authored the
platform of the New Jersey Democratic Party in 1912 which promised to continue to
work for legislation that included the “careful regulation of the hours of labor for
children.” 222
As president, he repeatedly voiced his support for the principle of restricting child
labor. In his 1913 inaugural address, he declared as just, “laws determining conditions of
labor which individuals are powerless to determine for themselves.” 223 When the editor
of the Medical Review of Reviews asked him for a statement of support to be used in an
upcoming child labor awareness campaign in 1914, Wilson complied, responding, “This
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is a cause to which I have long been devoted.” 224 Later, he approved of a plank in the
1916 Democratic Party Platform promising that all federal agencies would adhere to the
child labor standards proposed by the NCLC in its “Uniform Child Labor Law” and that
the party encouraged similar legislation for each of the states. 225 In every case where he
had the opportunity to voice his support for the principle of restricting child labor, Wilson
expressed such support. Simultaneously, though, he consistently stated his concern about
the constitutionality of any federal regulation.
As early as 1908 Wilson wrote in his political treatise, Constitutional Government
in the United States, that a federal child labor bill which relied on the commerce clause
was an abuse of Congressional power. 226 Wilson’s primary concern – one which could
continue to plague his thoughts even after he decided to support federal regulation – was
opening the floodgates of the commerce clause. If congress could regulate the labor of
children within the borders of a state, he worried, where else might they see fit to use the
commerce clause to intervene?
He reiterated this concern when speaking to reporters just after his gubernatorial
victory in New Jersey in November, 1910. Wilson explained his belief that, “We will
never get to the place toward which we all aspire by any such excited life in any one part
of the Constitution. If it is to grow as we grow, it must be throughout its structure. The
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theory that child labor, for example, may be classed under interstate commerce logically
leads to the inclusion of more and more of the phases of intercourse until there is no
reason why divorce and marriage laws should not be put there.” 227 This statement
illustrates two important characteristics in Wilson’s thinking. The first is his belief, in
1910, that the commerce clause could not safely be extended to regulate child labor
without becoming an open avenue for Congress to regulate matters far beyond the
intended scope of the clause. Secondly, though, the statement reveals Wilson’s
recognition of the fact that the Constitution should “grow” and be adapted by the public
to meet their changing needs. Clearly, he believed that any such growth should be
gradual, limited, and carefully applied so as to not upset the delicate constitutional system
of checks and balances. But he was not so conservative that he believed the American
public should be prisoners of a document designed to serve their needs.
Wilson’s concern about the constitutionality of a federal child labor bill continued
throughout his first presidential term. Prior to taking office in January, 1913, Wilson told
NCLC leaders, “My own party in some of its elements represents a very strong States’
rights feeling. It is very plain that you would have to go much further than most
interpretations of the Constitution would allow if you were to give to the government
general control over child labor throughout the country.” 228 His position changed little
over the course of his first year in office. When NCLC President Felix Adler and two of
his lieutenants requested a meeting with the President in January, 1914 to discuss the
Palmer-Owen Bill, he told his secretary, “Glad to see these gentlemen, but they ought to
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know, in all frankness, that no child labor law yet proposed has seemed to me
constitutional.” 229 Neither his public statements nor his private correspondence include
any direct references to the constitutionality of federal regulation after this point. That
can be partially explained by Lovejoy, McKelway, and Adler’s success in getting the
president to agree to maintain a public silence while Congress debated both the PalmerOwen and the Keating-Owen bills. It may also be explained by the fact that the NCLC
leaders had done extensive work to build their case that the proposed bill was, in fact,
constitutional and would be upheld by the Supreme Court. 230
Like Wilson, NCLC leaders were apprehensive about the ability of the PalmerOwen Bill, if passed, to withstand judicial review. Their concerns with constitutionality
had driven Lovejoy to bring in a number of legal and labor experts to help draft the
bill. 231 Additionally, they drafted an educational memorandum entitled “In Reply to
Questions on the Constitutionality of the Palmer Federal Child Labor Bill.” 232 In
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anticipation of questions that NCLC leaders knew would be asked, the memorandum
cited a series of recent Supreme Court rulings that the authors believed had increased the
power of the federal government to intervene in the economic affairs of individual states
if it was to safeguard or improve the welfare of the nation as a whole. 233
When the NCLC leaders met with Wilson in February, they presented him with a
copy of the proposed bill and the educational memorandum. 234

According to Lovejoy,

the President agreed to maintain a public silence and said “that he would give the matter
very careful consideration.” 235 It is significant to note that the next public action taken by
the president with regards to child labor was to press for the passage of the KeatingOwen Bill in July 1916. This suggests that he was sincere when he said he would
carefully consider the memorandum on constitutionality and that, perhaps, he was
convinced by the compelling document that federal regulation of child labor was not
beyond the scope of the commerce clause. At a minimum, it seems, he became willing to
let the courts decide the matter.
Although there is no transcript of Wilson’s meeting with Democratic Senators on
July 18, 1916, the debate that followed in the Senate suggests that, in addition to making
his point about the political value of passing the bill, he may have also urged the reluctant
members of his own party to defer to the judicial branch. The consensus opinion of the
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bill’s proponents, repeated in one form or another in almost all of their speeches, was that
the bill was desirable for humanitarian reasons and that it stood a solid chance of being
upheld by the Supreme Court, particularly given the Court’s recent favorable rulings in
Muller v. Oregon and Hoke v. United States. 236 Senator Gallinger, a Republican from
New Hampshire, made direct reference to Wilson’s changed outlook on the bill’s
constitutionality. Gallinger explained, “I have since had occasion to consult some of
those same [Democratic] Senators and they have told me that they have changed their
views, as the President of the United States has changed his views, and that they now
believe the legislation to be constitutional . . . assuming that it will go to the Supreme
Court of the United States for interpretation and decision.” 237 Gallinger’s statement
implies that Wilson told members of his own party that he had changed his mind on the
possibilities of the commerce clause to regulate child labor. If that implication is correct,
it also means that Wilson’s motivation in pressing for the bill was more principled than
the interpretation which holds that he acted almost purely out of political necessity.
Political necessity, however, was certainly part of the motivation. Early on in the
1916 campaigning season, Wilson began receiving advice from supporters about how to
use the child labor issue to win over disgruntled progressives. In June, Senator Owen,
co-sponsor of the child labor bill, wrote to Wilson, “I enclose what I think would be of
special value as a plank to attract the progressive elements in the country who ought to be
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with us . . ..” 238 The enclosure to which Owen referred was a statement of Democratic
principles that included a plank to prohibit child labor. Wilson’s willingness to include
this plank in the 1916 Democratic Party platform indicates that he took Owen’s
suggestion to heart.
As the Keating-Owen Bill languished in the Democratic Senate Caucus in July,
Wilson’s Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, wrote to encourage the President to
intervene. Daniels, a native of North Carolina and former editor of one of the South’s
leading newspapers, The Raleigh Observer, told Wilson that he knew there was
opposition to the federal child labor bill among certain southern Congressmen - but went
on to say, “I believe that the failure to pass that bill will lose us more votes in the close
states than our Southern Senators appreciate.” 239 On the same day that Wilson heard
from Daniels, he also received a letter from McKelway who cautioned, “In spite of the
progressive record of the Democratic Party, I fear that the action on the child labor bill
will be regarded as a test of genuine interest in humane measures opposed by commercial
interests. I wish that you could see your way clear to use your influence in furtherance of
this important measure.” 240 The combined effect of Daniels’ and McKelway’s warnings
were enough to propel Wilson to action. He responded back to the NCLC leader the
following day, “I went up to the Senate yesterday to urge the immediate passage of the
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Child Labor Bill and am encouraged to believe that the situation has changed
considerably.” 241
In terms of winning over reform-minded voters, both the public coverage of
Wilson’s actions and the private correspondence he received were overwhelmingly
positive. A July 19th headline in the New York Times read, “President Demands A Child
Labor Law, Makes a Personal Visit to the Capitol to Impress his Views on Senate
Leaders, Urges the Pending Bill, Bases His Request on the Measure’s Merits as Well as
Political Expediency.” 242 Subsequent New York Times coverage highlighted the manner
in which the bill’s proponents used Wilson’s activism as a mechanism for propelling the
bill towards a successful vote. 243 This was clearly an intended effect. Banking on the
political value of the bill, Wilson even postponed accepting the Democratic Party’s
nomination until the bill had passed so that he could make reference to it in his
acceptance speech. 244
A flood of letters in the days following Wilson’s trip to the Capitol suggest that his
activism did, in fact, garner him progressive support. Progressive journalists from both
sides of the country congratulated him on taking decisive action. 245 Similarly, Wilson
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received a telegram from Benjamin Barr Lindsey, a district judge in Denver and a
member of the National Executive Committee of the Progressive Party. Lindsey’s
telegram, which the Democratic National Committee subsequently released for
publication in the New York Times, gushed, “Your splendid attitude on this question and
willingness to change from your former position with the states rights Democrats to
Federal or National control when it becomes clearly apparent that it is the best method to
put an end to certain evils or advance certain rights should be sufficient proof to wavering
Progressives that the Democratic Party is as willing as the Republican Party in proper
cases to put the National welfare above state considerations.” 246 Lindsey’s sentiments
were echoed by other progressives in both their private correspondence with Wilson and
their public writings. 247
Wilson’s support for child labor legislation was one of those rare political moves
that managed to please a significant number of voters, while not having the simultaneous
affect of alienating a large voting bloc. Opponents of the federal bill were primarily
limited to a few southern states that Wilson’s advisors often told him were not
representative of the South as a whole. This fact was made clear in a number of ways.
When the House Labor Committee held public hearings on the bill in the spring of 1914,
the testimony was dominated by the bill’s advocates. 248 The bill passed in the House by
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an overwhelming majority of 233-43 in February 1915, indicating the broad support the
measure enjoyed. Of the 43 opposition votes, 35 came from six southern states, but there
was not a “solid south” vote. In fact, only in the Congressional delegations from North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi did a majority oppose the bill. 249
More serious opposition emerged before the final vote in the Senate. David
Clark, a native of North Carolina and the editor and sole owner of the Southern Textile
Bulletin, seeing the ease with which the bill passed in the House, organized a conference
of mill men from several southern states and founded the Executive Committee of
Southern Cotton Manufacturers. The organization’s sole purpose was to block federal
child labor legislation. 250 Clark had tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the NCLC to
abandon its campaign for a federal law. He accused the NCLC propagandists of grossly
exaggerating both the number of children working in textile mills and the poor working
conditions within those mills. He conceded that there were a significant number of
children employed in mill work - but argued that a federal law was unnecessary because,
“The Southern States are essentially law abiding, and sooner or later every mill will be
forced to comply with the legal requirements.” 251 Clark’s plea fell on deaf ears, for the
NCLC was moving confidently forward with federal legislation.
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Neither Clark nor the organization he represented ever tried to influence Wilson
directly. When the federal child labor bill was reintroduced in the 64th Congress, Clark’s
organization had numerous manufacturers and doctors give testimony before the House
Labor Committee and, later, before the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee. 252 When
the latter voted 7-6 to report the bill favorably, Clark successfully appealed to southern
senators to block consideration of the bill. They only relented, he later recalled, “when
President Wilson under the influence of certain agitators went to the Senate and
demanded the passage of the law.” 253
Clark was convinced that Wilson’s motivations were purely political. In an editorial,
he wrote, “The passage by Congress and the approval by President Wilson of the Child
Labor Law was a matter of politics; nothing more, nothing less. 254 Still, Clark made no
attempt to correspond directly with the President or any members of his cabinet about his
decision. Instead, the Executive Committee of Southern Cotton Manufacturers chose to
fight the federal law through the court system. It was Clark who recruited a mill
operative, Reuben H. Dagenhart, to file suit against the Keating-Owen law. This case
eventually became the Supreme Court Case Hammer v. Dagenhart in which the law was
found to be unconstitutional. 255
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So opposition to the bill was limited. Wilson heard from several men from the South
that Clark and the mill owners he represented were a small minority. For example, James
H. Holloway of North Carolina told Wilson, “The opposition to the Child Labor Law
does not represent One PerCent of the people of the South. It is being festered and
agitated by our cotton and Knitting Mill Barons who look with horror and dismay on any
effort looking to the reduction or curtailment of their enormous profits.” 256 The message
from men like Holloway was clear – do not worry about alienating the South by
supporting the Keating-Owen bill. Armed with this advice and seeing the overwhelming
support that the bill received in the House, Wilson recognized an opportunity to support a
popular piece of legislation without alienating a significant bloc of voters. The political
benefits clearly outweighed the potential costs.
Despite his eventual support for the Keating-Owen bill, Wilson never fully
relinquished his constitutional misgivings about the use of the commerce clause to
regulate the labor of children. Several months after signing the bill into law he received a
letter from Secretary of War Newton Baker containing a series of resolutions adopted by
the National Consumers League. One of the resolutions was approval of a federal eighthour day law for women founded on the principles embodied in the federal child labor
law. Wilson responded to Baker, “I dare say these are the first of a series of suggestions
of a similar kind which will grow out of the Child Labor bill. I wonder what you yourself
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think as to the limits of this sort of legislation by Congress?” 257 If Wilson harbored such
doubts about expanding the commerce clause after the fact, why had he consented to
support the child labor bill in the first place?
The president was willing to set aside his constitutional misgivings as a result of
conducting his own cost-benefit analysis. On the benefit side of the ledger, he could list
the fact that the principle behind the Keating-Owen bill, restricting the labor of children,
was one he had consistently supported during his career in public life. Additionally, the
measure enjoyed tremendous support among progressive voters and trade unionists, two
voting blocs he sought to add to his coalition for the 1916 election. Finally, he was
convinced by the two votes in the House (233-43 in 1915 and 343-46 in 1916) that
passage of this bill was the will of the general public. And the costs were negligible.
Pressing the Senate antagonized men like David Clark and the southern mill owners he
represented, but it was clear from the House and Senate hearings and from the advice he
received from other southerners that Clark and company were a small minority. More
importantly, though, for a man with a strong states’ rights and laissez-faire background,
was the potential for opening up the commerce clause to continued intervention by the
federal government into the economic affairs of the states.
Wilson was able to rationalize away this final cost by taking to heart the arguments
in favor of constitutionality offered up by the NCLC. Never a strict constructionist, the
President recognized the need for the Constitution to change in order to meet the needs of
those it was designed to serve. As he reviewed the NCLC memorandum that cited cases
in which the Supreme Court had upheld the right and, in some cases, the responsibility of
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the federal government to intervene in the economy in order to promote social welfare, he
became optimistic about the potential for the Keating-Owen bill to withstand judicial
review. 258 At a minimum, the overwhelming public support, the lure of progressive and
labor votes in the upcoming election, and the rightness of the principle involved made
him willing to support the bill in the near term and defer to the judiciary in the long term.
Ultimately, his decision to support a federal child labor bill reflected a combination of
political need and principled decision-making.
The Adamson Act differed markedly from the Keating-Owen Act in that it did not
involve such a direct matter of constitutionality and its opponents were a much larger and
more unified group, namely the pro-business interests from across the country. 259 But
Wilson’s involvement with this legislation did follow very much the same pattern as the
child labor bill. In the months leading up to the 1912 election, he explicitly rejected
federal action to protect class interests. Speaking to a group of unionists in Buffalo on
Labor Day in September, 1912, Wilson championed traditional American individualism
and denied the very concept of different interests between labor and capital: “Half of the
difficulties, half of the injustices of our politics, have been due to the fact that men
regarded themselves as having separate interests . . . I would like always to look at [the
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nation] as a whole, not divided up into sections and classes.” 260 He went on to
specifically criticize the Progressive Party’s proposals for federal protective labor
legislation, saying, “Let me tell you that the old adage that God takes care of those who
take care of themselves is not gone out of date. No federal legislation can change that
thing.” 261 Speaking to a Working Men’s League in New York a few days later, Wilson
began by saying, “I always like to feel that the company in which I am speaking
represents no class and no class feeling, but represents the united interests of a people
which can be divided, if divided at all, only artificially.” 262
Perhaps as a result of his narrow victory in 1912 and the election returns that
indicated just how many Americans clearly disagreed with him on the reality of class
interests, Wilson’s tone softened dramatically between September 1912 and his inaugural
address in March 1913. As he took office, he reached out to workers and reform
advocates alike. The new president noted America’s industrial achievements, but also
said, “We have not hitherto stopped thoughtfully enough to count the human cost, the
cost of lives snuffed out, of energies overtaxed and broken, the fearful physical and
spiritual cost to the men and women and children, upon who the dead weight and burden
of it all has fallen pitilessly the years through.” 263 He even took the dramatic step of
questioning whether industrialization had rendered the ideal of individualism obsolete:
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“Our thought has been ‘Let every man look out for himself; let every generation look out
for itself,’ while we reared giant machinery which made it impossible that any but those
who stood at the levers of control should have a chance to look out for themselves.” 264
Most dramatically, his inaugural address seemed to indicate a new openness to
protective labor legislation. Wilson proclaimed, “Nor have we studied and perfected the
means by which government may be put at the service of humanity . . . There can be no
equality of opportunity, the first essential of justice in the body politic, if men and women
and children be not shielded in their lives, their very vitality, from the consequences of
great industrial and social processes which they cannot alter, control, or singly cope
with.” 265 He did not clarify whether the federal government or state governments or
corporations themselves should “shield” workers, but his words were enough to raise the
hopes and, more importantly, the expectations of progressives and labor leaders.
As documented previously in this chapter, Wilson’s actions in his first term
consistently failed to live up to the expectations created by his inaugural address. Siding
with the Brotherhoods in the railroad crisis of 1916 was, then, another opportunity for
him to make amends. The potential votes to be gained by siding with labor on this issue
are largely the same as those associated with the child labor bill and need not be
recounted here. 266 But how to move from general support for the principle of the eighthour day to federal regulation of workers’ hours when he had previously stood so firmly
against just such measures – and how to do so without appearing to be pandering for
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votes - remained an obstacle. Ultimately, Wilson justified his position on three basic
principles: the justice of the eight-hour day, its endorsement by the general public, and
the very real calamitous effects that would result from a general strike by the railroad
Brotherhoods. He further shielded himself against charges of political expediency by
repeatedly emphasizing that legislative action was a last resort to which he had turned
only when all other options had been exhausted.
As the crisis reached a breaking point in late August, Wilson expressed in both his
private correspondence and public declarations that he believed the eight-hour day was
just and that it represented the consensus opinion of the majority of Americans. In a
private letter to Democratic Senator Francis Newlands, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce, Wilson explained, “I made this recommendation [for
the owners to concede the eight-hour day] because I believe the concession right. The
eight-hour day undoubtedly has the sanction of the judgment of society in its favor and
should be adopted.” 267 On that same day, he issued a public statement that word-for-word
repeated what he had told Newlands. The president’s statement was subsequently
reprinted in every major newspaper in the country. 268
As the battle over the eight-hour day increasingly moved into the public arena and
was fought out in the nation’s newspapers, Wilson stood by his argument from justice.
On August 18, the President of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM),
George Pope, sent Wilson a telegram (which he simultaneously released to the press)
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calling for the President to side with the owners and to force the Brotherhoods to agree to
arbitration. In his response (also released to the press), Wilson again cited the public’s
support for the eight-hour day, calling it a measure “to which the whole economic
movement of the time seems to point.” 269 Predictably, editors of the nation’s leading
newspapers weighed in on the Pope-Wilson exchange, with Democratic-leaning papers
generally supporting Wilson and the Brotherhoods and Republican-leaning papers
supporting Pope and the owners in their call for arbitration. 270 In the face of criticism,
the president never wavered. He continued to emphasize justice, public will, and the
debilitating impact of a general strike.
There is little reason to doubt Wilson’s sincerity about the disastrous effects of the
strike. The fact that he devoted more than a week in the middle of August to personally
leading the negotiations between the Brotherhoods and the owners is evidence of both his
desire to avoid a strike and his hope to achieve a non-statist agreement. The New York
Times reported on August 19 that the president was “still optimistic” about bringing the
two sides together on a compromise. 271 But when hopes of a compromise vanished and
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the strike appeared imminent, Wilson’s fear of the consequences overpowered all other
considerations and, reluctantly, he made the dramatic decision to turn to Congress. 272
In his address to the joint session of Congress on August 29, Wilson reiterated the
same arguments he had made in the press during the preceding weeks. He explained that
he remained committed to the principle of arbitration for industrial disputes but went on
to say that current law did not grant him the power to compel the two sides to submit the
issue to arbitration. Emphasizing that a strike by 400,000 rail workers was now
imminent, he forecasted the potential effects in cataclysmic terms: “Cities will be cut off
from their food supplies, the whole commerce of the nation would be paralyzed, men of
every sort and occupation will be thrown out of employment, countless thousands will in
all likelihood be brought, it may be, to the very point of starvation, and a tragical national
calamity brought on . . .” 273 Wilson also cited the potential for the railroad strike to
threaten the nation’s security, both in terms of hampering the military’s ability to
logistically support the 15,000 troops stationed on the Mexican border and its ability to
respond to changing events in the war in Europe. Finally, he spoke again of justice,
proclaiming, “that the whole spirit of the time and the preponderant evidence of recent
economic experience spoke for the eight-hour day. It has been adjudged by the thought
and experience of recent years a thing upon which society is justified in insisting.” 274
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Congress heeded the president’s call and the Adamson Act became the law of the
land on September 3, 1916. Labor leaders and progressives alike hailed the attainment of
what many considered to be labor’s most significant goal. IRC Chairman Frank Walsh
heaped praise on Wilson, calling his action “unparalleled in the annals of statesmanship”
and claiming that the Adamson Act marked, “the beginning of the end of an industrial
despotism.” 275 Again, the newspapers lined up along partisan lines, but it is interesting to
note the much more significant outcry from the Republican-leaning press over the
Adamson Act as compared to the child labor bill. 276 In the weeks that followed, Wilson’s
Republican presidential opponent, Charles Evan Hughes, increasingly centered his
campaign around attacking the incumbent on this specific issue. He accused Wilson of
selling out to labor in order to win votes, a charge that Wilson hotly disputed. 277 Rather
than becoming defensive, Wilson embraced his action with regard to the eight-hour day
and, much to Hughes’ dismay, also made it a centerpiece of his campaign. 278
Whereas Wilson needed reassurance from his southern advisors that his support
for the Keating-Owen Bill would not alienate the majority of southern Democrats, he
neither sought nor received any such advice with regards to the Adamson Act and the
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alienation of the “commercial interests.” This simplest explanation for this difference is
that Wilson never harbored hope of swinging pro-business voters away from the
Republican Party. As with the Keating-Owen Bill, he conducted a cost-benefit analysis
and saw that he stood to make substantial gains with progressives and labor by his
support of the eight-hour day. The potential electoral losses were relatively insignificant.
The only real loss was his abandonment of the principles of both states’ rights and antistatism. As he looked to build a national party, one that could face both domestic and
international challenges, he was willing to accept that loss. And it was, in fact, Wilson’s
ability to portray himself and his party as more attuned to the nation’s temper on issues of
progressivism and peace that carried him to victory in 1916.
So how did Wilson’s moderate stance on woman suffrage, outlined in the
preceding chapter, factor in with his broader platform of progressivism and peace during
the 1916 election, particularly with regard to women voters in the West? In short, it
worked brilliantly. With the exception of Oregon, Wilson won the electoral votes of
every state in the West. The headline in the New York Times read, “Votes of Women and
Bull Moose Elected Wilson; Western Progressives Turned to Him Almost En Masse, but
Not Those of the East; Peace a Powerful Issue.” 279 The article specifically derided the
efforts of the NWP. Under the banner, “Woman’s Party Failed Utterly,” it read,
The Woman’s Party terrorized the two conventions and frightened them with the
prospect of ‘four million votes,’ which it held over them as a club. Mr. Hughes was
led to believe that it had the votes and made his celebrated declaration for the
Anthony Federal amendment. The Woman’s Party tried to make its threats good and
marshal the Western women for Hughes, but the dispatches received by The Times
showed that it failed utterly. It did have an influence, but the wrong kind. These
dispatches are unanimous in recording the antagonism excited by the activities of the
Woman’s Party, and also by the special train of Hughes women which went
279
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campaigning from New York into the West. From many states come reports that
both these things added greatly to Wilson’s vote; from no State comes a report that it
subtracted from that vote. The women, where they broke away from party lines or
where they voted contrary to their men folks, voted for Wilson. They did so
generally on the argument that ‘He kept us out of war.” In some States, such as
Washington, the influential argument with them was not this one, but the legislative
record which appealed to them as progressives. 280
Correspondence between Wilson and his closest advisors in the months before the
election indicate that they should not have been at all surprised by women’s behavior at
the polls in November. With a much firmer grasp of the relative importance of suffrage
as an election issue than that held by the NWP, they had counted on such behavior all
along.
Wilson was instrumental in the development of the Democratic platform that was
eventually adopted at the St. Louis convention in June. The plank endorsing the principle
of suffrage but only recommending that the individual states extend the franchise to
women had his full support. During the debate over that particular plank, the antisuffrage Governor Ferguson of Texas made a last-minute attempt to have it removed
completely. His motion gained the support of a number of Southerners, which propelled
Catt to telegraph the President and ask him to clarify his position. He promptly replied
that the plank received his approval and that he wished to recommend to the states that
they extend suffrage to women upon the same terms as to men. 281 After the newspapers
ran reports of Catt’s call to Wilson for clarification of his position, a woman in California
wrote the president, “Who is Carrie Chapman Catt that she can call the President of the
United States to order. Don’t fear those four million woman votes in the Suffrage states.
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They will vote the democratic ticket.” 282 The message to not worry about Western
women abandoning the Democrats over the issue of suffrage was one that Wilson heard
repeatedly over the next four and a half months.
In early August, Daniels relayed a message to Wilson from Representative
Keating from Colorado. Reacting to Hughes’ declaration in support of the federal
amendment just a few days earlier, Keating opined that Wilson should not change his
states’ rights position. Voters would recognize that he was only changing his position to
try and win votes, and, in fact, a shift at this juncture would only have the opposite effect.
Despite the fact that Keating was an advocate for the federal amendment and desired
Wilson’s support, he recommended that the president adhere to the party platform in
order to win the election. 283 Similarly, both Vice-President Marshall and Colonel
Edward House complimented the president on standing by his states’ right stance, even as
Hughes voiced support for the federal amendment. 284 Interestingly, all of this counsel
came from members of Wilson’s advisory circle who were self-professed suffragists.
They recognized, though, that suffrage would not be the deciding issue of the election
and that a Democratic victory was more important for accomplishing a wide range of
Wilsonian initiatives.
Wilson articulated his position on suffrage during a speech to the Jane Jefferson
Club of Colorado on August 7. He proclaimed his faith that women voters would study
the broad questions facing America and select the candidate that could best handle all of
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those questions. Additionally, he criticized Hughes for supporting a federal amendment
when the Republican Party had been unwilling to go that far at their Chicago convention.
Adamant that he would not disregard the official declaration of his party, he would do
everything within his power to press for suffrage in state referenda. Finally, in a sign of
things to come, he complimented the sacrifices and war service of women in Europe as
proof that women contribute service to their nations just as men do and therefore deserve
equal citizenship. 285
Political insiders from the West continued to reassure Wilson that his suffrage
position would not harm him throughout the late summer and early fall of 1916. One of
Wilson’s advisors passed along a letter in late August from Mary Field, “a highly
intelligent woman who knows more about California than anyone I know.” Field refuted
the Woman’s Party claim that they would be able to sway the woman’s vote in the West.
She was confident that women would not vote on a sex basis. Rather, most people in the
West were grateful that Wilson had kept the nation out of war. She continued, “I feel that
Wilson’s policy has done for women far more than the endorsement of the franchise
amendment. Far reaching and less obvious are the results of his federal reserve banking
system, his rural credits, his tariff regulations, his industrial relations commission – all of
which have direct, though subtile [sic], effect on the lives of women, especially the
workers. 286 Field’s letter, much like the majority of responses to Belmont’s request for
financial support of NWP activities, indicates that women were much more complex
political creatures than the NWP made them out to be.
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Wilson even received reassurances from NAWSA leaders that he need not worry
about the Woman’s Party activity in the West. Anna Howard Shaw, now retired but still
an honorary member of the NAWSA executive council, told Wilson’s campaign manager
to disregard the NWP. She stressed that NAWSA was the largest suffrage group and the
one to whom the President should pay attention. 287 Less than two weeks later, Wilson
found himself being wildly applauded by the assembled members of NAWSA at the
Atlantic City Convention. His closest advisors, political activists from the West, and the
nation’s largest group of suffragists all expressed their support for his stance on suffrage.
With good reason, he ignored the NWP and ran a successful campaign based on his
accomplishments in the arenas of foreign policy and progressivism.
Wilson’s strategy of supporting the principle of woman suffrage, federal child
labor legislation, and the eight-hour day as part of a broad program of reforms aimed at
securing the votes of progressives and trade unionists was successful. He narrowly
defeated Hughes in the electoral college 277-254. The popular vote went 9,126,300 for
Wilson (49%) as compared to 8,546,789 for Hughes (46%). Importantly, the Socialist
vote was reduced to just 589,924 (3%). 288 Most contemporary election analysts attributed
the shift in votes from the Socialist candidate to Wilson to the Democratic Party’s record
on labor issues. 289 Historians have reached the same conclusions. 290 And, of course,
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there was the issue of peace. Perhaps even more important than any of the debates on
domestic policy, Wilson’s firm stance against American intervention in the war in Europe
secured the necessary votes for his 1916 victory. As the next chapter will show, the
significance of this fact weighed heavily on the president in early 1917 when he was
forced to make the difficult decision to lead the nation into war.
NAWSA viewed the election results as a vindication of their strategy to remain
non-partisan and to continue to work for suffrage amendments at both the state and
federal level. For months after the election, NAWSA leaders used their newsletter and
journal to editorialize about the superiority of their approach over that of the NWP.
Oftentimes, they reprinted articles and editorials from the nation’s mainstream
newspapers, most of which contained the same analysis: that the women’s vote in the
West had played a large role in Wilson’s victory and that women proved to be
independent thinkers who were concerned with a broad range of domestic and foreign
policy issues. 291
Predictably, the NWP had a much different interpretation of the election results.
In contrast to every major newspaper in the country, the first post-election publication of
The Suffragist declared, “In analyzing the election returns, we find that the women
responded loyally to our appeal not to give their support to Mr. Wilson because of his
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opposition to national woman suffrage.” 292 To support this dubious claim, the editors
cited the results in Illinois – the only state in which votes of women were counted
separately – pointing to the fact that Hughes received 70,000 more votes from women
than did Wilson. That the results in Illinois did not reflect the larger trend in Western
states did little to deter NWP leaders from claiming victory for their strategy. Neither did
the fact that, despite their call to “hold the party in power responsible” for inactivity on
the federal amendment, Wilson was re-elected and the Democrats retained control of
Congress.
NWP leaders struggled to explain away this apparent failure: “We were not
concerned with the result of the election. Ours was a campaign in which it made no
difference who was elected … What we did try to do was to organize a protest vote
against Mr. Wilson’s attitude toward suffrage. This we did.” 293 Again, this claim ran
contrary to the consensus opinion of election analysts across the country that women in
the West voted overwhelmingly in favor of Wilson. In subsequent editions of The
Suffragist, the editors slightly modified their victory assertion. They backed away from
the claim of swinging a large number of women voters away from the Democrats and,
instead, focused on their achievement of having made suffrage a central issue in the
campaign. In future elections, they warned, politicians of both parties will be more
acutely aware “that many women are anxious to use their votes to win political liberty for
the women of the whole country.” 294 Whether this statement was accurate or not, in
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taking this position, Paul and her followers stood squarely in line with the prevailing
theories about the role of third parties. But they also faced the challenge that confronts
all third parties in the wake of an election; that is, how to sustain and even build
momentum in the years before the next election. The next chapter will show that Paul
answered that challenge with the NWP picketing strategy.
As 1916 drew to a close, Wilson found himself still in control of the White House
and his party still in control of Congress. He had been narrowly reelected, largely on the
basis of his ability to keep the nation out of war. And he had shown an openness to
change his policy stances if certain conditions were met. Based on the evidence in this
chapter, those conditions included the following: proof that the change was just and that
it represented the will of the general public, that it enjoyed the support of his closest
advisors, and that, while political benefits would certainly be welcome, Wilson could
justify to himself that it was in keeping with the contours of the Constitution. Despite
having run as the “peace” candidate, events on the world stage would force him to
radically alter America’s position on the war in 1917. The crisis in Wilson’s
Administration would force Catt to also make a fundamental change in NAWSA’s policy
by convincing the organization to simultaneously work in support of the war and
suffrage. Paul, too, would drastically alter the strategy of the NWP in 1917. Rather than
taking a stand on the war in Europe, Paul initiated a war at the White House gates.

138

CHAPTER 5
1917 – YEAR OF DECISIONS

On New Year’s Day in 1917, the biggest and boldest headline on the front page of
the New York Times read, “London Applauds the Allies’ Reply; Washington Sees Chance
for Peace; Stir About Second Note From Spain.” 295 News of the war in Europe
dominated the headlines on the first day of the new year. In many ways, this was a sign of
things to come. Long before the United States formally entered the war in the spring of
1917, events on the battlefields of Europe captured a great deal of the attention of
American politicians and the general public alike. By February 1917, though, with US
entry into the war looking increasingly likely, national attention became almost entirely
focused on the war. This would remain the case for the remainder of 1917 and for most
of 1918 as well. It is critical to establish this fact at the start of this section in order to
keep the events that will be described in this chapter in their proper perspective. In very
different ways, the nation’s suffragists sought to keep some attention on their movement
in 1917. But for the general public and certainly for the President, the war remained the
central focus throughout the year.
As the last chapter revealed, Wilson was narrowly reelected in November 1916,
largely on the basis of keeping the nation out of war. But by early February 1917, events
on the international stage would result in his dramatic decision to reverse course and lead
the nation into war. This chapter places Wilson’s actions with regard to suffrage in the
year after his re-election into context with the other issues he faced – issues that had the
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potential to affect the entire world. It reveals an increasingly close political and personal
relationship between Wilson and NAWSA President Carrie Chapman Catt, two leaders
who needed one another’s support. Wilson desired all the political allies he could find as
he reversed his position on US involvement in the war. As president of NAWSA, Catt
needed support from the President as she executed “The Winning Plan,” which entailed
winning referenda in a number of states and overcoming legislative hurdles so as to
increase the chances of securing a federal amendment. 296 Evidence presented in this
chapter shows Wilson and Catt’s vision for the proper suffrage strategy evolving in
concert in 1917 through constant and careful correspondence. 297 At Catt’s behest,
Wilson played a vital role in several successful state suffrage campaigns and facilitated
the creation of a separate congressional committee on woman suffrage. A factor pushing
Catt and Wilson even closer together was the strategy employed by Alice Paul and the
NWP.
From January through November, the NWP sent groups of women dubbed “silent
sentinels” to picket the White House. Wilson’s opposition to the federal amendment was
the focus of their protest. Starting in June, angry mobs attacked the pickets.
Subsequently, the pickets, rather than their attackers, were arrested and jailed. The
bravery of the NWP pickets in the face of hostile crowds and certain imprisonment is an
inspiring story. Further, the violation of their civil rights by a government claiming that
the world needed “to be made safe for democracy” is a dark stain on the Wilson
Administration. Shamefully, NAWSA chose to look the other way as their sister
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suffragists were sent to jail for exercising the right of free speech. But contrary to NWP
claims at the end of the year, the picketing campaign was not critical in Wilson’s shift
toward support of the federal amendment. That shift had been underway since his speech
at Atlantic City in September 1916. Rather, it was NAWSA’s work in 1917 that speeded
his conversion to advocacy of the federal amendment by early 1918. At best, the
antagonistic actions of the NWP improved NAWSA’s standing with Wilson. At worst,
their actions armed anti-suffragists with yet another reason to deny women the vote and
made the work of pro-suffrage forces across the nation that much harder.
This chapter begins with an overview of the ideology behind the picketing
campaign followed by a summary of how historians have interpreted its impact. A
careful examination of the evidence regarding Wilson and the public’s reaction to the
pickets results in a challenge to the pro-militant revisionist interpretation. Switching
focus to the issue that actually dominated the year – namely, US entry into the war – this
chapter analyzes key decisions made by Wilson, Catt, and Paul. It chronicles Wilson’s
assistance to Catt as she and NAWSA orchestrated victories in a number of state suffrage
referenda and as they pushed for the creation of a separate suffrage committee in the
House of Representatives. With the President’s backing, the federal amendment received
its first successful vote in Congress in January 1918. An analysis of the competing
NAWSA and NWP strategies and an assessment of the suffrage situation on the eve of
that vote serve as this chapter’s conclusion.
Beginning on January 10, 1917, the NWP sent daily delegations of “silent
pickets” to stand outside the White House gates holding banners which read “Mr.
President, What Will You Do For Woman Suffrage?” and “How Long Must Women
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Wait for Liberty?” The women came in groups of two or three and stood at their posts for
hours at a time, day after day. For nearly six months, the police and the President
generally ignored the activists. However, as the United States entered the war in April
and patriotic fever swept across the nation, many citizens began to view the picketers as
disloyal.
In June, the NWP banners became increasingly provocative, accusing Wilson of
hypocrisy by fighting a war for democracy abroad but denying true democracy at home.
Angry onlookers attacked the pickets and shredded their banners. As scenes like this
played out repeatedly in late June and early July, several picketers were arrested and
imprisoned on charges of obstructing sidewalk traffic. Their attackers were almost never
arrested. During their imprisonment, the jailed suffragists resorted to hunger strikes in
protest against the illegality of their arrests and the bad conditions in the prison. Prison
officials responded by conducting brutal forced feedings. The picketing, arrests, hunger
strikes, and forced feedings that went on from June through November provided the
NWP with intense press coverage. Although much of it was critical of their actions,
NWP leaders believed it helped the cause by keeping the issue of suffrage on the front
pages of the nation’s newspapers. Further, in pointing out Wilson’s hypocrisy and
waging an unrelenting war at his doorstep, they believed they forced him to capitulate to
the federal amendment in order to escape the negative publicity brought about by their
campaign. 298
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Much historiographical debate has centered on the role of the pickets in Wilson’s
eventual decision to advocate for the federal amendment. Indeed, the President began the
year as a staunch states’ rights suffrage supporter but ended the year with tacit
endorsement of the federal amendment. 299 Did this transition occur mostly or partly as a
result of the picketing campaign, or did it occur in spite of the NWP actions? The
traditional interpretation, first articulated by Eleanor Flexner in Century of Struggle,
argues that NWP-generated histories in the years immediately following ratification of
the nineteenth amendment greatly exaggerated the impact of the pickets. Flexner
concedes that suffrage received increased publicity as a result of the NWP activity but
believes that more of the general public and members of Congress were alienated rather
than won over to the cause. Wilson, she argues, was much more influenced by other
events in 1917, particularly his close association with NAWSA and the increasing role
women played in the public after the U.S. entered the war. 300
In their close analysis of Wilson’s relationship to suffrage in a 1981 article,
Christine Lunardini and Thomas Knock argue that the NWP’s action pushed Wilson
towards NAWSA, but they take no further stand than that. Responding to that argument,
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Sara Hunter Graham launched a revisionist interpretation by maintaining that Wilson
came out in support of the federal amendment in December 1917 as a direct result of the
NWP picketing campaigns. The pickets, she claims, succeeded in pointing out the
inconsistency of his war aims about spreading democracy and his administration’s
indifference to democracy at home. Graham contends that the pickets posed such a threat
to Wilson that he entered into a conspiracy with NAWSA, major newspaper editors, and
the director of his Committee of Public Information in order to suppress coverage of
NWP activities. 301
Perhaps inspired by Graham’s rebuttal, Lunardini more boldly argues in a later
work that the NWP campaign did succeed in making the point to the President that there
would be consequences to pay if he did not accede to their demands. Those
consequences included losses for Democrats in future elections and loss of positive
public opinion as a result of his administration’s harsh treatment of the pickets. 302 With
few exceptions, more recent scholarship has tended to accept the revisionist
interpretation, emphasizing the heroism and bravery of the NWP pickets over the
traditional lobbying efforts and state-level work conducted by NAWSA. 303
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Evidence in this chapter challenges the revisionist interpretation. A thorough
examination of the relevant correspondence and newspaper coverage for the most intense
period of picketing (January-November 1917) reveals that the pickets were a constant but
relatively mild annoyance to the President. Most of the publicity so coveted by Paul and
her followers was negative. As ugly as the crowds and the police were towards the
suffragists standing by the White House gates, there was no public outcry when they
were arrested and imprisoned. Rather than being pushed to take more decisive action on
the federal amendment, Wilson found his ability to work for the suffrage cause hampered
by the activities of the NWP. The President acknowledged that the actions of the pickets
brought some bad publicity to his administration, but he was more concerned with the
bad publicity their actions brought to the greater suffrage campaign. From the beginning,
but increasingly so after the war began, Wilson, NAWSA leaders, members of Congress,
most of the general public, and even a significant number of NWP loyalists thought the
picketing campaign was ineffective and, in fact, harmful to the cause.
So, what exactly was the picketing strategy, why did it appear, and how did
Wilson respond to it as it evolved over the course of the year? The NWP Executive
Council released a statement to the press on January 9, 1917 that they had met with the
President and that he had declined to support the federal amendment, citing his allegiance
to the Democratic Party’s platform. At an “indignation meeting” held that afternoon, the
Council had resolved to initiate a new campaign against the President. Their press
release explained that they intended to post women pickets at the White House grounds in

Brown, Did Woodrow Wilson's Gender Politics Matter?, 125-162. Echoing Morgan in many ways, Brown
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the president as problem solvers and mediators.” Quote from p. 151.
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order to make it impossible for the President to enter or leave the White House without
encountering a picket pleading for the cause of suffrage. 304
In fact, Paul had begun developing the picketing strategy at least a month before
the “indignation meeting” in January. Letters from the NWP headquarters were sent to
potential picket line volunteers in late December 1916. 305 Paul had campaigned hard
against Wilson and the Democrats in 1916, but the President had been reelected and his
party retained control of Congress. Claims of victory in The Suffragist notwithstanding,
Paul was keenly aware that “holding the party in power responsible” had failed in 1916
and that the next opportunity to test this strategy again – the 1918 mid-terms – was a long
way away. In the months following the disappointing 1916 election, Paul “felt she
needed to instigate a new nonviolent technique to rally her troops and keep them from
exhaustion and depression.” 306 She specifically settled on picketing the President for
many of the same reasons that she pursued the “holding the party in power responsible”
strategy in 1914 and 1916. As the leader of the party that controlled both houses of
Congress, Wilson had the power to force the issue of the federal amendment. According
to Paul, the pickets would serve as a form of visual rhetoric aimed at convincing the
President to use that power. 307
Wilson’s initial reaction was to view the pickets as a sort of amusing distraction.
He would tip his hat to them as he came and went from the White House. On the first
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extremely cold day that the pickets stood at their posts, he instructed his chief usher to
invite the women into the lower corridor of the White House in order to escape the wind.
When they declined, he ordered the usher to deliver hot bricks to the gate for the women
to use for warmth. 308 He joked with members of his Cabinet that he actually liked the
pickets because they brought him prominence. 309
An article in the New York Times reveals that Wilson was not the only one
amused by the pickets. The Gridiron Club of Washington held a dinner for the President
and several members of his Cabinet in February. A group of actors performed a series of
comedy acts in which they parodied recent political events. The article reported that the
actors introduced a character named “Hazel Jones” as one of the silent suffrage sentinels
at the White House. “Hazel” was then made the target of several gibes in a minstrel skit,
demonstrating that most members of the audience viewed the pickets as a group of crazy
women. The newspaper related one specific joke: “‘Do you know Hazel had an awful
accident? . . . One of those big fat squirrels in the White House grounds bit off her ear.
The President said it wasn’t the squirrel’s fault, and the President was right . . . Suppose
you were a hungry squirrel with an appetite for nuts, and for eight hours in the rain and
snow and sleet somebody stood in front of your house.’” 310 The pickets were mocked
again when actors portraying Ellis Island officials quizzed an immigrant about his
knowledge of America. When they asked the immigrant what President Woodrow
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Wilson spent most of his time doing, the man responded, “Dodging women with
[suffrage banners].” 311
The President was forced to give the pickets more careful consideration beginning
in late June. On June 20, a group of delegates from the new Russian Republic that had
just enfranchised its women arrived at the White House to meet with Wilson. They were
greeted by an NWP banner that read, “President Wilson and Envoy Root are deceiving
Russia. They say ‘We are a democracy. Help us win the war so that democracies may
survive.’ We women of America tell you that America is not a democracy. Twenty
million women are denied the right to vote.” 312 The banner went on to say that Wilson
was the chief opponent of suffrage in America. It urged the Russian delegation to tell
Wilson he must enfranchise women before claiming Russia as an ally. The inflammatory
banner drew a crowd of opponents who ripped the banner to shreds. A similar scene
occurred on the following day when NWP members arrived at their posts with an
identical banner. On that day, the crowd not only tore apart the banner, but some also
physically attacked the pickets and had to be restrained by the police. 313
The incident surrounding the “Russian banner” received considerable press
coverage. Almost every major newspaper in the country carried the story. 314 Several
leading papers responded by publishing editorials condemning the pickets for attacking a
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sitting president during wartime. The Boston Daily Globe, a pro-suffrage paper,
chastised the pickets because they had “harmed the cause” of suffrage. The editorialist
argued, “The women of America should be enfranchised, but if they are to be, they must
pass the test of service . . . A Red Cross nurse, a housewife saving food, a woman worker
setting free a man for the Army, any of them is a more telling argument for suffrage than
a whole line of silent sentinels picketing the man on whose shoulders rest the burdens of
America.” 315 Editorials in the Chicago Daily Tribune and The Atlanta Constitution
echoed the Globe: The NWP pickets were disloyal citizens who would serve their cause
more faithfully by supporting the nation through war service. 316
Members of Congress also voiced their displeasure over the “Russian banner” to
reporters. Congress was deeply divided over the issue of woman suffrage, but senators
and representatives were nearly unanimous in their condemnation of the NWP’s
actions. 317 The Washington Post reported, “Meanwhile the affairs of the last two days
have operated to give Congress a veritable chill. Even the friends of suffrage among
senators and representatives now have ‘cold feet’ and feel that the cause of suffrage has
received a setback from which it cannot recover during the present session.” 318 Of note,
news accounts, editorials, and statements from members of Congress all highlighted the
fact that the NWP represented a minority of suffragists and noted that NAWSA did not
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condone the pickets. In almost every case, reporters made a clear distinction between the
NWP and NAWSA, evidence of the success of the former in distancing itself from the
latter over the course of the preceding year.
Over the next two weeks after the first “Russian banner” appeared, a pattern
developed in which the pickets would arrive at their posts, be attacked by unruly crowds,
and then be arrested. Initially, the police claimed that the arrests were for their own
protection, although later the pickets were charged with obstructing sidewalk traffic.
Wilson did not make any public statements during this time, but privately he confided his
disappointment in the type of publicity being drawn to suffrage. He wrote to his daughter
on the day of the second crowd attack, “I dare say you heard of the fracas raised by the
representatives of the Woman’s Party here at the gates of the White House. They
certainly seem bent upon making their cause as obnoxious as possible.” 319
On July 14, sixteen women were arrested on the charges of causing unlawful
assembly before the White House. In court three days later, the women received fines,
but refused to pay, so were sentenced to varying periods of confinement at Occoquan
Workhouse in Virginia. According to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia,
Louis Brownlow, the President was not told beforehand that the arrests were going to be
made, and he was indignant when he found out afterwards. He immediately pardoned the
women and ordered Brownlow to his office. Brownlow recalled that Wilson clearly
disapproved of the arrests because it only indulged the women in their desire to be
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considered martyrs. The President ordered Brownlow to refrain from further arrests
without his approval. 320
When fighting between the pickets and the crowds continued over the next few
days, Brownlow reported to the President that he needed to make more arrests. Wilson
agreed that Brownlow should take minimum measures necessary to maintain peace on the
streets. Brownlow recalled, “Thereafter we pursued a policy of attempting to keep the
peace, not arresting the pickets until they, or at least some of them, had taken positive
action.” 321 Brownlow’s memory of the events, written more than 40 years later, was
undoubtedly affected by his desire to appear concerned for the safety of the pickets rather
than guilty of committing serious breaches of their First Amendment rights.
I will not make the argument that Wilson was unconcerned with publicity, but I
will dispute the contention of Graham that he engaged in a conspiracy to suppress the
facts involved in the picketing arrests and imprisonment. Wilson’s secretary, Joseph
Tumulty, informed him on the day after he had pardoned the sixteen pickets that several
editors of prominent newspapers had inquired how the White House would like them to
cover the events. T.W. Noyes, editor of the Washington Evening Star, told Tumulty that
he favored having a bare statement of fact, but no publicity in any paper. Arthur
Brisbane, editor of the Washington Times suggested that the Administration avoid the
appearance of any “conspiracy of silence.” Wilson instructed Tumulty, “My own opinion
is that a compromise course ought to be adopted . . .My own suggestion would be that
nothing that [the pickets] do should be featured with headlines or put on the front page
320
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but that a bare colorless chronicle of what they do should be all that was printed. That
constitutes part of the news, but it need not be made interesting reading.” 322
Graham contends, “At NAWSA’s instigation, President Wilson and the wartime
censorship agency abridged the freedom of the press” in order to suppress news about
NWP activities. 323 She finds evidence for this conspiracy in Wilson’s instructions to
Tumulty (as noted above) and in a report from NAWSA lobbyists that the Committee on
Public Information (CPI) Director, George Creel, arranged appointments for them with
major news services. The purpose of the appointments was for the NAWSA lobbyists to
emphasize their desire for newspaper coverage to make a clear distinction between
NAWSA and the NWP and to emphasize the former’s abhorrence of the picketing.
Creel’s office also issued an official bulletin to all newspapers, post offices, government
officials, and public agencies on July 3, 1917, in which similar points were made. 324
The President clearly preferred that the pickets not receive the type of publicity
that they were seeking, but Graham’s own review of prominent newspapers reveals that
the next major set of arrests in August received front page coverage. 325 If Wilson
attempted to suppress news coverage, and there really is no evidence beyond the
correspondence outlined above that he did any such thing, the attempt failed.
Furthermore, his alleged suppression was clearly not much of a priority since there is no
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evidence that Wilson or Creel took punitive action against any of the major newspapers
that continued to give front-page coverage to the pickets.
When viewed in comparison to the administration’s suppression campaign against
anarchists, I.W.W.’s, and Socialists, the plan to ask newspapers to provide “colorless”
coverage of the pickets appears relatively benign. 326 Beginning in the spring of 1917,
“federal marshals corralled radicals of every nationality, faction, and ideological
persuasion, and U.S. district attorneys freely interpreted a vague Espionage Act, passed in
1917, to win indictments and convictions on charges of treason and antiwar activity.” 327
Additionally, the Postmaster General denied second-class mailing privileges to leftist
publications such as the Milwaukee Leader, the Appeal to Reason, and the Masses,
resulting in the virtual shut-down of those publications. In June 1918, Socialist leader
Eugene Debs was arrested and later sentenced to ten years in prison for speaking out
against American participation in the war. 328 The fact that the Wilson Administration
was generally more lenient toward the pickets than other dissenters does not make the
arrests and imprisonments more palatable. Nor is this evidence presented as an excuse
for the clear violation of the NWP’s civil rights. Rather, it serves to demonstrate that the
administration simply did not consider these activists to pose a significant threat to
Wilson’s standing with the American public or with his international audience.
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Given that most of the articles about suffragist arrests were critical of the NWP
anyway, Wilson had even less motivation to actively work to limit the exposure. There is
no doubt that NAWSA leaders worked closely with the administration, including the CPI,
to distance themselves and the cause of suffrage from the militants. But they did so in
full view of the public eye. The fact that NAWSA and Wilson were in agreement on the
damage to the cause being inflicted by the NWP does not equate to a conspiracy to
“abridge the freedom of the press.”
The argument that Wilson resorted to arrests to try and silence the pickets who
were arousing public opinion against him is even less convincing when one sees the
number of letters that Wilson received criticizing him for being overly lenient with the
pickets. A woman in Missouri wrote to him in late July demanding that he put a stop to
the “un-American” picketing of the White House. In August, a man who had witnessed
the fighting between pickets and crowd members and the subsequent arrests, defended
the actions of the crowd, saying, “An indignant public should be allowed to deal with
such banners according to the dictates of their patriotism without police interference.” 329
The actions of the crowd, of course, also led Wilson to believe that the opinion of the
pickets was a tiny minority. Editorialists further reinforced this view. Wilson was
actually criticized for his leniency by a number of leading newspapers. 330
He did occasionally receive advice and petitions from those who supported the
pickets, some of whom were prominent citizens, but there is no evidence that any of these
329
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appeals caused Wilson to alter his suffrage stance. 331 When he received letters from
people concerned about the conditions in which the jailed suffragists were kept at the
Occoquan Workhouse, he directed his staff to immediately investigate the charges and
take any such action as needed to ensure there was no basis for future charges. 332
The last day of picketing in 1917 occurred on November 10. According to a press
release, NWP leaders decided to suspend the picketing campaign because “there are few
candidates for the role remaining outside of jail, and the other [reason] is that the women
hope that the next Congress will pass the Federal amendment and so make further
picketing unnecessary. 333 In late November, the 31 suffragists remaining in jail (to
include Paul) appeared before a District Judge who ruled that they had been illegally
committed to Occoquan Workhouse and were entitled to liberation on bail pending an
appeal. After their release, they did not picket again until the summer of 1918. 334
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To the greatest extent possible, Wilson ignored the pickets during 1917. When
the publicity surrounding their arrests made it impossible for him to ignore them, he did
his utmost to minimize the publicity they received. Undoubtedly, this was partially an
attempt to keep bad light from falling on his Administration. More importantly, though,
he sincerely believed the pickets were harming the cause of suffrage at the state and
national level. 335 His growing interest in the federal amendment was not a result of the
coercive actions of the NWP. Rather, it was the result of its increasing political value as
NAWSA successfully won more and more state suffrage campaigns, as the U.S. engaged
in a war to spread democracy, and as Democrats began to prepare for the 1918 mid-term
elections. 336
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For example, when Wilson wrote a message of support for the suffrage campaign in New York
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NAWSA, unlike the President, could not ignore the pickets. From the start,
NAWSA leaders denounced the silent sentinels of the NWP – continuing the campaign
Catt had started in 1916 to distinguish NAWSA from the CU. Shaw wrote to a close
friend of Wilson’s in March 1917 expressing her deep regret at the actions of the
Woman’s Party and reiterating her continued support for Wilson. After condemning the
pickets, she added, “I fully agree with you that Mr. Wilson intended just what he said at
our National Convention at Atlantic City and what is more he has lived up to his promise.
He has done more for suffrage during the month of February than all of the Presidents
who have even been in the White House.” 337 Shaw’s friend passed along the letter to
Wilson, emphasizing her belief that the majority of suffragists opposed the pickets.
In response to the wave of publicity after the July arrests, Catt issued an “Open
Letter to the Public” in which she stressed the complete separation of NAWSA from the
NWP. Pointing out that the NWP was a minority organization, she claimed that the
National represented 98% of the organized suffragists in the United States and was
officially on record as absolutely opposed to the picketing tactics. Catt urged the press
and public alike to disregard the tactics of the NWP and to grant women suffrage in spite
of the distasteful actions of a small minority. 338 In describing NAWSA, she boasted,
“With its membership of two millions [sic] of women representative of all the states, it is
the essential agent to be reckoned with; that its work has always been constructive, lawLuther King, Jr. more palatable to many Americans, including President Lyndon Johnson. But the NWP
never came close to posing a legitimate threat to Wilson or the Democratic Party. Their effectiveness as a
radical alternative pales in comparison to the other factors pushing Wilson toward Catt, NAWSA, and
support of the federal amendment.
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abiding and non-partisan.” 339 Catt thus established the NWP as a dramatic foil for the
National, urging the public to make a clear distinction between the two groups.
Interestingly, Catt had not always been so intolerant of militant tactics. Just seven
years earlier, when interviewed about an upcoming trip to America by Mrs. Emmeline
Pankhurst, leader of the militant suffragists in England, Catt said:
I am not a militant, and believe in evolutionary rather than revolutionary
methods for obtaining reforms. Consequently, I do not indorse the policy
of the militants, but, on the contrary, I have much admiration for Mrs.
Pankhurst, whose sincerity of purpose and willingness to sacrifice herself
no one who know her can question. Further I freely acknowledge that the
situation created by a vacillating, short-sighted government on the one
hand and sharp, clever, militant women on the other has resulted in much
useful agitation the world over . . . It is well known that I am non-militant.
Nevertheless, I wish to go on record with the statement that I shall never
publicly nor privately repudiate the militants. I do not like nor approve of
their form of campaign, nor do I share a common opinion that they have
set the woman suffrage movement ahead tremendously, but when a wrong
is to be righted and millions of people are aroused to action in behalf of
the movement, it is pusillanimous and contemptible for those who work in
one way to condemn those who work in another.” 340
Apparently, tolerance and respectful disagreement was easier when it involved British
militants rather than militant tactics on American soil. In the heat of the suffrage battle in
the United States in 1917, Catt did exactly what she said she said she would “never” do;
at every opportunity, she publicly and privately repudiated the NWP pickets.
Catt especially made sure the President understood that she did not support the
NWP campaign against him. Prior to his decision to pardon the pickets after the July
arrests, she had scheduled a conference with the President to discuss the negative impact
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the pickets might have on upcoming legislative action. After he granted the pardon, the
NAWSA Executive Secretary wrote to Wilson’s chief of staff that Catt thought the
meeting would be unnecessary and that it could wait “to a later date when the war
measure and the Congress will bear less heavily upon him . . . His serene and tactful
handling of the recent ‘picket crisis’ cleared the air for a time, at least, and makes the
conference unnecessary, we hope until the close of this Congress.” 341 While emphasizing
that her organization disapproved of the pickets, Catt made sure to recognize the other
issues facing the President. This diplomatic and considerate approach, while abhorred by
Paul and other NWP leaders, was effective in winning the support of the President and
his staff.
As the crucial New York state suffrage campaign neared its climax in the fall of
1917, pro-suffrage forces across the state worked tirelessly to overcome the damage to
their campaign caused by the NWP pickets. The NAWSA affiliate in New York passed a
resolution protesting against men who said they planned to vote against the amendment
because of the picketing in Washington, D.C. NAWSA representatives denounced the
tactics of the NWP. They asked the men of New York not to punish them for the acts of
a few who were misled into militancy. 342 Governor Charles Whitman and Congressman
Charles Smith, both pro-suffrage, also attacked the pickets for their questionable tactics
and asked New Yorkers to vote in favor of suffrage despite the actions of the NWP. 343
New York suffragists had only to look north to Maine to see they had good reason to fear
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that the NWP campaign had damaged their chances of winning the referendum. Maine
voters defeated that state’s suffrage measure by a vote of almost two to one on September
10, 1917. Analysis in The Portland Press indicated that the “natural conservatism of
Maine people” was the primary reason for the referendum’s failure. The article went on
to say, “Intensifying this natural conservatism of the people of Maine . . . was the action
of the suffragists in Washington, which came into prominence almost simultaneously
with the submission of the question to the voters of this state. Maine people, as a whole,
entirely disapproved of the action of the women agitators for suffrage in Washington.” 344
After the suffrage victory in New York, Catt and other members of the NAWSA
Executive Council requested a meeting with Wilson to thank him for his assistance in
New York and solicit his support for the federal amendment. In the memo requesting the
meeting, NAWSA executive secretary Helen Gardener informed the President that the
NWP was planning a large demonstration against him on November 10 and that it would
help squelch NWP publicity if Wilson met with NAWSA members prior to that. 345 This
exchange is probably the most convincing piece of evidence to support the contention of
traditionalist historians who have argued that the NWP’s antagonism of the President
pushed him closer to NAWSA. Gardener’s note perfectly illustrates Bissell Brown’s
assessment: “The pressure of the pickets gave NAWSA . . . the leverage they needed to
approach the president as problem solvers and mediators.” 346 Wilson not only met with
the group, but also came closer than ever to fully and publicly endorsing the federal
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amendment. After the meeting, Catt explained to reporters that the President had
promised to do everything within his power to help the cause. While this somewhat
ambiguous statement stopped short of endorsing the federal amendment, Catt chose to
interpret it as evidence that Wilson would, in fact, lend his aid to that fight when the new
session of Congress opened in January. 347
After Catt’s meeting with Wilson, his director of the Committee for Public
Information, George Creel, sent him a memo stating that the NWP wanted to have an
audience with him in order to urge the federal amendment. Creel recommended that
Wilson decline to meet with them, saying, “May I advise against such an audience and if
you agree with me will you suggest form of refusal. Mrs. Catt and Dr. Shaw speak for
equal suffrage in the nation and the Congressional Union is without standing and
deserves no recognition.” 348 Creel’s letter indicates that Catt’s campaign to distinguish
NAWSA as the “organization to be reckoned with” fully succeeded with leading
members of the administration.
NWP leaders, though, also believed they had led a victorious campaign in 1917.
Paul spent a period of time in a sanatorium in Baltimore during the summer of 1917
recuperating from exhaustion. Burns filled in as the acting chair of the NWP.
Expressing her confidence in the NWP strategy to a supporter in Rhode Island in late
July, Burns declared, “We have been passing through a very trying time, but I believe
great good has been accomplished . . . We expect to go on picketing during the coming
347
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week. There is great indignation that so many arrests have been made which now
apparently can be proved false.” 349 Despite the public outcry against the pickets, Burns
was convinced that a significant number of people were actually more indignant of the
pickets’ arrests. This false belief was shared by most NWP leaders. 350 Writing to her
comrades who were in jail, NWP member Beulah Amidon encouraged:
The big world is watching---and learning---and admiring, and pretty soon
the job you’re helping at will be done. Can you imagine how it will be
when that amendment actually passes? Sometimes, when I am too tired to
think, I just take a long breath and try to dream of a whole nation
politically free---and then there is nothing too hard to do to make the
dream come true. We had wonderful stories in the NY, Washington,
Phila., and Boston papers this morning, and every batch of clippings that
comes in is bigger and friendlier. 351

Amidon’s words were surely encouraging to her comrades in jail. Undoubtedly, she
believed every word she wrote. But her perception that people were “admiring” the
pickets and that the press coverage was friendly was simply wishful thinking.
Upon her return to the NWP ranks in late September, Paul, too, voiced her belief
that the picket strategy was effective. In an argument foreshadowing Graham’s article
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more than sixty years later, Paul wrote, “The vigor with which the administration is
seeking to crush the picketing indicates, it seems to me, the effectiveness of this form of
agitation.” 352 Again, Paul’s method of measuring success seems skewed. As with her
campaign against the pro-suffrage Senator Thomas of Colorado in 1914, she was
convinced that garnering the hatred of those whose assistance she sought was good for
the cause. The responsiveness of the White House and Congress to NAWSA, who
employed the exact opposite approach, demonstrates just how wrong Paul’s philosophy
was.
Enough of the leaders, though. What did the rank and file of the Woman’s Party
(small though they were) across the country think of their organization’s new direction in
1917? Some were supportive when the picketing first started and before the war began.
A woman in Philadelphia wrote in February, “Don’t let people persuade you to withdraw
the ‘pickets’ from the White House. They are something far more than a spectacle. If
war should be declared and our country should need our energies . . . it will be time
enough then to call in the pickets.” 353 Two sisters in New York who pledged $500 to the
NWP in July because they were so inspired by the brave pickets expressed a similar
sentiment. When they actually sent their check in August, they qualified their support,
“We do not feel that the banners which display protest such as Kaiser Wilson are at all
worthy of the cause and we fear may discredit it even among those most sympathetic.
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We hope that our contribution will not be used for this part of the work but rather for the
educational propaganda.” 354
Perhaps the oddest letter of support came from Mary E. McCumber, the head of
the North Dakota NAWSA affiliate. McCumber, apparently a closet militant, wrote to
Paul to tell her how much she admired her willingness to “fight right on the firing line.”
She added that there were “thousands of women scattered over the country who are
watching your achievements with pride and gratitude. 355 We can probably assume with
relative confidence that Paul derived more than a little satisfaction in receiving a letter of
support written on NAWSA stationary.
The bulk of the mail from NWP members, though, was strongly opposed to the
picketing campaign. 356 Two letters in January came from members canceling their
pledges because they thought the picketing was both unwise and ridiculous. 357 Many of
those who had not been opposed in January and February became so when the U.S.
entered the war in April. Many more were later driven completely away from the NWP
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by its actions with regard to the Russian delegation in June.358 The tenor of the letters
Paul received grew much graver after the incident with the Russian delegation.
In a note that struck right at the heart of Paul’s belief that there was no such thing
as bad publicity, a woman in New Jersey reflected:
Because I believe in the federal amendment and because I believe the war
should not stop the fight for suffrage, I belong to the Woman’s Party; and
because I have had confidence in the women in Washington I have said
many times to myself that they know best and the rest of us must stand
behind them. But today’s paper shakes my confidence, so untrue and
misleading does that [Russian] banner seem to be. Publicity is certainly
gained, but at a great cost. 359

This letter conveys the torn feelings of many NWP members who wanted to continue to
work for the federal amendment but were uncomfortable with the militant course Paul
charted for their organization.
When Paul sent out a mass mailing requesting funds in late June, many of the
recipients took the opportunity in their replies to voice their displeasure with the
picketing (and to decline to send any money). The Chair of NAWSA’s Massachusetts
state association wrote that she was convinced that the work of the NWP was delaying
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rather than helping the federal amendment. In her state, she reported, the tactics of
picketing and heckling the President repelled both men and women. 360 Similarly, a
woman in Illinois who confessed that she subscribed to the NWP newspaper, The
Suffragist, refused to send money saying, “I do not believe that Mr. Wilson is our greatest
enemy, though I have been impatient at his attitude, nor do I think that we gain by
holding a party as a party responsible.” 361
From the far side of the country came a major blow to the NWP leadership in
early July. Elizabeth Kent, a member of the NWP Executive Committee, and an
extremely active campaigner in California, tendered her resignation from the Executive
Committee on July 9. She telegrammed Paul, “Have greatest respect for your judgment
but feel that present methods are not my methods and therefore I cannot honestly remain
on board.” 362 Kent had been supportive of the initial picketing strategy, but the Russian
banner had been too much for her to handle. Many less prominent members of the
organization echoed her sentiments. 363
During the fall of 1917, a number of letters from women not located in the urbanindustrial center of New York or the political hub in Washington, D.C. warned that the
NWP was losing the publicity war in most other parts of the country. An NWP member
in Mississippi reported, “I do ‘my bit’ in your defense whenever I can get in a word.
Through much garbled and prejudiced news reports the sentiment, and emphatically
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among suffrage enthusiasts, is violently against you.” 364 A Tennessee woman
complained that the papers in her area refused to print the NWP publicity bulletins and
instead published articles critical of the pickets. The Woman’s Party, she lamented, was
losing almost all of its members in Tennessee. From Georgia came a report that the
Atlanta Constitution refused to publish anything about the pickets as an interview or as an
article of news. 365
Publicity was stymied in other ways, too. A representative of the American Bar
Association, upon receiving circulars and tickets concerning a mass meeting by the NWP
to describe their prison experiences, wrote back to the NWP Headquarters that he had
received the materials too late to announce it at the meeting of the Bar Association, but
would not have announced it even if he had received them earlier. He explained, “I am
thoroughly in favor of Woman’s Suffrage but have no toleration whatever for the conduct
of the Pickets which has disgraced this city for some months past.” 366
Beulah Amidon’s inspiring letter to her comrades in jail failed to take these types
of sentiments into account. The women who braved freezing cold weather in the winter
and steaming temperatures in the summer, angry crowds and indifferent police, dirty
prison cells and forced feedings, exhibited tremendous courage and dedication to their
cause. The violations of their civil liberties is a black mark on the history of the United
States, and especially on all those who supported the cause of suffrage but stood by as the
pickets were arrested for exercising their right to free speech. Regrettably, Catt and other
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NAWSA officials actually facilitated the attack on the pickets’ civil liberties by their
constant denunciations of NWP tactics. 367 Neither the bravery of the pickets nor the
injustices they suffered, though, changes the fact that their actions were harmful to the
greater suffrage cause. Specifically aimed at the President, their actions only made the
positive work he did for the suffrage cause in 1917 even more difficult at a time when his
difficulties were legion.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the primary reason for Wilson’s reelection
was the support he received from people who believed he had kept the nation out of the
war in Europe. His bold plan for a mediated peace had appealed to Americans deeply
divided over the cause of the war and fearful of ending America’s neutrality. In the
month after his narrow election victory, he constructed a plan for a peace conference. As
a first step toward the realization of that vision, he sent a memo to both the Allies and the
Central Powers asking for a clear statement of their war aims. Their responses in early
January demonstrated just how difficult a mediated peace would be, for their visions of a
just post-war settlement were vastly different. Nonetheless, Wilson felt comfortable in
giving his “peace without victory” speech to Congress on January 22, 1917. 368
Unbeknownst to him at that time, the German leadership had already decided to resume
their unrestricted submarine warfare in an attempt to speed the end of the war. This
action was a direct violation of the Sussex Pledge the Germans had given Wilson in May
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1916. In that accord, the German government had agreed to refrain from attacking
merchant vessels and liners without warning. The German ambassador informed the
President of the submarine warfare plan on January 31, and Wilson – true to the promise
he had made at the time of the Sussex Pledge – broke off diplomatic relations with
Germany on February 3. 369
Wilson’s cabinet urged him to request an armed shipping bill from Congress so
that U.S. merchant ships could defend themselves against attack. Wilson was reluctant to
do so until he learned of the German plan to bring Mexico into a war against the U.S.
After the famous “Zimmerman Telegram” containing the German message to the
Mexican leadership came to light for Wilson on February 24, he asked Congress to arm
merchantmen on the following day. Illustrating the limits to executive influence, the bill
passed the House but failed in the Senate where staunch neutralists debated it so long that
the Congress expired on March 4 without a vote. 370
On March 12, a German submarine sank an unarmed American merchant ship –
the first time Germany violated the Sussex Pledge in deed, rather than word. That same
day saw the start of the Russian Revolution, widely welcomed in America which had
been troubled by the presence of the authoritarian Tsarist regime’s presence among the
Allied Powers. Wilson recognized the new Russian government on March 22. 371
The President called an emergency session of the new Congress in early April.
He gave his war message to a joint session and uttered the famous phrase, “The world
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must be made safe for democracy.” Angered by the Zimmerman Telegram and the
sinking of U.S. merchant ships, the Senate adopted a statement of war against Germany
on April 4 by a vote of 82-6 and the House adopted it two days later by a vote of 373-50.
Congress also adopted a joint resolution to restrict their debate during that session of
Congress to “war measures” - issues that directly affected America’s ability to prosecute
the war. 372
American troops began arriving in Paris in June. Much of Wilson’s time over the
summer was spent negotiating the terms of American Army units’ participation in the
war with the Allies. Wilson and his commander, General John J. Pershing, felt strongly
that American troops should fight as a united unit and not be used as individual fillers for
gaps in the Allied armies. Wilson and Pershing’s views prevailed, but the negotiations
with the allies were tense and time-consuming. 373
The second Russian Revolution in November ended Russia’s involvement in the
war and made its eventual outcome very unpredictable. In January 1918, Wilson
delivered his famous “Fourteen Points” speech to Congress. The exuberance with which
it was initially received was quickly overshadowed when the Germans initiated a major
offensive in the spring of 1918 that was marginally successful. They were on the move
again in the Marne offensive of July only to be badly defeated, mostly by the fresh U.S.
troops. 374 The Allies began a counterattack in July that succeeded in pushing Germany
back toward her borders over the course of the next few months. The Central Powers
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began to crumble in October and, finally, the Germans capitulated and signed the
armistice on November 11, 1918.
It was against this backdrop of world-changing events that Catt developed and
executed the “Winning Plan” she had outlined in Atlantic City in September 1916.
Recognizing early on that Congress would be distracted by the war, she made state
campaigns the main arena for NAWSA activity in 1917. As Morgan argues, Catt was
content to fight a holding action in Congress while increasing the eventual number of
supportive Congressmen by creating more suffrage states. She also recognized that
participation in the war effort could be used to demonstrate the full capacity of women
and further justify their demands for equal suffrage. 375
For the majority of her public life, Catt worked simultaneously towards
broadening women’s rights and achieving world peace. Before the First World War, she
was active in the Woman’s Peace Party. After the war and the passage of the federal
suffrage amendment, she founded the Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, an
organization to which she devoted herself until the end of her life in 1947. Her decision,
then, to support American involvement in World War I may at first seem contradictory.
Certainly many of her comrades from the peace movement believed it was and harshly
criticized her decision. 376
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What those comrades-turned-critics failed to grasp was Catt’s political
pragmatism. She articulated time and again in letters, articles, and speeches her
conscientious objection to war of any sort but also her realization that American
intervention in the war in Europe was inevitable after February 1917. Given that
inevitability, Catt calculated that NAWSA stood a much greater chance of achieving its
objectives if they threw themselves solidly into home front war service while
simultaneously working to secure the federal suffrage amendment. NAWSA’s war
service would aid in the public relations campaign to convince voters that women as
citizens fulfilled their obligations just like men and deserved the vote. It would also
deflect the potential criticism of anti-suffragists who would surely criticize NAWSA as
“unpatriotic” for working towards suffrage while the war was being fought overseas. 377
When war became inevitable, Catt the pragmatist felt that her decision to support the war
was also inevitable. 378
February was indeed the crucial month in terms of decisions about the war. On
February 3, 1917, Secretary of State Robert Lansing informed Congress that the United
factions: one that decided to support the war and devote themselves to war service, one, led by Crystal
Eastman, which resolved to continue agitating for an early peace, and one, led by Jane Addams, which
sought to promote a durable peace settlement while working for civilian relief at home during the war. See
O'Neill, Everyone was Brave: A History of Feminism in America, 183-184.
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States had broken off diplomatic relations with Germany. On that same day, one of
Catt’s closest co-workers at NAWSA, Clara Hyde, wrote to Mary Peck about Catt’s latest
activities. She informed Peck, “The second item you should know about is that C.C.C.
dines with President and Mrs. Wilson on Monday night as the guest of Secy. Of War
Daniels and his wife!! The old goat is warming up. I’d give a king’s ransom to watch
Carrie turn her lamps on him.” 379 Wilson’s appointment book confirms that he and his
wife dined with Daniels and Catt on February 5, 1917. 380 No record exists of what was
discussed during their dinner. However, the events of the preceding and following days
strongly suggest that the impending war was a topic of conversation, along with whether
or not NAWSA intended to support the President should he officially decide to send
troops to Europe. Wilson had held a meeting just four days earlier with the executive
officers of the Woman’s Peace League who voiced their continued disapproval of
increasing U.S. militancy. 381
It seems more than likely that the President inquired if Catt and NAWSA held the
same views as the Woman’s Peace League. Whether or not he asked that question
remains a mystery, but the following day Catt issued a call to the Executive Council of
NAWSA to meet later that month and adopt their official position on the war. It would
seem that Catt felt the question of NAWSA’s position had been raised – if not explicitly
by the President then at least by the circumstances of the day.
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In her call to the Executive Council, Catt began by stating, “Our nation is on the
brink of war.” She went on to explain that the decision the organization needed to make
was whether “suffragists [should] do the ‘war work’ which they will undoubtedly want to
do with other groups newly formed, thus running the risk of disintegrating our
organizations or shall we use our headquarters and our machinery for really helpful
constructive aid to our nation. The answer to these questions must be given now.” 382
Even before war had been declared, Catt seemed to see the political benefits of making
NAWSA’s stand apparent to the public and key politicians alike.
At the meeting of the Executive Council on February 23-25, the members passed
a resolution by a vote of 63-13 pledging their support and service in the event of war.
Although invited, Wilson was unable to attend the final session in which the resolution
was presented to Secretary of War Newton Baker. He did send a letter to the NAWSA
headquarters expressing his “very great and sincere admiration of the action taken.” 383
Wilson expressed his appreciation and admiration in more concrete terms over the next
two years as he became not only a supporter but also an advocate for the federal suffrage
amendment. In her urgent call for NAWSA to define its position on the war, Catt
rigorously answered any question the President might have had about looking for support
to its two million members. In return, he seems to have answered Catt’s question about
his support for national woman’s suffrage.
A statement of support in the case of war from the nation’s largest suffrage
organization provided an embattled Wilson with a much-needed ally. Antiwar sentiment
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ran high in the early months of 1917. Between February and April, peace federations
from across the country flooded Congress with petitions opposing the war. Wilson
received thousands of telegrams reminding him that he had been elected on the basis of
keeping America out of war. 384 Membership in the antiwar Socialist Party actually started
to rise in early 1917 as many Americans viewed the war as a conflict backed by
American corporate interests. Opposition was especially widespread in farm
communities and urban working-class neighborhoods. 385 Although public opinion would
shift dramatically once US troops headed into the fight in Europe, that transition was far
from being a foregone conclusion in February. Facing strong opposition for reversing his
peace stance, Wilson was sincere when he thanked Catt for NAWSA’s early vote of
confidence in him.
The NWP, too, realized that it must take some position on the war. Paul sent a
letter out to all her state chairmen on February 8th in which she called for a national
convention in March to consider the organization’s war policy. In the letter, she stressed
that the organization was dedicated only to the enfranchisement of women and that, until
changed by an action of the convention, that would continue to be the NWP policy. 386
The March convention voted to sustain the current policy of focusing only on suffrage
and remaining neutral on the issue of the war. What Paul did not anticipate, or ever
realize, was that a majority of Americans saw “taking no stand on the war” as a very
active stand. They viewed the NWP as unpatriotic and harmful to the nation. This, much
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more so than opposition to suffrage, was the source of the anger that propelled crowds to
attack the White House pickets. 387
Paul maintained her belief that NAWSA had forgone suffrage work to participate
in war service throughout the remainder of her life. In an interview given just a few years
before she died in 1977, Paul related the same thing to her interviewer that she expressed
to members of the NWP in 1917: it was up to the NWP to singularly focus on suffrage
because the National was “working only for war.” 388
Paul’s charge that NAWSA abandoned suffrage work is totally unfounded. An
April 1917 article in the New York Times, running under the headline, “Suffragists’
Machine Perfected in All States under Mrs. Catt’s Rule,” gave testimony to NAWSA’s
two-pronged strategy. The article referenced NAWSA’s recent commitment to war
service, but went on to describe the organization’s vast political lobbying, publicity
activity, and state campaigning. Specifically, it pointed out that the National’s news
service sent press releases to 6,000 newspapers throughout the country and that members
in all the states collected stories of local work and fed them back to the National which
then redistributed them to Washington and New York papers. 389 Of greater significance,
NAWSA successfully orchestrated suffrage referendum victories in nine states while the
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war raged in 1917-1918, further testimony to the organization’s ability to simultaneously
perform war service and conduct suffrage work.
Catt was quick to exploit the political capital earned by suffragists’ war service.
An excerpt from one of the NAWSA press releases to the New York Times demonstrates
the manner in which she wedded the issues of suffrage and war service:
In the United States, suffrage associations have illustrated this alertness of
women.
Suffragists were already stimulating the production and
conservation of food before any definite governmental action was worked
out. And through their suffrage associations they were passing on the
word to other women. What Connecticut found out was told in Alabama.
Nebraska’s thrift aroused emulation in New York. Women in Plattsburgh,
New York, and San Antonio, Texas, were of one mind about being “camp
mothers” to soldiers . . . There has been no sectionalism, there can be none
among women, alike disfranchised, and alike, seeking for the ballot for the
common end of protecting that which is dearest to their hearts. No other
group of people came so readily into line for national service, for no other
group seeking enfranchisement has ever sifted through every class and
station of life. Ready-to-serve suffragists have put the handles of the tools
of their colossal organization into the government’s hands. 390

This article underscores several important points that Catt thought critical in the public
relations campaign. It mentions the nationwide spread of NAWSA’s efforts, the unity of
their effort that transcended sectional boundaries, and their willingness to heed the
nation’s call for aid while still fighting for equal suffrage.
Wilson did not fail to hold up his end of the bargain, either. Although he did not
advocate for the federal amendment until the year was complete (neither did NAWSA
push him to do so), he made significant contributions to the cause, as will be shown,
through his support of state referenda and the creation of a separate suffrage committee in
the House of Representatives. Partially as a result of the President’s aid, eight more
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states granted women full or partial suffrage in 1917. 391 With the support of
Representatives from these states, suffragists secured the necessary two-thirds vote in
favor of the federal amendment in the House on January 10, 1918. Wilson’s actions in
1917 contributed no small amount to that victory.
Catt repeatedly called on the President for support in state suffrage battles in early
1917. In January, she wrote to the President’s secretary, Tumulty, alerting him that
Oklahoma’s legislature was about to vote in favor of a suffrage bill. She requested that
Wilson write her a letter that included a statement that he hoped the voters in the state
would approve the amendment. 392 On the same day, she sent another letter to Tumulty
explaining that a somewhat different bill was pending in North Dakota. Implying that
she and the President were in accord on the issue, she requested, “A letter of
congratulations from the President and an expression of approval of this form of
legislation, together with an expression of his continued interest in the suffrage
movement and hope for its ultimate establishment would be of great assistance to the
cause in general and serve the purpose of which we spoke.” 393
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Wilson responded quickly, conforming to Catt’s specific wording requests in both
cases. In his letter of congratulations regarding the successful North Dakota vote, he
wrote, “As you know, I have a very real interest in the extension of the suffrage to
women and I feel that every step in this direction should be applauded.” 394 Catt’s use of
the phrase “of which we spoke” and Wilson’s phrasing “as you know” testifies to the
level of high agreement and cooperation between the two.
Wilson also lent his support to the ultimately unsuccessful campaigns in
Maryland and Maine, but in the most important state battle, New York, Wilson was
particularly active. Like Catt, he weaved the issues of democracy, war service, and
suffrage into his statements and letters. To a letter from the head of the New York
Woman Suffrage Party, Vira Whitehouse, asking for a declaration of his support, he
responded, “I hope that the voters of the State of New York will rally to the support of
woman suffrage by a handsome majority. It would be a splendid vindication of the
principle of the cause in which we all believe.” 395 When Whitehouse wrote back to thank
Wilson for his supportive words, she informed him that New York suffragists were
suffering, “from the very general disapproval of the course of the pickets, over whom, of
course, we have no control and whose methods we deeply deplore. Your message should
help as much as anything to show the voters of New York State the fair attitude to
take.” 396
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Taking into account the obstacle of the pickets, Wilson wrote to Catt in October
again expressing his support for the campaign in New York. He included a statement,
“May I not say that I hope that no voter will be influenced in his decision with regard to
this great matter by anything the so-called pickets may have done . . . Their action
represents, I am sure, so small a fraction of the women . . . that it would be most unfair
and argue a narrow view to allow their actions to prejudice the cause itself.” 397 Catt was
quick to give the President’s letter a wide circulation in the New York newspapers.
Just a few weeks before the vote in New York, Wilson met with Whitehouse and
a delegation of 110 members of the New York State Woman Suffrage Party. His
statement to them represents the climax of his connecting the war, women’s service to the
country, and the right to full citizenship. So sweeping were his words that some even
saw it as his first public endorsement of the federal amendment. 398 His statement, printed
in the New York Times on October 26, read, in part, “I am free to say that I think the
question of woman suffrage is one of those questions which lie at the foundation [of the
struggle for democracy].” He added, “I believe that, just because we are quickened by
the questions of this war, we ought to be quickened to give this question of woman
suffrage our immediate consideration . . . I think the whole country has appreciated the
way in which the women have risen to this great occasion [of the war].” 399 The suffrage
amendment passed in New York two weeks later by a margin of 94,000 votes. The New
York victory alone added 43 more representatives in Congress from suffrage states.
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Wilson was also instrumental in breaking up a major administrative obstacle for
the suffragists. For years, suffragists had been forced to plead their case for a federal
amendment with the House Judiciary Committee because the House leadership had
refused to establish a separate committee on woman suffrage. The Senate had established
a separate committee in 1878, and suffragists were convinced that their interests had been
treated more fairly and with greater attention in the Senate than in the House. 400 In May,
NAWSA executive secretary Helen Gardener wrote to Wilson and asked him to intervene
on NAWSA’s behalf with Representative Edward Pou, a Democrat from North Carolina,
who, as chairman of the Rules Committee, held the necessary influence to create a
separate suffrage committee. Pointing out that this was the only request NAWSA had
made during the “war session” of Congress, she implored the President to come to her
aid. Gardener, too, made use of women’s war service by adding, “With this added bit of
legislative machinery working in our interests, as occasion permits, we can all the more
freely and happily give of our services in other directions to our country.” 401
In a polite and carefully worded letter, Wilson complied with Gardener’s request
and endorsed the idea of a separate committee to Pou. The Congressman responded that
he would heed the President’s advice and hold a vote on the matter with the Rules
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Committee. The committee ruled favorably on the resolution on June 6. 402 Still, the
creation of a new committee had to be approved by vote of the full House. Gardener
again called on the President to use his influence. She asked that he try to persuade
Representative James Heflin or Carter Glass, both Democrats, to vote in favor of the
measure. 403 Wilson again complied and was successful. He wrote to Heflin, urging him
to support the new committee. The representative from Alabama wrote back that he
personally favored a states’ rights approach to suffrage, but, “after reading your letter
several times and thinking over the situation, I have concluded to follow your suggestion
and not oppose the creation of a committee in the House on Woman Suffrage.” 404 The
House finally voted and approved the new committee by a close vote on September 24.
Wilson’s contributing role in this matter was of no small significance. With a
separate committee in place, the federal amendment moved smoothly through the
committee process in late 1917, resulting in its favorable report and eventual successful
vote in the House in January 1918. The newly created committee’s report in January was
the first time a favorable report on suffrage was issued by a House committee since the
51st Congress met from 1889-1891. 405 While not nearly as exciting or dramatic as arrests
and hunger strikes, NAWSA quietly scored a major victory in its long-fought struggle to
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eliminate a legislative roadblock to the federal amendment. By cooperating with
NAWSA in convincing Pou to push the creation of the committee and convincing Heflin
to cast an affirmative vote, the President played a major role in one of the crucial battles
of the larger federal amendment war.
In his struggle to ensure the autonomy of U.S. troops in Europe and his ongoing
struggles with Congress over other pieces of war legislation during the summer of 1917,
Wilson was unwilling to support suffrage as a war measure. When members of the
NWP, accompanied by representatives of the Progressive, Labor, and Socialist
movements, urged him in May to press the federal amendment at the existing session of
Congress he refused. 406 Catt declined to join the May deputation to the president and, in
fact, declined to ask him to push the federal amendment at all during the “war congress.”
In July, though, Gardener wrote to Wilson advancing NAWSA’s wish that he would use
his opening speech to the new Congress in December to support the federal amendment
as a war measure. 407 In this one case, the president failed to comply with NAWSA’s
wishes. His speech to Congress on December 3rd contained no mention of suffrage. Catt
was unfazed. She had interpreted his remarks to her in November as a tacit endorsement.
In early January, her confidence in Wilson was rewarded when, on the day before the
vote in the House, he finally provided a public endorsement of the federal amendment. 408
The President’s primary focus during 1917 was U.S. entry into the war. Suffrage
histories sometimes miscalculate the relative importance of their subject. Wilson’s
attitude toward suffrage during 1917 must be placed into context with the world-changing
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issues that dominated his thinking during the year. To the extent that he involved himself
with suffragists at all, he did so in concert with Catt’s strategy for securing the federal
amendment and in spite of the hostile actions of the NWP. Wilson and Catt’s vision for
the proper suffrage strategy changed over the course of 1917 as events unfolded.
Importantly, their vision evolved jointly.
The evidence suggests that there were three decisions NAWSA made in 1917 that
contributed to the eventual success of the federal amendment. First, they led the charge
in denouncing the militancy of the NWP. As a result, NAWSA’s chastisement of the
pickets made it easier for the Wilson Administration to deny the pickets their right of free
speech. Nonetheless, NAWSA preserved the suffrage movement’s reputation and its
political standing by distinguishing themselves from the White House pickets that the
majority of Americans (and, more importantly, members of Congress whose votes would
eventually be needed) abhorred. Wilson undoubtedly looked even more favorably on
NAWSA as a result of his annoyance with the NWP campaign against him, but the NWP
never posed enough of a threat to “force” him into the arms of NAWSA or into support
of the federal amendment. That transition occurred largely in spite of the NWP
campaign.
Secondly, NAWSA recognized the need to win more suffrage states before they
could have a chance at success at the federal level. Knowing that the President and
Congress would not, in all likelihood, give the federal amendment serious consideration
during the “war congress” they chose to focus their efforts on state campaigns. As a
result, they won victories across the nation and dramatically increased the number of
Congressmen responsible to equal suffrage constituents. As political scientist Eileen
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McDonagh demonstrated in her 1989 study of House roll call voting on the 19th
Amendment, the single most important factor in determining whether representatives
would vote in favor of the federal amendment was whether or not they came from a state
that had granted suffrage. In her analysis, state-level suffrage was more important in
determining representatives’ votes than either regional or party identification. 409 When
the House voted on the federal amendment in 1915, only 47% voted in the affirmative.
Just three years later, 67% of representatives voted in favor of the amendment. The
biggest reason for this dramatic change was the increase in suffrage states – a change that
only occurred as a result of NAWSA’s continued emphasis on state-level suffrage work.
Finally, Catt convinced NAWSA’s leaders to choose to actively support the war,
simultaneously strengthening their own hand and the hand of the President when it came
time to stake their claim as equal citizens. To be sure, Catt and other NAWSA leaders
recognized that suffrage was a right they deserved apart from their war service – most
had been working for suffrage for multiple decades and their arguments during the war
years were almost always a mix of natural rights and expedient claims. Still, the reality
of the situation dictated that they use all practical arguments to support their claim. Right
or wrong, the fact of women’s enormous contributions to the successful prosecution of
the war was a major contributing factor in the nation’s willingness to support the federal
amendment.
What was the result of these three critical decisions? By the end of 1917, eight
more states had been added to the national total of those that had granted women either
full or partial suffrage. The President’s support in the state campaigns had been critical
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to their success. Likewise, his influence had helped to secure a separate committee on
woman suffrage in the House of Representatives. This removed a major legislative
hurdle for suffragists as they attempted to bring the federal amendment to a vote. Finally,
by January 1918, they had succeeded in persuading the President to lend his voice to the
growing chorus that demanded equal suffrage for all American women through passage
of a constitutional amendment.
From January 1918 until final ratification of the 19th Amendment in August 1920,
Wilson was an unwavering advocate for the cause. Presidential support did not equal
quick victory. Chapter Seven will explore the challenges facing Wilson and the
suffragists in the final years of the battle for the federal amendment. The following
chapter, though, will pause to consider those who opposed suffrage. Specifically, it will
examine the actions of the nation’s organized female anti-suffragists. The anti-suffragists
failed to prevent Wilson from joining ranks with the suffragists, but they succeeded in
shaping the terms of the national debate and the strategy of the suffragists. A full history
of the federal woman suffrage amendment demands consideration of both their failures
and successes.
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CHAPTER 6
FIGHTING FOR WILSON: THE IMPACT OF THE ANTI-SUFFRAGISTS

The preceding chapters have recounted Wilson’s gradual shift from complete
opposition to suffrage, to a position of states’ rights and – finally – to support of the
federal amendment. For us to fully understand this transition, though, the activities and
influence of those who opposed woman suffrage must be taken into account. Like their
pro-suffrage counterparts, the opponents of woman suffrage battled on a number of fronts
to defeat both state and federal suffrage measures. However, only two groups – southern
Democrats and female anti-suffragists – openly petitioned the President. They were
ultimately unsuccessful in halting Wilson’s drift into the pro-suffrage camp, but the
arguments they developed and publicized were effective in framing the boundaries of the
national debate over woman suffrage. This was especially true in the case of the
organized female anti-suffragists, whose aura of respectability allowed them to be more
overt in their appeals than other anti-suffrage forces. 410 This chapter will outline the
opponents of woman suffrage, with particular attention to those who waged an ultimately
unsuccessful campaign to influence the President. Additionally, it will show how antisuffragists effectively shaped the debate and forced their suffrage counterparts to make
difficult and often divisive tactical decisions.
The opponents of woman suffrage can be roughly divided into four categories,
with the caveat that significant overlap exists among these categories. The first – a
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category I will title “the interests” – tended to oppose women as voters because they
feared that women would follow through on the suffragists’ promise to purify American
society and political life. The interests included the liquor industry (fearful of women’s
association with prohibition), the cotton and textile manufacturing industries (fearful that
women would support reform legislation that would drive up their labor costs), and the
railroad owners (fearful that women would support regulation of large, powerful
corporations). The second category consisted of southerners who saw woman suffrage as
a threat to white supremacy in the South. Having just succeeded in disenfranchising
black men via state constitutional amendments, southern white supremacists were loath to
reopen the issue of voter qualification and/or eligibility in the South. 411 Leading Cathloic
Church clergy comprised the third category, basing their opposition on the belief that
each sex had its own God-given distinct sphere of activity. 412 The fourth and final
category included over 700,000 women who belonged to the nation’s organized female
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anti-suffrage movement. At the head of this final category stood the National
Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage (NAOWS). 413
Suffrage historians have scoured the historical record in an attempt to measure the
impact of the interests. 414 There is no doubt that these groups played an instrumental role
in persuading voters – often through illicit means – to vote against suffrage in a number
of state referenda. Leading suffragists were certain that the “liquor interests” stole the
election in at least three states in 1912 alone. 415 Given that these groups often operated in
the shadows, the charges posed by the suffragists were difficult to prove. 416 More
importantly for this study, though, these groups did not overtly petition Wilson. 417 The
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absence of letters from these groups in Wilson’s papers should not be all that surprising.
Despite their abhorrence of women voters, they generally eschewed overt lobbying
against the cause. Furthermore, Wilson was elected in both 1912 and 1916 on a reform
platform. The interests surely calculated that their entreaties to him to oppose suffrage
for fear of the reforms that might follow would not have been well received.
Members of the second category – southern white supremacists – were more
hopeful that Wilson would understand their position. Historian Elna Greene has
established clear connections between those who led the charge for black
disfranchisement in the South and those who worked to defeat woman suffrage. 418 She
concludes: “Just as they once had worked to redeem their states from Republican rule and
then had disfranchised black voters to protect the Redemption, they then worked to
prevent women from upsetting the political balance that they had worked to create.” 419
Southern Democrats had good reason to believe that Wilson would support them in
protecting the South’s unique racial hierarchy. He was a native southerner and a man
whose party’s political base was firmly grounded in their region.
Several moves by Wilson during his first administration gave southern Democrats
who opposed suffrage even more confidence that he would never forsake them or the
“Lost Cause.” First, as outlined in preceding chapters, he maintained a staunch states’
418
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right position throughout his first term. Secondly, he made it clear that he was of a like
mind with his Southern brethren when he supported members of his cabinet who chose to
segregate their federal departments. Finally, Wilson held a showing of William Dixon’s
inflammatory and racist film, The Birth of a Nation, at the White House in 1914. Dixon
and Wilson had been classmates at John Hopkins, and Dixon later used the fact that the
film had been shown at the White House to fight off attempts by civil rights organizations
and censors to prevent the film from wider distribution. 420
Before examining Wilson’s interaction with the southern opponents of suffrage, it
is important to establish the unique nature of the suffrage movement in the South.
Instead of producing a two-way contest between pro and anti-suffrage forces, states’
rights advocates created a three-way battle. 421 States’ rights suffragists were those who
opposed a federal suffrage amendment but worked to convince individual states to grant
women the right to vote through state constitutional amendments. Unlike the federal
amendment which would theoretically enfranchise all women regardless of race, the
advocates of the state method believed that state amendments could be written in such a
way as to enfranchise white women while still preventing blacks from voting.
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The extreme difference in how many southerners viewed federally-enforced
versus state-controlled woman suffrage is critical to understanding Wilson’s interaction
with southern members of his own party. From the time of his 1912 campaign up until
his vote in favor of suffrage in the New Jersey referendum of October 1915, Wilson
claimed that he had not made a decision about his personal position on suffrage. He was
clear, however, that he was definitely opposed to a federal amendment; woman suffrage
was a decision for the voters of each state. This position was completely palatable to
southern opponents of suffrage. Even when Wilson revealed that he was personally in
favor of the principle of woman suffrage by voting for the referendum in New Jersey, by
remaining adamant about states’ rights, he was careful to not offend southerners. His
decision in New Jersey may have riled those southerners who opposed woman suffrage in
any form, but Wilson’s states’ right caveat prevented an outright break with the South.
So, up until the point at which he endorsed the federal amendment, Wilson did not
find himself at odds with his southern brethren. Once he crossed that line, though, he
came into direct conflict with two factions: southerners who opposed woman suffrage in
any form and the states’ rights advocates. In other words, his conversion to the federal
amendment placed him dramatically out of step with the majority of his own party in the
South.
While the reform climate of the early 20th century forced the liquor interests to
run shadow campaigns against woman suffrage, white supremacists felt free to work in
the open. In speeches on the floor of Congress, southern congressmen clearly stated that
they opposed woman suffrage because it threatened white rule in the South. For
example, Senator Oscar Underwood of Alabama explained to his colleagues in the Senate
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that he would never support a federal amendment because it violated the principle of
states’ rights – a principle that was essential to maintaining the racial hierarchy. He
declared, “We stand for these principles because we believe that the integrity of our race
and our Government and the protection of our women require it.” 422 This sentiment was
echoed by Senator Ellison “Cotton Ed” Smith of South Carolina who evoked the memory
of black voters during Reconstruction, saying, “In the enactment of the fifteenth
amendment this principle of local self-government was revoked and, of course, disaster
followed.” 423 Despite appeals from the President and other members of their own party,
Underwood and Smith never relented in their opposition to the federal amendment.
In the following chapter, we will see that Wilson was unable to allay the racial
fears of key southern Senators as he lobbied them to support the federal amendment.
Time and again, they explained to him that they could not (or would not) abandon either
their outright rejection of woman suffrage or their states’ rights position. Again, the
following chapter will show that it was largely the issue of preserving white supremacy in
the South that prevented Wilson from securing the necessary votes for the federal
amendment to pass under a Democratic Congress. This failure had important
implications for the 1918 mid-term elections in which the Democrats lost control of
Congress for the first time during Wilson’s two terms.
Another group that worked against woman suffrage included leading members of
the Catholic Church. The Church did not officially stand in opposition to the suffrage
movement, but some of its most prominent clergymen in the United States lent their
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names to the anti-suffragists. 424 For example, Cardinal James Gibbons - Archbishop of
Baltimore, only the second American man to be named a Cardinal, and seen by many as
the public face of Catholicism in the United States – repeatedly warned of the dangers of
granting women the right to vote.
Gibbons was careful to distinguish between his personal opinion and the position
of the Church. In April 1913, he publicly corrected suffragists who claimed that the
Church was opposed to suffrage by releasing the following statement: “The mission of
the Church is fine faith and morals. In other matters, individuals decide for
themselves.” 425 Gibbons went on, however: “Personally, I am opposed to female
suffrage because I am in favor of perpetuating the real dignity of woman . . . If she were
to embark on the ocean of political life, it is very much to be feared that her dignity
would be impaired, if not jeopardized.” 426 Gibbons later sent a message of support to
NAOWS during the anti-suffragists’ annual convention in December 1916. In part, he
derided the leaders of the suffrage movement, saying, “I regard ‘woman’s rights’ women
and the leaders of the new school of female progress as the worst enemies of the female
sex . . . I wish I could show them the ultimate result of participating in public life. It has
but one end – the abandonment, or at least the neglect of the home.” 427 NAOWS
reprinted his statement in a flyer that was widely circulated to its state organizations.
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Even as some Catholic leaders provided assistance to the anti-suffragists and
joined them in petitioning state legislature to reject suffrage referenda, they did not
collectively work to influence Wilson. In fact, by the time that the federal amendment
had taken center stage in the suffrage battle, much of the Catholic opposition had begun
to crumble. Historian James Kenneally’s case study of Massachusetts reveals that
Catholics in the Bay State eventually became advocates for suffrage as a result of
changing social conditions and shifting lay attitudes. Large numbers of working women
saw the value of the ballot and key clergy members swayed popular opinion by switching
their allegiance from the antis to the suffragists. 428
While Catholic opposition began to fade during the second decade of the 20th
century, the activities of the nation’s organized female anti-suffragists reached a fever
pitch. Unlike the interests and leading clergy members, this group worked hard to claim
Wilson as an ally to their cause and struggled mightily to prevent his drift into the ranks
of the suffragists. More importantly, the rhetoric of the anti-suffragists forced their
suffrage counterparts to alter both their arguments and their approach to Wilson.
In the preface to the 1981 Norton Edition of her classic book, The Ideas of the
Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920, Aileen Kraditor described several changes that
she would have liked to have made to the original 1964 edition. One of her most
significant recommendations for change was the removal of the existing chapter on those
forces that opposed suffrage and its replacement “with one that [took] the antisuffragists
Suffrage, December 7, 1916. The Suffrage Collection, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College,
Northampton, MA (Hereafter referred to as SSC).
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more seriously, in both tone and content.” 429 Kraditor voiced the hope that other scholars
would study the women who opposed their own enfranchisement with greater respect for
both their ideology and their impact on the woman suffrage movement. Her call was
answered by a number of scholars.
A wealth of detailed studies now exists that place the anti-suffrage organizations
at the center of their inquiries. These studies have outlined the ideology, membership,
strategy and tactics, alliances, and impact of the anti-suffragists, covering almost every
aspect and angle of the anti-suffrage movement. New research and analysis have shown
that, while the anti-suffragists were generally defensive, always reacting to the relative
intensity of the suffrage movement, the arguments of the latter had to be formulated in
such a way as to counter the arguments posed by the former. As one scholar puts it, the
anti-suffrage experience illustrates the point that “countermovements are not solely
reactive movements, but can impel movement innovation.” 430
Despite both the quality and quantity of anti-suffrage research in recent years, the
relationship of the anti-suffragists to President Wilson remains under explored. Suffrage
historians have devoted a great deal of attention to understanding how and why Wilson
eventually transformed into an advocate for the federal suffrage amendment. Antisuffrage historians, however, have given this conversion relatively scant attention. If
Wilson is included in their scope at all, it is usually to point out that anti-suffragists
expressed both public and private disappointment when the President announced his
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support for the federal amendment. To what extent anti-suffrage women had tried to
influence or delay that announcement, however, is unclear. 431 Wilson historians, sadly,
rarely consider the suffrage movement, let alone the anti-suffrage movement. The
presence of an active anti-suffrage organization involving over 700,000 women during
Wilson’s Administration is completely absent from their accounts. 432
Anti-suffragists claimed Wilson as an ally to their cause while he was still the
Governor of New Jersey. In a 1912 circular entitled, “Opinions of Eminent Persons
Against Woman Suffrage,” the Massachusetts Association Opposed to the Further
Extension of Suffrage to Women (MAOFESW) listed “Governor Woodrow Wilson of
New Jersey” as one of the “notable persons who have remonstrated against women
suffrage.” 433 When he adopted a states’ rights stance, the anti-suffragists continued to
promote him as more closely aligned with their movement than with the suffragists. An
article appeared in the January 1915 issue of The Woman’s Protest (a monthly
publication of NAOWS), entitled, “The Attitude of the President – and the Suffragists’.”
431
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The article quoted a recent statement by Wilson in which he reiterated the states’ rights
position that he had adopted during his 1912 presidential campaign. The anti-suffrage
analysis of his statement follows:
Of course, the statement of the President’s views is diametrically opposed
to both of the suffrage amendments [Anthony and Shafroth-Palmer] he has
been asked to support . . . It certainly does not indicate a “flop” to “votes
for women” to anyone but a hopeful Suffragist without a sense of humor.
But this goes to illustrate the kind of straws the sinking suffrage agitation
will attempt to clutch. President Wilson believes that the woman suffrage
question can be solved ‘most solidly and conclusively’ by the States under
our present Constitution. Strangely, this is exactly what Ant-Suffragists
believe! And just what Suffragists do not want! 434
Just as the suffragists worked to portray Wilson as friendly to their cause long before he
took substantive action on their behalf, so too did the antis continue to cling to him after
he had started his migration toward the enemy’s camp.
When it was rumored that the President might vote in favor of the suffrage
legislation in New Jersey, anti-suffragists hurried to squelch the report. 435 The Woman’s
Protest printed an article in the February 1915 issue citing statements from White House
officials to counter the claim made by Anna Howard Shaw regarding Wilson’s favorable
attitude toward the New Jersey amendment. Anti-suffragists could not still claim that
Wilson was unalterably opposed to the principle of woman suffrage, but they refused to
let him be portrayed as pro-suffrage. The article stressed that, despite suffragists’ rumors
to the contrary, “White House officials took pains this afternoon to make it clear that
President Wilson had said nothing to a delegation of suffragettes earlier in the day which
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could possibly be construed as a commitment of himself to the equal franchise legislation
which is soon is to be voted upon in the New Jersey Legislature.” 436
Like their counterparts in the suffrage movement, the anti-suffragists put great
stock in endorsements for their cause. In addition to clinging to the President as an ally,
they also claimed allegiance from members of his family. During a speech to the General
Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC) in April 1913, Wilson’s daughter, Margaret, was
quoted by the New York Times as saying that she did not think woman suffrage was
necessary for women’s influence to be felt in the public sphere. The Woman’s Protest
quickly reprinted the article under the headline, “Miss Wilson Thinks Vote
Unnecessary.” 437 Just a few days later, though, the New York Times printed a second
dispatch in which Margaret Wilson said she had been misquoted during the GFWC
speech and that she was, in fact, “very much in favor of woman suffrage.” The suffragist
press quickly countered the antis with an article in the Woman’s Journal and Suffrage
News entitled, “Miss Wilson for Suffrage.” 438 Editor Alice Stone Blackwell used the
article to chide the anti-suffragists for “chronic misrepresentation.”
Earlier that year, the two camps had engaged in a similar turf war over the soonto-be First Lady, Ellen Wilson. Following a report in early January 1913 from the antisuffragists that the President-elect’s wife supported their cause, The Woman’s Journal
printed a front-page article under the headline, “Mrs. Wilson is Not an Anti.” The article
claimed that Ellen Wilson had told suffragist and Wilson supporter Annie Peck that she
was unequivocally not an anti. Ms. Peck concluded, “Although not avowed suffragists, I
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am confident that both Mr. and Mrs. Wilson are open to reason.” 439 The desire to claim
prominent allies consumed both sides and Wilson and his family figured largely in their
calculations.
Having once been able to hold Wilson up as a “notable person” who remonstrated
against woman suffrage, the anti-suffragists registered concern when it began to appear
that he might give in to pressure from the suffragists. As the preceding chapters have
shown, Wilson began to figure more prominently into the calculations of NAWSA in
1913 thanks to Alice Paul’s reinvigoration of the Congressional Committee. Over the
next several years, the federal amendment re-emerged as central to the suffrage
movement. In that the anti-suffrage movement was, by its nature, a reactionary
movement, the increased attention of the suffragists to Wilson’s stance inspired the antis
to ramp up their efforts to maintain his alliance.
During the crisis with Mexico in the spring of 1914, a number of women’s
organizations joined with pacifist groups to protest Wilson’s order for US Marines to
invade Vera Cruz. NAOWS not only refused to participate in the protests but also
telegraphed the following resolution to Wilson: “Resolved, That we believe in leaving the
decision of the policy of peace or war to the men of the nation, but in case of war we
stand ready to render to the nation such service as American women have always
rendered in like emergencies.” 440 In reprinting this resolution in their journal, The
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Woman’s Protest, the anti-suffragists contrasted their reaction to the Mexico crisis with
that of their rivals. Many leading suffragists had participated in a mass meeting at
Cooper Union in New York – the result of which was a resolution calling on the
President to withdraw troops from Mexico and “thus with true courage and a high sense
of honor repair the harm he has already done.” 441 This strategy employed by the antisuffragists during the crisis with Mexico – trumpeting their patriotism and deference to
the “men of the nation” while highlighting the lack of such attitudes by the suffragists –
foreshadowed the path that the antis would follow once the United States entered World
War I. Catt’s decision to pledge NAWSA to war support in 1917 was most probably
influenced by anti-suffragist attacks on the suffragists’ patriotism during the 1914
Mexican crisis.
The anti-suffragists were dealt a major blow in June 1914 when the General
Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC) voted to endorse woman suffrage. When
NAOWS learned that a delegation of clubwomen planned to call on the President to
present the GFWC’s resolution, they responded with a pre-emptive strike. NAOWS
President Josephine Dodge delivered a statement to the White House on June 28, 1914,
two days before the suffrage delegation was scheduled to arrive. Dodge’s letter to the
President read, in part, “The suffragists are already quoting widely that 1,000,000
clubwomen have indorsed woman suffrage, which is absolutely untrue . . . there are
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hundreds of thousands of women who belong to clubs that have indorsed it who are
actively opposed to woman suffrage.” 442
When the delegation of more than 500 suffragists met with the President two days
later, reports surfaced that some of the women had grown impatient with Wilson’s
insistence that suffrage was an issue to be settled by individual states and his refusal to
state his personal opinion on the issue. According to a report from the New York Times,
some of the suffragists hissed when the President refused to allow them to cross-examine
him. 443 Quick to capitalize on this apparent act of disrespect by their rivals, the antisuffragists fired off a sympathetic letter to Wilson. NAOWS President Dodge,
congratulated the President on his “judicial attitude” toward the suffragists, going on to
say, “I wish also to express our regret that any body of women should have so presumed
on your courtesy in receiving them as to subject you to personal questions.” 444
In the wake of the 1914 mid-term elections, Dodge sent a more extensive letter to
Wilson in which she pleaded with him to withstand the entreaties of the suffragists to
support a federal amendment. Citing the failure of suffrage referenda in five out of seven
states that considered the question in 1914, Dodge wrote, “We are confident that the
Chief Executive of this great nation will not lend his influence to the cause of a small
minority of women who seek to gain their own ends by undemocratic disregard of both
states’ rights and the will of the people.” 445 She concluded the letter by asking Wilson to
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reaffirm his opposition to “national legislation designed to throttle the will of the people
and the principles of local self-government, and impose upon women a political burden,
to remain free from which the overwhelming majority consider and esteem a great
privilege.” 446
NAOWS was clearly concerned in late 1914 that the President might be pressured
to support the federal amendment. But a more immediate concern for the coming year
was what action Wilson would take on the suffrage referendum pending in his home state
of New Jersey. The President of the New Jersey Association Opposed to Woman
Suffrage (NJAOWS), Mary Scudder Jamieson, wrote to her former governor in January
1915 to ask that he oppose the pending legislation. Jamieson boasted of her
organization’s 11,500 members, many of whom were “well known in their home State in
connection with large, charitable, benevolent and educational movements.” She went on
to say, “It would seem that due consideration should be paid to the convictions of women
of such character and influence . . . who honestly believe that political equality will not
be for the good of the state or for the elevation of the individual.” 447
Jameison’s letter illuminates one of the anti-suffragists’ most common lines of
attack against enfranchising women. Women like Jameison and Dodge – both of whom
were active in philanthropic work – believed that gaining the right to vote would damage
women’s ability to influence change in that it would result in their loss of non-partisan
status. Although leading suffragists usually portrayed their rivals as sheltered patricians
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who did not understand the challenges facing most women in the country, this charge was
hardly accurate. Many of the anti-suffragists were well-informed, concerned with
contemporary issues, and heavily engaged in social welfare work. Instead of seeking
reform through the use of the ballot though, they sought to change society through their
ability to influence male decision makers. They believed women could be more effective
by utilizing the traditional method of non-partisan, non-electoral influence over male
legislators. 448 There is an obvious class bias in this argument. Anti-suffragists realized
that, without the vote, only women with the social position and leisure to be involved in
women’s clubs would influence their communities. With full woman suffrage, all types
of women (i.e. not necessarily the “right types”) would have influence and most of these
women, the antis believed, would be swept up in the political machines. 449
There is no record of a reply from Wilson to the NJAOWS letter. And he did not
comply with the request to oppose suffrage in New Jersey, instead voting in favor of the
448
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suffrage referendum in October 1915. 450 Wilson’s favorable vote in the New Jersey
election meant that the antis could no longer claim him as an ally. In fact, his action
eliminated their ability to even portray him as neutral. The only thing he gave them to
hold on to was the fact that he maintained his states’ rights position – saying that he had
voted in New Jersey as a private citizen and that he was still opposed to a federal
amendment. The anti-suffragists would cling to this last bit of support up until the time
Wilson endorsed the federal amendment in January 1918.
Even though the President had sanctioned the states’ rights position early in his
first term and then showed that he personally favored the measure via his vote in New
Jersey, the anti-suffragists hoped to stop the Democratic Party as a whole from moving in
that direction. In fact, they worked to stop both major parties from endorsing suffrage
during the 1916 presidential election. Prior to the national conventions in June, Dodge
wrote to members of the platform committee from both the Democrat and Republican
parties. She passed on a resolution from NAOWS: “That we request the Committees on
Platforms of the Republican and Democratic National Conventions convening at Chicago
and St. Louis to make no mention of woman suffrage.” 451 Dodge asked for their support
in terms that encompassed all the standard anti-suffrage arguments:
We trust that you will lend your influence to this end, so that our women
may retain their present freedom from the maelstrom of politics, in
accordance with the desire of the majority of both men and women; so that
American women may continue to devote their splendid energies to the
advancement of non-partisan and humanitarian enterprises without
political bias; and that they may concentrate on the service of womanhood,
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childhood and the home through with they make their greatest contribution
to the country and the common good. 452
This request, of course, brought the anti-suffragists into direct conflict with both Catt and
Wilson, who worked together to ensure the Democratic Platform included support for
suffrage as a state measure. 453 Later that summer, the antis were rebuffed by Wilson
again when he agreed to speak at NAWSA’s annual convention in September 1916, but
rejected a similar speaking offer from NAOWS. 454
Despite the clear indications that Wilson had allied himself with NAWSA, the
anti-suffragists continued to remind him of their presence, dedication, and patriotism.
NAOWS beat NAWSA to the punch in offering themselves to war service in early 1917.
Just as Catt was sending out a call to NAWSA to take a favorable position on US entry
into the war, Dodge wrote to inform Wilson that NAOWS had adopted the following
resolution: “That we offer our services to the President and will serve in any way in
which we can be of use.” 455 Anti-suffragists later trumpeted the fact that support for this
resolution among NAOWS members had been unanimous, as compared to the strife that
the war issue created among the suffragists. One anti mocked Catt’s pledging NAWSA
for war service: “It should not be forgotten, however, that her offer brought out a storm of
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opposition among her followers . . . and that various meetings of suffragists were called
immediately to condemn her action.” 456
The NAOWS’ attitude toward Wilson – and toward the suffrage battle in general seemed to change somewhat in the summer of 1917. The new NAOWS President, Alice
Hay Wadsworth, replaced the deferential tone that was the hallmark of correspondence
between Josephine Dodge and President Wilson with a bitter and demanding tone . The
wife of James Wadsworth, the ardent anti-suffrage Senator from New York, Alice had
previously been the president of the District of Columbia Association Opposed to
Woman Suffrage. Her sudden replacement of Dodge as the leader of NAOWS in July
1917 came as a surprise to many and marked an important turning point in the
organization’s history. 457 Under Wadsworth, NAOWS took a sharp turn to the right.
The organization had long insisted that suffrage was linked with radicalism and
had often touted the anti-suffragists’ unflinching support for all of the President’s policies
as a far superior form of patriotism than that practiced by the suffragists. Still, under
Wadsworth, the vitriolic nature of the anti-suffrage attacks attained new heights. As one
historian describes it, “anti-suffragism now took on the character of a frenzied religious
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inquisition.” 458 In Splintered Sisterhood, Susan Marshall offers the most plausible
explanation for the movement’s rightward lurch. She posits that as Wilson appeared
more and more willing to support a federal amendment and as a victory in the upcoming
New York referendum appeared inevitable, many of the more moderate anti-suffragists
resigned themselves to failure and departed the ranks of NAOWS. Their departure left
the most conservative anti-suffragists at the helm of the organization with no voices of
reason there to protest when they abandoned any limits in their attempt to derail suffrage
momentum with charges of radicalism and apocalyptic predictions. 459
If Marshall is correct – and the evidence certainly seems to support her thesis –
then it would seem that the nation’s leading anti-suffrage organization had given up on
Wilson as an ally by the summer of 1917. Given his increasing support to Catt and
NAWSA over the first half of the year, their loss of faith was understandable. 460 If
Dodge had always erred on the side of deference in the hope that Wilson might still
support the antis, Wadsworth took a different tact. She wrote to Wilson in late July 1917
to protest his pardon of 16 NWP picketers. Questioning his decision to permit “women
of wealth, family, and position to violate the laws and go unpunished,” Wadsworth
demanded, “Can it be necessary that to preserve peace within our borders in this time of
stress and imperative need for progress, the machinery of government should be halted
that these ‘flies on the wheel’ may bask in the light of publicity?” 461 Wilson was
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apparently taken aback by the letter. He passed it on to Tumulty with the following note:
“This is a very awkward letter to answer. I would be obliged if you would write to Mrs.
Wadsworth saying that I have asked you to acknowledge the letter and express my warm
appreciation of her sincere and candid letter.” 462
Just a month after this exchange with Wadsworth, Wilson signaled his support for
the pending suffrage legislation in New York. When that legislation passed in November
and New York joined the ranks of the suffrage states, the President’s congratulatory notes
to NAWSA indicated that he would almost certainly endorse the federal amendment at
the start of 1918. If the anti-suffragists had sensed that Wilson was lost to their cause
during the summer, they were all but certain of his treason by the end of the year. Still,
some held on to the hope that he would not take the final step of endorsing the federal
amendment.
When the Milwaukee Leader published the story of David Lawrence’s visit to
Alice Paul in prison, NAOWS’ General Secretary Minnie Bronson immediately wrote to
Wilson and asked him to refute the article. It will be recalled from the previous chapter
that the article in question alleged that Lawrence had been sent as a representative of the
administration to cut a deal with Paul: stop the picketing and the President will support
the federal amendment. Bronson was indignant that a Socialist newspaper had published
this unbelievable story. She requested that Wilson “stop any further circulation of this
canard, and make it impossible for men . . . to intimate that the President of the United
States “secretly favors” suffrage methods he has publicly condemned.” 463 There is no
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record of a reply from Wilson on the specific issue of the Lawrence visit to Alice Paul.
However, he gave an answer to Bronson’s broader question in early January 1918 when
he made his first public statement in support of the federal amendment as it was headed
for a vote in the House of Representatives. 464
Even though the writing had been on the wall, leading NAOWS members were
apparently devastated by the President’s announcement. 465 Bronson was so disappointed
in the man that she had defended just a month earlier that she issued a public apology on
behalf of NAOWS to Alice Paul for questioning the David Lawrence story. 466 For
NAOWS to admit it was wrong and to issue an apology to the leader of the dreaded
picketers demonstrates just how much the President’s betrayal shook the organization.
NAOWS did not correspond directly with Wilson ever again following his emergence as
a supporter of the federal amendment. 467 Neither did they attack him for his betrayal.
Despite their disappointment and frustration, to attack the President during the war would
have been too gross a violation of their rigid brand of patriotism.
Several reasons emerge to explain why this well-organized and fairly
sophisticated organization of anti-suffragists was unable to maintain Wilson’s alliance.
First, NAOWS and its affiliated state anti-suffrage organizations did not see the President
as the center of gravity in the suffrage battle. Rather, the antis focused their efforts on
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state referenda. 468 In addition, NAOWS was slow to react to the suffragists’ shift in
attention and effort toward the federal amendment. The organization did not even move
its headquarters from New York to Washington, D.C. until the summer of 1917. 469 By
that time, Wilson’s conversion to the cause of suffrage was almost complete.
Finally, the failure of NAOWS to influence Wilson is explained by a fundamental
flaw in their basic ideology. The anti-suffragists consistently argued that women actually
possessed more influence without the vote. But this premise simply did not hold up to
the political realities of the day. If nothing else, Wilson could calculate political math.
The preceding chapters have outlined how the votes of women from the enfranchised
states served to push him toward support of a federal amendment. His advisors - and
leading suffragists like Catt – warned him repeatedly that he and the Democratic Party
would suffer at the hands of women voters if he continued to withhold his support. There
were no such warnings about the danger of disregarding the nation’s anti-suffrage
women. A pro-suffrage cartoon from mid-1913 perfectly illustrated this flaw in antisuffrage thinking. Under the title, “Getting Her Pigs to Market,” sit two pictures. In one,
an anti-suffragist bearing a club entitled “moral suasion” chases uncontrolled pigs around
a yard. The adjacent picture shows a suffragist whose pigs are moving in perfect order
along a ramp labeled “the vote.” 470 Despite their belief in the power of moral suasion,
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anti-suffragists who did not wield the vote simply did not figure into Wilson’s political
calculus.
So, the attempt by the anti-suffragists to prevent Wilson from becoming a
suffrage supporter must ultimately be viewed as a failure. Still, the actions of this active
movement have important implications for this study of Wilson’s conversion. It is my
contention that the specific strategy that Catt employed with the President played a
crucial role in winning him over to the cause. Key components of that strategy were
developed in response to the challenges posed by the anti-suffragists. 471 Specifically,
Catt’s decision to disavow the campaign strategy of the CU and, later, the militancy of
the NWP and to pledge NAWSA to war service must be viewed, in part, as a product of
the battle with the antis. 472
Some general observations that support this point can be gleaned from a review of
both suffrage and anti-suffrage publications during the period 1911-1920. First, the two
opposing camps were obsessed with one another. They clearly scoured one another’s
publications, looking for factual errors or faulty logic, and then attacked any such errors
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in their own publications or in mainstream media outlets. 473 In The Woman Voter, a
monthly publication of the NAWSA-affiliated Woman Suffrage Party of New York City,
the editors devoted a section of every edition to the anti-suffragists. Believing that the
arguments and actions of the antis actually helped to reinforce the argument for suffrage,
The Woman Voter cleverly entitled this monthly piece, “With Our Allies – the Antis.” 474
The near-obsession that these organizations had with one another raises the
question of whether they sometimes focused too much on each other at the expense of
lobbying the mostly-male voters who could actually affect the status of woman suffrage.
For the suffragists, at least, this may be true. But the amount of attention and the
resources they devoted to combating the antis is evidence of the fact that – right or wrong
- they viewed them as a real and powerful threat. 475
The antis were quick to exploit the 1914 NAWSA/CU rift and to attack Paul and
her followers for their campaigns to “hold the party in power responsible.” Later, they
railed against the NWP’s militancy in the picketing campaign. In most cases, the antis
simply conflated NAWSA with the CU/NWP, generalizing their attack to all suffragists.
473
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For example, an anti-suffrage article published during the 1914 mid-term elections asked,
“Who are the ‘conservative’ Suffragists, and who are the ‘radical’ Suffragists? In what
way can a Suffragist ever be considered as conservative?”476 The article went on to
exploit the divisions within the suffrage movement’s ranks: “The country is confronted
with the spectacle of several bands or groups of women quarreling among themselves,
unable to determine whom they shall oppose or what they shall advocate, making
speeches that contradict each other, and altogether creating a confusion which is sure to
fail in accomplishing any definite results for ‘votes for women.’” 477
NAOWS branded all suffragists as militants following an encounter between CU
agitators and President Wilson in New York in May 1915. The CU members interrupted
an event at the Biltmore Hotel and confronted Wilson with a letter demanding him to
give a straight-forward statement of his personal opinion on suffrage. In relating the
event in a full-page article, the anti-suffragists opened with, “The recent militant methods
of American Suffragists have created wide-spread comment.” 478 Although the article
went on to print Catt’s repudiation of the CU actions, it also stressed that the nation’s
suffrage organizations were divided and could not contain the growth of militancy in
their ranks.
Attacks like these almost certainly helped Catt make the important decision to
distance NAWSA from the CU/NWP. Her relentless campaign to distinguish NAWSA
from Paul’s organization becomes even more understandable in light of anti-suffrage
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attempts to hold the former responsible for the actions of the latter. Catt’s decision to
pledge NAWSA to war service must be viewed in the same light.
The anti-suffragists took advantage of every opportunity to associate suffragism
with Socialism and to charge that suffragists/Socialists represented twin threats to
America. 479 As has previously been described in this chapter, these attacks became
increasingly personal and vindictive once Wadsworth assumed the NAOWS presidency
in July 1917. 480 Still, the association with Socialism was present in anti-suffrage rhetoric
from a much earlier date. 481 In testimony before Congress in 1913, former suffragist
turned anti, Annie Bock, told the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage, “Woman
suffrage will expose the Nation to anarchy. Gentlemen, do you believe any woman
desires the vote so much that she will become an incendiary, a dynamiter, a murderer? Is
there not some ulterior motive in all this? Sure; it is socialism. The militants work in the
revolutionary way; the sly nonmilitants employ the Fabian method.” 482 Bock went on to
make the familiar anti-suffrage charge that associated Socialists with treasonous
behavior. In reference to a specific suffragist who was also a Socialist, Bock said, “I
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don’t like her politics. She stands for the red. I stand for the red, white, and blue . . .
Gentlemen, where do you stand?” 483
As Catt pondered which direction to move NAWSA in February 1917 –with the
nation standing on the brink of entering the First World War – she was highly cognizant
of anti-suffrage attacks against the suffragists’ patriotism. The dedication of all the major
suffrage journals to answering the antis’ charges is evidence of this. Knowing that
NAWSA would be castigated by the anti-suffragists if the organization adopted anything
less than a “100 Percent Americanism” attitude, Catt urged her organization to support
the President’s decision to go to war. Just before Wilson made a formal declaration of
war in April, she defended this break with her pacifist past, saying, “I am a pacifist, but
not for peace without honor. I’d be willing, if necessary, to die for my country. The
women of this country are, as a whole, patriotic, and if war comes they will prove it.” 484
Catt’s need to prove that suffragists were loyal citizens was clearly influenced by
the active anti-suffrage movement which stood ready to pounce on any chink in the
suffragists’ armor. As the previous chapter outlined, Catt and NAWSA’s silence over the
violation of the NWP pickets’ civil rights was part of NAWSA’s broader complicity in
sustaining the oppressive environment in wartime America. The fact that the pressure of
the anti-suffragists further encouraged NAWSA to abandon their better principles and to
move toward even greater wartime nativism does not excuse Catt or NAWSA for doing
just that. 485 Suffragists must be included in those held responsible for one of the ugliest
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chapters in American history with regards to intolerance for those who voiced dissent.
Still, it is important to note that the suffragists’ decisions were driven, in part, by the
extreme nativism and narrowly defined patriotism of the anti-suffragists.
The fact that NAWSA did, in fact, decide to pledge itself to war service became
increasingly important in 1918 as the federal suffrage amendment made its way to a floor
vote in both the House and the Senate. Wilson – along with many suffrage supporters in
Congress – repeatedly pointed to the suffragists’ war service as they fought for the
amendment’s passage. The President’s actions during this battle in Congress, which
ultimately culminated in the amendment’s passage and movement to the states for
ratification, is the subject of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
WILSON AS AN ADVOCATE, 1918-1919

On January 8, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson appeared before a joint session
of Congress and gave one of the most famous speeches of the 20th century. In soaring
terms, he outlined America’s war aims and proposed a world peace based on the
“Fourteen Points” which included his vision for the League of Nations. The following
day he met with a group of Democrats from the House and offered his first public
endorsement of the federal woman suffrage amendment. At first glance, these events
seem more connected by calendar proximity than anything else. Certainly the former has
gone down in history as having much greater significance than the latter. But closer
inspection reveals a more considerable connection between the two events than one might
expect. As this chapter will show, the war, Wilson’s postwar vision, and the issue of
woman suffrage became deeply intertwined in 1918.
After publicly endorsing the federal amendment in January 1918, the President
never backed away from full support of nationwide woman suffrage. His newfound
enthusiasm was consistent with his behavior throughout the suffrage campaign; it was
based on the political value of the issue. By the start of the new year, suffrage had
gathered momentum as a powerful political issue through the addition of eight more
suffrage states, the war being fought in the name of democracy, and women’s massive
participation in the home front war effort. Wilson’s close advisors communicated a very
different message to their leader heading into the 1918 mid-term elections than they had
in the election years of 1914 and 1916. They expressed concern about suffrage as a
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political liability if the suffrage amendment failed to pass under a Democratic Congress.
As this chapter will show, Wilson did everything in his power to avoid that liability.
Understanding Wilson’s motivation during this time period is a complex
endeavor. His foremost goal, as he told the nation and the world in his “Fourteen Points”
speech, was to attain a peaceful, liberal world order. Wilson’s vision included selfdetermined capitalist nations governed by international law and safe from both traditional
forms of imperialism and revolutionary socialism. He believed that America had a
mission to extend her national values to the rest of the world – a mission that could only
be fulfilled within the stable boundaries of his postwar vision for world order. 486 The
significance of the 1918 mid-term elections was enormous for Wilson. If the Democrats
lost control of Congress, he knew that he would face tremendous Congressional
opposition to American participation in the League of Nations – a key component of the
postwar order. 487 Wilson’s strong desire to win votes for Democrats in order to pursue
his larger strategy for the war and the peace that would follow must be seen as the driving
force behind all of his decisions leading up to November.
It is precisely because this particular desire was so strong in Wilson that it is
difficult to determine the degree to which his personal feelings about women as political
beings changed, if at all. As this chapter will reveal, he worked tirelessly to secure the
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federal amendment under a Democratic Congress. Was this purely an attempt to
strengthen his party in order to pursue his foreign policy or was there a personal
conversion involved?
Wilson’s exposure to women in the public sphere had certainly increased during
his six years in the White House. The President more and more dealt with women fully
engaged in matters of political import, not only in the form of suffragists, but also as
members of the Woman’s Peace Party, the Women’s Trade Union League, and the
Women’s Christian Temperance Union. As the nation moved into war, he appointed
women to the Woman’s Committee of the Council of National Defense and approved the
enlistment of thousands of women in the American Expeditionary Force that deployed to
Europe. 488
It seems more than plausible to suggest that increased familiarity with women
operating in the public sphere bred in Wilson a newfound respect for women’s
capabilities. Perhaps he finally tested some of those assumptions about women’s mental
limitations that his Bryn Mawr graduate student complained of and found them in serious
need of revision. As Victoria Bissell Brown argues persuasively, “In the two decades
that passed between Wilson’s stint at Bryn Mawr and his academic and political careers
in New Jersey, American women defied, daily, the assumption that domestic life was
incompatible with political life.” 489 In the absence of any personal writings from Wilson
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that indicate a private conversion that matched his public enthusiasm for suffrage, we are
left only with the proposition that such a conversion most likely occurred. Setting aside
the possibility of a private conversion, though, there can be no doubt about his advocacy
for woman suffrage in the public sphere - advocacy that would see both victory and
defeat during the course of his final two years in office.
Months before the first suffrage victory in Congress, Wilson had begun preparing
for the battle that he knew would have to be fought. Throughout the summer and fall of
1917, he corresponded back and forth with members of his cabinet and suffrage
advocates trying to determine where the House and Senate stood if the measure were to
come up for a vote. 490 His major concern during the months leading up to the start of the
65th Congress was that the measure would be put to a vote before the necessary
affirmative votes were secured. Pro-suffrage Congressmen and Senators succeeded in
blocking any premature votes in December, and by the first week of the new year, it was
fairly evident that the first vote would come in the House on January 10.
Two days before the vote, the women’s representative of the Democratic National
Committee, Elizabeth Merrill Bass, who had been in close communication with the White
House for several months, wrote to encourage Wilson to publish a public message of
support for the amendment. She made the political implications clear, urging, “Do not let
us give [the Republicans] the advantage of our silence to carry with them into the
congressional campaigns next year when asking for the votes of the enfranchised
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women.” 491 In a theme that she would repeat for the next year, Bass stressed to the
President the political importance of a suffrage victory under a Democratic Congress.
Wilson heeded her advice. He made himself available to a group of Democratic
members of the Suffrage Committee the following day and voiced his support for the
federal amendment. After the meeting, the Representatives handed a statement to
members of the press that read, “The Committee found that the President had not felt at
liberty to volunteer his advice to members of Congress in this important matter, but when
we sought his advice he very frankly and earnestly advised us to vote for the amendment
as an act of right and justice to the women of the country and the world.” 492 The New
York Times ran their story about the meeting under the headline “Wilson Backs
Amendment for Woman Suffrage.” 493
The press statement included a list of Wilson’s four reasons for supporting the
federal amendment. Again, in the absence of private correspondence regarding his
changed position, this statement provides important insight into the President’s rationale.
Additionally, the themes articulated in this statement would serve as the basis of Wilson’s
advocacy for the amendment for the next two years:
First – The party platform, which declares woman suffrage to be a question for
each State to decide was adopted before the present exigencies arose – exigencies
which make it all-important that the women be allowed to vote. Therefore, strict
adherence to that platform cannot now be expected of Democrats. Second – The
President does not regard this as a matter of State rights, therefore it is to be
differentiated from the prohibition amendment. He holds that the matter of
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suffrage is primarily a national question and a constitutional question and has
been so decided in frequent decisions of the Supreme Court . . . Third – The
President insists that if the members of Congress believe that the women should
have the right to vote, they should accept the first favorable opportunity to grant
them that right. The manner of application of such a principle, he contends,
should not be the main question. Fourth – A large part of the civilized world is
favorable to woman suffrage, many countries having granted it and England
having promised it. 494
Not surprisingly, three of Wilson’s four justifications were related to federal versus state
action. Wilson had used the party’s “states’ rights” position as a reason for not endorsing
the federal amendment for the past two years, so he clearly felt compelled to defend his
decision to now move away from that platform. American entry into the war (“the
present exigencies”) served as his justification and provided cover for other Democrats to
do the same. In this first endorsement, he did not fully explain why women voters were
necessary now that the nation was at war, but he would flesh out that argument over the
course of the next year. To call woman suffrage “a national question” marked a
complete reversal of his 1912 position, when he opined to the governor of Massachusetts
that “[suffrage] is not a national question but a state question.” 495 The final justification
Wilson offered – the fact that other “civilized” nations had granted woman suffrage –
reflects his belief that the United States had emerged as a world leader. With that new
role came new responsibilities, to include being ahead of others in preserving and
extending democracy.
Reaction to the President’s statement was predictable. Suffragists were elated.
Catt and Paul both immediately released statements praising Wilson’s new stand. 496
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Within the Democratic Party, Wilson’s conversion to federal action received mixed
reviews. Elected officials from suffrage states (almost all of whom were pro-suffrage)
were pleased, but a number of Southern Democrats reacted negatively. One Southern
congressman blasted the President’s abandonment of the states’ rights position, publicly
accusing Wilson of “attempting to coerce Democrats into voting against their party and
their personal convictions.” 497 An editorial in the New York Times compared Wilson’s
reversal on the federal amendment to the position flips of previous presidents and
concluded that Wilson was no better and no worse than his predecessors. Questioning
the sincerity of his conversion, though, the Times’ editorialist suggested that Wilson came
out in support mainly to “put the Democrats on a par with the Republicans in ‘the
suffrage states.’” 498 While criticizing him for his lack of principles, even the anti-suffrage
Times concluded that Wilson’s move was good politics considering the importance of
suffrage in the upcoming midterm elections. Regardless of the reaction, Wilson’s support
was important in what turned out to be an extremely close vote.
The House of Representatives voted on the measure on January 10, 1918. As the
table below indicates and as Catt and NAWSA had always maintained, bipartisan support
was a key element in the victory:

Republicans
Democrats
Miscellaneous
Total

Yes
165
104
5
274

No
33
102
1
136

496

“Wilson Favors Suffrage Vote; Says Changed Conditions Call for Federal Amendment,”
Boston Daily Globe, January 10, 1918, 2.
497

“House for Suffrage, 274 to 136,” New York Times, January 11, 1918, 2. The Congressman
making this charge was Representative Frank Clark of Florida, a staunch anti-suffragist.
498

“After the First Battle,” New York Times, January 12, 1918, 10.

224

The final vote was less than a fraction over the necessary two-thirds. The newest suffrage
state – New York – figured prominently into the result. New York’s delegation, with 33
ayes and only 3 nays, played a pivotal role in the first congressional triumph for the
federal amendment. 499 With high hopes for another quick victory, suffragists turned
their attention to the Senate. Despite Herculean efforts by the President, their hopes for
success in the Senate were not to be realized for more than a year.
From January to October 1918, the Senate vacillated on whether or not to vote on
the suffrage amendment. Predictions about the outcome were so close that calling for a
vote was extremely risky for both sides. When it looked as if it might pass, anti-suffrage
Senators would filibuster to block a vote. When it appeared that it would fail, they would
rush to try and get the measure voted on. Wilson campaigned zealously throughout the
eight-month period between victory in the House and the first vote in the Senate. The
main point he used to try and persuade reluctant Senators to vote for the amendment was
that the Democrats might lose control of Congress if the suffrage amendment did not pass
before the November 1918 mid-term elections. Wilson repeatedly wrote to Senators that
he needed Democrats to maintain control of Congress in order to successfully prosecute
the war and ensure a lasting peace in the post-war settlement.
Despite his full desire for the amendment to pass, Wilson was constrained in his
advocacy by several factors. First, he recognized that the line between executive interest
and executive interference was both highly sensitive and extremely thin. His
correspondence with Senators during the spring and summer of 1918 demonstrates that
he struggled mightily with how far and how hard he could push without crossing that line
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and creating a negative backlash against the amendment. Secondly, he fully realized the
pressure that Southern Democrats were under to protect white supremacy by opposing the
amendment. Knowing that they may face dire consequences in future elections, Wilson
attempted to provide cover for Southerners who would be willing to support suffrage.
Finally, Wilson was aware that dedication to continued white supremacy was only
part of the issue for some Southern senators. Despite the intense efforts of NAWSA and
NWP leaders to not allow the suffrage movement to become entangled with other
progressive issues, the overlap in membership between suffrage groups and other
progressive interests such as the prohibition and child-labor movements made the
entanglement impossible to avoid. Leaders of the liquor and cotton textile industries
feared that women voters would provide massive support to progressive legislation that
would curtail their ability to turn a profit. 500
For Senators who came from states in which those interests had the most power,
support for suffrage was political suicide. Though they often publicly emphasized their
racist opposition to suffrage over their economic concerns, Wilson was not ignorant of
the additional reasons beyond race for their opposition to a federal amendment. Nor did
he choose to push those particular senators with as much vigor. As the record shows, he
focused his efforts on those Democrats who did not have to answer to powerful industry
lobbyists.
In March, Tumulty received word from the Senate that the suffrage amendment
would be brought to a vote within the next few days. He wrote a memo to Wilson
voicing his fears that the amendment would not pass and that its failure would be laid at
the feet of the Democratic Party. Indicating the continued importance of NAWSA’s
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close relationship with the Administration, Tumulty informed the President that Catt had
called and expressed hope that the two Democratic Senators from Florida might vote in
the affirmative if Wilson asked them to do so. Wilson responded that he “would weaken
my influence in a score of directions if I were to depart from the rule I have set myself
and send for Senators, but I am eager to advise them to vote for the amendment if they
will themselves give me an opportunity to do so.” 501 Anxious to not violate senatorial
courtesy, he encouraged Tumulty to devise a way for the Senators to come to the White
House without being “called.”
In a letter that sheds fascinating insight into the lengths to which a president will go
to not cross the line between interest and interference, Tumulty wrote back to Wilson
with an elaborate plan to get Senator Duncan Fletcher from Florida to come see the
President without having it appear that Wilson had ordered him to the White House.
Tumulty met with the pro-suffrage Senator Henry Hollis (D-NH) and together they
devised a plan that Tumulty then passed along to Wilson:
You [should] send for Senators Fletcher and Ransdell, both of whom are members of
the Committee on Commerce, which Committee has recently been investigating the
Shipping Board and Hog Island. Senator Hollis understands that you have not talked
over shipping matters with Fletcher and Ransdell for some time and that they will be
able to give you some valuable information that may speed up the shipping
programme. They are both great friends of the Administration and are anxious to
serve. You might very properly send for them at once to discuss the speeding up of
the shipping programme. If you do this, Senator Ransdell will call your attention to
the situation in connection with suffrage and will give you a most excellent chance to
discuss it with Senator Fletcher. Senator Trammell [from Florida] has stated that if
Senator Fletcher votes for suffrage, he will also. This will enable us to put the matter
over this week. 502
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Tumulty’s letter is instructive for a number of reasons. First, it shows that senatorial
courtesy was not just an excuse that the President used to avoid openly pressuring
Senators to vote in a particular way – a charge repeatedly leveled by the NWP. If
Tumulty and Wilson, in their private correspondence, were willing to go to these lengths
to respect the need for Senators to at least appear independent, then the fear of crossing
that invisible line was surely real and not just a convenient excuse for inaction.
Secondly, it indicates the remarkable amount of coordination that was required among
Wilson, his staff, NAWSA leaders, and pro-suffrage Senators to try and secure the
federal amendment. Winning suffrage in the Senate was no small task.
The vote in March was blocked by opponents who feared that the resolution might
pass. The next time a vote appeared on the horizon was early May. Following a request
from Catt and similar urging from Bass, Wilson wrote to seven Democratic Senators
urging them to support the amendment. The letters show his struggle to secure their
support without alienating them through pushing too hard. To Senator Josiah Wolcott of
Delaware he typed, “I am writing this letter on my own typewriter (notwithstanding a
lame hand) in order that it may be entirely confidential and may not in the least embarrass
you if you should find that you cannot yield to this very earnest request.” 503 He went on
to make a convincing connection between passing the suffrage amendment and winning
Democratic victories in the mid-term elections. His letter concluded, “The next Congress
must be controlled by genuine dependable friends; and we may lose it, - I fear we shall
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lose it, - if we do not satisfy the opinion of the country in this matter [of suffrage]
now.” 504
The rest of the letters Wilson sent carried a similar message. The replies he received
indicate the many fronts on which he had to fight the suffrage war. Senator J.C.W.
Beckham of Kentucky said that he opposed the federal amendment because it violated the
principle of states’ rights and because he was personally opposed to women having the
right to vote. Senator Benjamin Tillman of South Carolina replied by saying that the
women of his state did not really want the vote and that he would not be a party to
forcing it on them. A similar reason was offered up by Senator Atlee Pomerene of Ohio
who pointed out that he had personally voted for a state amendment when serving in the
Ohio legislature, but that the amendment had been defeated in his state. Like Tillman,
Pomerene argued that he would be contradicting the will of his constituents if he
supported the federal amendment. From Florida came replies from Senator Fletcher that
he did not believe suffrage was an issue that would hurt the Democrats in the upcoming
election and from Senator Trammell who claimed only that he had already pledged to his
constituents to oppose the amendment. 505
In addition to these objections, Wilson heard from Senator Lee Overman of North
Carolina who made it very clear why he could not vote for suffrage. In addition to
offering up the same reason as Tillman and Pomerene, Overman wrote, “I am sure it will
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be exceedingly unwise at this time, from a political standpoint, for a North Carolina
Senator to favor the passage of this measure, as our people believe it might result in a
very dangerous inroad into our social condition, if adopted, and would give us a great
deal of trouble in the future.” 506 Overman’s reference to the threat of black voters was
clear. What he did not say, but what was surely a part of his thought process, was the
way the powerful cotton textile industries would be alienated by his support of suffrage –
the passage of which they saw as directly connected to increased federal regulation of
cheap child labor. 507
Wilson, exasperated over the situation, sent an uncharacteristically curt letter to Bass
in late May. Bass had written the President expressing her belief that there were at least
six senators who could be influenced to change their votes if the President would make
an appeal to them. As always, she mentioned the difficulty of winning the mid-term
elections if suffrage did not pass. Wilson wrote back, “It was supposed as you say in
your letter . . . that there were ’half a dozen possibilities’ in the Senate from whom we
might draw sufficient support to put the federal amendment through, but as a matter of
fact I have done my best to draw from that half-dozen and have utterly failed.” 508
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Unable to secure the necessary votes in May, suffragists were able to get their
advocates in the Senate to delay the vote again. With this additional time to garner
support, they began to push Wilson to support the amendment as a war measure. They
hoped that the pressure of a war measure would either cause at least two Senators to
change their votes in order to not appear unpatriotic or that Southerners could argue to
their constituents that threats to national security were more important than threats to
white supremacy.
While Bass continued to communicate her fears about the mid-term elections,
Wilson also began to hear the same fear from other corners. U.S. Representative Jouett
Shouse of Kansas wrote to convey his concern that a defeat for suffrage in the Senate
would do serious harm to the re-election bids of Democrats in the suffrage states. Shouse
called for Wilson to make another public statement of his support for the amendment and
his encouragement of Democratic Senators to vote in its favor. On the same day, Catt
also wrote to the President urging him to make a public statement that granting equal
suffrage in the United States was critical to the successful prosecution of the war under
the stated aim of making the world safe for democracy. 509
Ultimately, Wilson agreed to make another public statement. He did so through a
publicity mechanism provided by Catt. The French Union for Woman Suffrage had
written to him in February asking for an expression of his opinion on woman suffrage.
He drafted a response that he submitted to Catt for her review on June 7. Catt wrote back
indicating her general approval of the letter but asking that he add one crucial sentence:
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“As America’s answer to this question, it is my earnest hope that the Senate of the United
States will pass the suffrage amendment to our federal constitution before the end of this
session.” Wilson rewrote his response with the new sentence inserted exactly as Catt had
written it, and the letter was reproduced in all the major newspapers in mid-June. 510
Hoping to capitalize on the publicity from the letter to the French women, prosuffrage Democrats tried to call for a vote in late June. Wilson again wrote letters to
secure the necessary votes. He did not publicly call the amendment a “war measure;”
however, his private correspondence to reluctant senators repeatedly stressed the link
between the war and granting equal suffrage. To Senator John Shields of Tennessee,
Wilson stated, “I feel that much of the morale of this country and of the world, and not a
little of the faith which the rest of the world will repose in our sincere adherence to
democratic principles, will depend upon the action which the Senate takes in this now
critically important matter.” 511
Despite Wilson’s willingness to privately argue for the amendment as a war measure,
he had little success with Southern Democrats. In his reply, Senator Shields not only
rejected Wilson’s contention that the adoption of the suffrage resolution would in any
way contribute to the successful prosecution of the war, but also reiterated that the fear of
losing white supremacy was “controlling” him and the majority of his colleagues from
Southern states. 512 Uundaunted, Wilson wrote back to Shields, “I do earnestly believe
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that our action upon this amendment will have an important and immediate influence
upon the whole atmosphere and more of the nations engaged in the war.” 513 His efforts
were in vain. Shields voted “nay” in October and again in February and June 1919.
With the vote scheduled for June 27, Wilson made himself available to a group of
Senate Democrats who came to ask his opinion on the measure. Like the meeting with
House Democrats before the January vote, this meeting was engineered solely for the
publicity it would again give to the President’s message of support. The Senators that
attended were all pro-suffrage already, but they were able to report to the press
afterwards that Wilson had been very enthusiastic about the measure passing under a
Democratic Congress. 514 Despite these efforts, the public pronouncement did not have
the intended effect of convincing any reluctant Democrats to change their votes.
What did have an effect was Wilson’s request to Senator Ollie James of Kentucky
to give up his agreement to be paired with an anti-suffrage senator for the upcoming vote.
With James’ agreement to give up his pair, the pro-suffrage forces believed they had
enough votes to pass the resolution. Thanks to Wilson’s intervention with James, a
victory in the Senate appeared imminent. Once again, though, opponents of the measure
refused to let it come to a vote for fear that they would not be able to secure its defeat. 515
The Senate then adjourned until the beginning of September.
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The Senate’s failure to vote on suffrage before adjourning for the summer
prompted Paul to resume the NWP campaign against Wilson and the Democrats. It will
be recalled from Chapter 5 that, following the release from jail of the final group of
pickets in November 1917, the NWP had ceased picketing the White House. Wilson’s
endorsement and the passage of the federal amendment by the House in January
convinced Paul to maintain a truce while working to secure victory in the Senate.
Interestingly, as Catt and other NAWSA representatives corresponded and coordinated
with the White House on a regular basis during 1918, the administration refused to
collaborate with the NWP. 516 Frustrated with the Senate and irritated by the President,
Paul ended her temporary truce.
In August, she orchestrated two protest meetings in Lafayette Square across from
the White House in which NWP members held up banners condemning Wilson and the
Senate Democrats. A number of women were arrested and received 10-15 day sentences
for the crime of “congregating in the park.” 517 In September, Paul initiated a new tactic:
burning the President’s words. Wilson met with members of NAWSA on the morning of
September 16 and assured them that he was doing his utmost to bring the amendment to a
vote in the Senate. Later that afternoon, NWP protestors rallied in Lafayette Square.
Holding up a copy of the President’s promise to NAWSA, the NWP speaker reportedly
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lit the paper on fire and threw it into an urn, declaring, “The President has given words,
and words, and words. Today, women receive more words. We announce to the
President and the whole world today, by this act of ours, our determination that words
shall no longer be the only reply given to American women.” 518
Clever visual rhetoric aside, these protests did nothing to move Wilson who was
already doing everything within his power to secure the federal amendment. Later in the
year, the NWP would turn more of their attention to the Senate, picketing and burning the
words of select senators on the steps of the Capitol. In early 1919, they returned their
attention to Wilson, burning him in effigy while he was participating in the peace talks at
Versailles. Paul also launched “The Prison Special,” a train tour across the country
featuring NWP prison veterans. Historian Sidney Bland refers to 1918-1919 as the
“pathological phase” of the NWP’s existence. 519 With the exception of the ardent
revisionists, most suffrage historians concur with Bland’s assessment and conclude that
the NWP became a liability to the cause of suffrage in this time period. 520 Evidence in
preceding chapters showed that most Americans disapproved of NWP militancy in 1917
even though the President was still not on record as supporting the federal amendment.
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Evidence presented later in this chapter shows that the American public – and more
importantly, potential political allies - moved beyond disapproval to disgust when the
NWP continued to target the President after he had publicly and repeatedly declared his
support for the measure. While the NWP wrongly and unwisely attacked him for
inaction in the summer of 1918, Wilson was actually hard at work securing support in the
Senate, a task often made more difficult due to the abhorrence of the NWP among most
Democrats.
In late August, Wilson was able to ensure additional support for the amendment
by urging the appointment of a pro-suffrage senator to replace Senator James who had
died earlier in the summer. Wilson maintained a close correspondence with Governor
Augustus Stanley of Kentucky who had the responsibility of appointing James’
successor. In his initial letter to Stanley, the only issue that Wilson mentioned in
connection with the appointment was that of suffrage. He wrote, “It would be of great
advantage to the party and to the country if his successor entertained views favorable to
the pending constitutional amendment.” 521 Stanley responded that he had appointed
George B. Martin to succeed James. He indicated that Martin was not personally in favor
of suffrage, but he was reasonably certain that the new appointee would defer to the
President and support the amendment. 522 Indeed, Martin helped to break the “solid
South” by voting “yea” in October.
When the Senate reconvened in September, the vote on the amendment was
scheduled for October 1. In concert, Catt and Wilson made a final push to secure the
necessary votes from Southern Democrats. On September 18, Catt wrote to Wilson,
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“Every Senator knows that the vote of the Amendment depends upon Mr. Benet [of
South Carolina] and he, if voting ‘aye’ on the first roll call, would virtually make the
announcement that it will pass.” 523 She went on to implore the President to seek Benet’s
vote that she was certain would swing over several other Southern Democrats.
Wilson did his best. He wrote to Benet on the same day that he received Catt’s
letter. Additionally, he coordinated a meeting with Benet and the governor of South
Carolina in the Oval Office on September 23. Benet was strongly opposed, but Wilson
did not give up. He wrote to him again three days later urging the amendment as a war
measure: “On this ground I appeal to you to hold up the President’s hands at the time of
all times when his responsibility to his own country and his obligations to the cause of
world-democracy weigh most heavily upon him.” 524 Again, Wilson’s efforts went
unrewarded as Benet voted “nay” just four days later. During his final correspondence
with Benet, Wilson also made one last appeal via telegram to five other Southern
Democrats, all of whom refused to change their positions.525
The Senate recessed over the weekend of September 28-29 with the vote scheduled
for Tuesday, October 1. Knowing that they were two votes short of the two-thirds
majority required for passage, Catt dashed off a desperation letter to Wilson on Sunday
morning. She informed him that the only way she could see to secure two more votes
was for the President to publicly endorse suffrage as a war measure. Catt asked the
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President to write a letter stating his support of suffrage as a war measure so that the
letter could then be printed in the newspapers prior to the Senate vote. She hoped,
although did not guarantee, that this step by Wilson would swing two senators around in
support of the resolution. 526
It was a busy Sunday for Wilson. In addition to receiving Catt’s letter, Treasury
Secretary McAdoo personally called on the President to urge him to appear before the
Senate on Monday and make a final appeal for the suffrage amendment. Two prosuffrage Senators came to see him in the afternoon voicing their support for McAdoo’s
suggestion. 527 Despite his fear that such an act might cross the fragile line into the realm
of executive interference, Wilson decided that it was the only hope for securing the
needed votes. He apparently believed that some Southern Democrats would feel safer
explaining an affirmative vote to their constituents if they could say that they had been
following the wishes of the President.
With only a few hours notice to Congress and to the media, Wilson appeared in the
Senate chamber at 1 pm on September 30. He spoke for just 15 minutes, but his speech
marked the first public pronouncement of his support for suffrage as a war measure. He
said that the amendment’s adoption was “clearly necessary to the successful prosecution
of the war and the successful realization of the object for which the war is being
fought.” 528 The rest of the world was looking to “the great, powerful, famous democracy
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of the West to lead them,” Wilson said, and he warned that “they will cease to follow or
to trust us” if the Senate failed to adopt the federal suffrage amendment. He made
repeated references to the injustice of withholding the full rights of citizenship from those
who had sacrificed so much in their country’s time of need. Noting that most of the
allied nations of Europe had enfranchised women, Wilson asked, “Are we alone to ask
and take the utmost that our women can give – service and sacrifice of every kind – and
still say we do not see what title that gives them to stand by our sides in the guidance of
the affairs of their nation and ours?” He concluded with one final and exceedingly
personal appeal that linked passage of the amendment with successful prosecution of the
war: “The executive tasks of this war rest upon me. I ask that you lighten them and place
in my hands instruments, spiritual instruments, which I do not now possess, which I
sorely need, and which I have daily to apologize for not being able to employ.” 529
The speech did not have the intended effect. In his memoirs, McAdoo regretted
having the President appear before the Senate. He recalled that the appeal was deeply
resented by those who opposed the amendment and even offended some pro-suffrage
senators who felt that Wilson had indeed crossed over too many lines of senatorial
tradition and respect. 530 Southern Democrats, in particular, rejected Wilson’s attempt to
portray a federal suffrage amendment as essential to winning the war.
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Senator John Sharp Williams of Mississippi found the idea of woman suffrage as a
war measure laughable. He told reporters that “he loved President Wilson as a brother,
but when the President told him he could not outmaneuver Ludendorff or capture
Palestine unless the women in Mississippi could vote, he declined to agree with him.” 531
Specifically raising the issue of race, Williams went on to say that winning the war “had
[nothing] to do with the right of negro women to vote in Mississippi.”532 On the floor of
the Senate, Senator Beckham of Kentucky also refuted the idea of the federal amendment
as a war measure and said that it was, in fact, a distraction from real war measures: “Our
whole attention and energy should be directed to the successful prosecution of this war
and not to a matter like this which can well wait until the minds of the people are in a
calmer and better condition to deal with such a radical change in a fundamental question
of government.” 533
Joining with his Southern comrades, Senator Underwood of Alabama predicted
calamity should the measure pass. Citing states’ rights as the foundation of the Republic,
Underwood described the federal amendment as “this instrument that may be the final
overthrow of the very life and integrity of these state governments.” 534 When another
senator suggested that the Southern states could disenfranchise black women just as
easily as they had enfranchised black men, Underwood bristled: “The Senator would buy
our votes with an assurance that conditions may remain as they are, and have us abandon
the great fundamental principles of government that [Southerners] have maintained from
531

“Suffrage Beaten in Senate by Two Votes,” Boston Daily Globe, October 2, 1918, 2.

532

Ibid.

533

Congressional Record, 65th Congress (September 30, 1918), 10949.

534

Ibid., 10929.

240

the beginning . . . Our votes are not for sale at any price. We stand for these principles
because we believe that the integrity of our race and our Government and the protection
of our women require it.” 535 According to Josephus Daniels, Senator Thomas Martin of
Virginia, an intense rival of Wilson’s, but a usually loyal Democrat, “was hot with
indignation at the President’s bringing up woman suffrage in the stress of war and trying
to persuade Senators that such action would help with the war.” 536
Whether senators were offended or not, the vote status did not change. As predicted,
when the votes were cast on the following day, the resolution fell two votes short of a
two-thirds majority:

Republicans
Democrats
Total

Yes
32
30
62

No
12
22
34

The breakdown of the vote showed that the overwhelming reason for the resolution’s
failure was the opposition of Southern Democrats – 19/22 opposed Democrats were from
the South. The three additional Democrats that voted “nay” were staunch anti535
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prohibitionists.537 The need to maintain white supremacy and the power of the cotton
textile industry in the South combined with the power of the liquor industry in certain
northern states was too strong a coalition for even the President to overcome.
Wilson was well aware of the political liability the failure had created for Democrats
from suffrage states facing reelection the following month. He was also aware that his
plans for the post-war settlement depended greatly on maintaining a Democratic majority
in Congress. In an angry letter to Senator Williams of Mississippi in the days
immediately following the vote, he wrote, “I must frankly say that I was very much
grieved that the Senate did not respond to my appeal about woman suffrage the other day,
because I knew what I was talking about when I spoke of the effect it would have upon
our moral influence on the other side of the water and the effect is going to be very
serious.” 538 As the mid-term elections would show, the effect was serious, indeed.
So concerned was Wilson with losing control of Congress that in late October he
issued a press statement in which he asked voters to set aside their partisan affiliation and
to return a Democratic majority in both the House and Senate. He explained, “This is not
time either for divided counsels or for divided leadership.” A Republican majority in
either chamber would not only obstruct his ability to prosecute the war, Wilson said, but
also, “be interpretative on the other side of the water as a repudiation of my
leadership.” 539 This desperate gamble backfired terribly. As one Wilson biographer
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noted, “No single act of Wilson’s as president would spark more criticism at the time and
lead to more retrospective repudiation.” 540 Failure to secure the suffrage amendment was
surely part of Wilson’s calculus as he surveyed the Democrats’ chances in the weeks
before the election and made the decision to issue such a radical call. Ultimately, it was a
call that voters answered in a most adverse way.
Voters went to the polls on November 5 and, for the first time in decades, restored a
Republican majority in both the House and the Senate. In the House, Democrats lost 23
seats. Republicans gained a 49-47 advantage in the Senate by garnering six seats and
only losing one. Suffrage was an issue in some of the Congressional campaigns, but
other powerful currents also caused a backlash against the Democratic Party. Chief
among them were Wilson’s post-war peace plans that violated the isolationist sentiments
of many Western voters. Democrats also wrestled with the strong perception among
mid-Western wheat farmers that the Wilson administration showed favoritism to the
South by fixing wheat prices to their detriment but allowing cotton prices to go
unregulated to the tremendous profit of Southern cotton growers. 541
The October Senate defeat of the suffrage bill caused both NAWSA and the NWP to
alter their traditional election year strategies for the 1918 mid-term elections. NAWSA
launched campaigns against anti-suffrage Senators in New Hampshire, New Jersey,
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Massachusetts, and Delaware. Catt made it clear that this was not a break from their
policy of remaining non-partisan – they campaigned against Democrats and Republicans
alike – but that it was a deeper plunge into the political fray than the National had
previously taken. 542 A more radical policy shift was that taken by the NWP. While
continuing their campaign to “hold the party in power responsible” by urging Western
women to vote against Democrats, they also decided to work for the election of a
Democrat in New Hampshire who was pro-suffrage and running against the incumbent
anti-suffrage Republican. 543
Through their combined – though not coordinated – efforts, the two suffrage
organizations contributed to the defeat of the Republican Senator Weeks in
Massachusetts by the pro-suffrage Democrat David Walsh. When J. Heisler Ball, the
Republican senatorial candidate in Delaware, announced his support for the federal
amendment just two weeks before the election, suffragists successfully threw their entire
energies into defeating the incumbent anti-suffrage Democrat, Senator Willard
Saulsbury. 544 The required two additional votes in the Senate were now guaranteed for
the 66th Congress.
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The question remained whether the Democrats would be able to make one more
effort to pass the resolution during the 65th Congress and at least claim partial credit for
the victory. The November election also saw state suffrage victories in Michigan, South
Dakota, and Oklahoma, which increased the number of presidential electors for which
women could vote to 339, as compared with only 92 in 1916. The women’s vote in the
1920 presidential election would be significant and both parties now began to jockey for
that vote. Democrats had hurt themselves with their failure to pass the amendment in
October. They would inflict further damage to their long-term interests by failing again
in February.
Wilson was incensed with the refusal of Senate Democrats to heed his call for
passage of the suffrage amendment. The tenor of his correspondence suggests that his
anger was not so much about prolonging the injustice of unequal suffrage, but about the
political damage done to the party. The most pressing thing in the President’s mind was
his plan for U.S. involvement in a league of nations after the war. Without a Democratcontrolled Congress, his ability to execute that plan would be greatly hindered. Without
the support of women voters, winning back the presidency in 1920 would be almost
impossible.
Even before the mid-term elections, he began to work the Senate again in the hope
that the amendment would pass during a later session of the 65th Congress. Less than two
weeks after the failed October vote, he wrote to the Governor of South Carolina in an
attempt to discern the suffrage stance of the newly elected Senator, William P. Pollock,
that would replace Senator Benet, stating, “I was so deeply disappointed in the action of
Senator Benet about the suffrage amendment . . . It is a matter of the utmost consequence
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that the amendment should be adopted by the Senate, and any representations that I can
legitimately make to Senator-select Pollock, I should like very much to convey.” 545
An early November memo written by Tumulty for the President outlining the major
issues for the next year further demonstrates the importance of the suffrage issue to
Wilson’s administration. Under the heading “things to be attended to at once,” Tumulty
listed suffrage as the number one issue. He explained, “The policy of the Democratic
Party should be to put [the federal amendment] over now and thus obtain the credit for it.
If we wait, the Republicans will surely put it over in March and we will have the name of
defeating it.” 546 Now that suffrage could serve as a wedge issue between parties, the
stakes over who could claim credit for its passage were considerably raised.
Suffrage leaders encouraged the President to press the amendment on the Senate
before he left for Paris – a request with which Wilson willingly complied. In his State of
the Union message, given just days before he sailed for Europe, Wilson said:
And what shall we say of the women, - of their instant intelligence, quickening every
task that they touched; their capacity for organization and cooperation, which gave
their action discipline and enhanced the effectiveness of everything they attempted.
Their contribution to the great result is beyond appraisal. They have added a new
luster to the annals of American womanhood. The least tribute we can pay them is to
make them the equals of men in political rights as they have proved themselves their
equals in every field of practical work they have entered, whether for themselves or
for their country. These great days of completed achievement would be sadly
marred were we to omit that act of justice. 547
Publicly, women’s war service figured prominently in Wilson’s appeal, but the
importance of suffrage to party politics was the resounding theme of his private petitions.
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The Governor of South Carolina had assured Wilson that Senator-select Pollock
would vote in favor of the federal amendment. Consequently, he needed to secure only
one more vote for the measure to pass in the 65th Congress. Before leaving for Europe,
he focused his efforts on Senator Williams of Mississippi and Senator Edward Gay of
Louisiana, neither of whom agreed to change their positions. 548 He remained in constant
contact with Tumulty about the suffrage situation while in Paris, inquiring, “Is their
anything else that I can do that might help to bring about the passage of the suffrage
amendment?” 549
A confidential letter from Williams to Wilson in mid-January made it clear that
his position was immovable. In addition to the fear of decreased white supremacy in the
South, Williams communicated his ongoing displeasure with the NWP’s latest series of
protests. A potential candidate to cast the one additional vote in favor of suffrage,
Williams responded to the President’s request for assistance by saying that he would
never vote for suffrage “as long as they keep up their infantile and asinine bonfire
performances in Lafayette Park.” 550 To the bitter end, the post-1917 tactics of the NWP
did more harm than good for the suffrage movement.
When the amendment finally came to a vote on the Senate floor on February 10, it
was more a formality than anything else. All interested parties were aware that the
resolution was still one vote short of the necessary two-thirds. The only changed vote
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from October was that of Senator Pollock who provided the keynote speech. His address
to the Senate was an eloquent tribute to women’s war service and to the President’s
leadership of the nation during the war. He explained that he felt it was his duty as a
Democrat to heed the President’s call and support the suffrage amendment. Additionally,
he appealed to his fellow southerners by claiming that white supremacy in the South
would not be threatened by extending suffrage to women. Pollock explained, “The black
man could not control the white man, and the Negro man and the Negro woman
combined can not any the more control the white man and the white woman
combined.” 551
Despite Pollock’s appeal, the outcome was as expected. The amendment failed to
pass by a vote of 63-33, one vote short of the required two-thirds majority. With nearly
three weeks to go before the 65th Congress officially adjourned, pro-suffrage Democrats
scrambled to try and get one more vote. When rumors emerged that they had the votes,
Republicans filibustered to block a vote before Congress adjourned on March 4. Fully
aware of and disgusted with the manner in which party politics were driving the train,
Catt later explained:
Friendly Democrats [contended] that the Northern opposed Senators were merely
postponing action in order to throw to the Republicans whatever political credit
might accrue from the passage of the Amendment in the Sixty-sixth Congress, and
Republican Senators accusing the Democrats of attempting to cover their years of
opposition to federal suffrage action, by the appearance of support at the eleventh
hour. Both accusations contained much truth, and the sorry fact was that the Sixtyfifth Congress adjourned with the Amendment not yet submitted. 552
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Barring unforeseen deaths of pro-suffrage Senators, the amendment was guaranteed to
pass in the Republican-controlled 66th Congress. Its failure during the 65th Congress was
a defeat for Wilson personally and for the Democrats as a party.
Both parties wanted an early vote on the suffrage amendment during the 66th
Congress. Wilson and his staff took several actions to try and give credit to the
Democratic Party for the eventual suffrage victory. First among these was the President’s
call for a special session of Congress to meet May 19, 1919. Within two days of
convening, the resolution to send the federal suffrage amendment to the states for
ratification passed in the House by a vote of 304-89. 553 As usual, the Senate was not as
swift.
Wilson was back in Europe by the time the 66th Congress convened. In another
attempt to claim Democratic credit for the victory, Tumulty wrote to the President that
suffrage organizations were beginning to publicly declare that victory in the Senate was
not assured, despite what had seemed a guarantee after the November 1918 elections.
Tumulty urged Wilson to secure the vote of Senator William Harris of Georgia, a
Democrat who had been elected largely as a result of Wilson’s support during his
campaign. 554 Harris was vacationing in Europe at the time, and Tumulty was convinced
that, if the President could get his vote and have him make a public statement to that
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effect, the newspapers would report that it was the Democrats, rather than the
Republicans that had secured the passage of the resolution. 555
Wilson met with Harris on May 8, and the newly elected Senator informed him
that he would vote for the federal amendment. Leading newspapers from across the
country carried stories about Harris’ pledge in the days following this meeting in Europe.
As Tumulty and Wilson had hoped, almost all newspaper accounts quoted Democratic
sources who claimed Harris’ vote was the one that would put the amendment through in
the special session of Congress. 556
As the final vote would show, Republicans would not allow full credit to go to their
opponents. There were four more votes in favor of suffrage on June 4 than there had
been on October 1, 1918. Two votes were from Democrats and two were from
Republicans. The debate over which party should get credit did not end in June 1919.
Just a few days before the Senate vote, when the actual date had been shifted for the third
time, an exasperated Mary Hay summed up the feelings of many suffragists who were fed
up with being the pawns in a game of partisan politics. Hay wrote to a comrade, “All
men are liars – Rep. and Dem – at least they get that way when they go to the Senate.” 557
When the roll was finally called in the Senate on June 4, 1919, the results were as
follows:
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Republicans
Democrats
Total

Yes
40
26
66

No
9
21
30

Senator Pollock’s “aye” vote from February had been cancelled by his successor, Senator
Dial, who voted “nay.” The four changes from October were Walsh of Massachusetts
and Ball of Delaware – both newly elected with the support of suffragists during the 1918
mid-term elections. These two were joined by Senator Harris who had been persuaded
by Wilson and Senator Hale, a Republican from Maine who changed his vote because his
state had passed into the ranks of the “suffrage states” since the October vote. 558
Victory in Congress, sweet though it was, only meant that suffragists could now
turn their attention to the ratification campaign that needed to be fought in the states. The
Wilson Administration, of course, did its best to put a positive spin on the victory for the
Democratic Party. Both parties, in fact, jockeyed in the press to claim credit for the
amendment’s final passage. 559 But those who studied the results of the Senate vote could
see that it was mostly in spite of the Democrats that the resolution passed.
Perhaps the most interesting thing to take away from the last stage of the suffrage
battle in Congress is the fact that Wilson’s ability to influence members of his own party
had its limits. When the political survival of certain senators depended more on their
constituents who feared any threat to white supremacy or their contributors who feared
the economic damage women voters might inflict than it did on the support of the
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President, they placed personal interests above the President’s request for support. As a
result, the Democratic Party suffered the backlash of pro-suffrage voters in both the 1918
mid-term elections and the 1920 presidential election.
This is not to say that Wilson’s conversion to the federal amendment was
inconsequential. On the contrary, evidence in this chapter reveals that the President
helped to secure key votes at critical moments. And his public endorsement of the
federal amendment – with its explicit approval for all Democrats to abandon the “states’
rights” platform of 1916 – opened the door for a number of Southern Democrats in both
houses to change their positions. But Wilson’s conversion alone was not enough. The
single most important factor in the amendment’s ultimate victory at the national level was
the series of victories won in the states from 1917-1919. Eleven new states enfranchised
women during this two year period, largely as a result of Catt’s “Winning Plan” to
simultaneously work for suffrage at the state and federal level. The combination of
increased representation from suffrage states and Wilson’s support finally tipped the
scales in favor of the federal amendment. The rising “tide” of suffrage that Wilson had
described to the assembled NAWSA members in Atlantic City in September 1916 finally
crested nearly four years later.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

Victory in Congress was not the final hurdle for the federal woman suffrage
amendment. In order to become part of the Constitution, the amendment required
ratification by 36 out of 48 states. This was no small task. Suffragists across the nation
once again strapped on their armor and marched into the political fray for this final battle.
The ratification campaign lasted more than a year, ending only when Tennessee became
the thirty-sixth state to ratify (by a margin of only one vote) in late August 1920. 560
Aspects of the ratification process are both fascinating and illuminating, and it is an
important part of the overall history of the federal amendment, but President Wilson
played only a minor role. He returned from Europe in July 1919, shortly after the
suffrage victory in Congress. During the next several months, his primary focus was the
battle over U.S. membership in the League of Nations. 561 He suffered a debilitating
stroke in early October and practically vanished from public life for more than six
months. 562
Wilson had recuperated enough by the spring of 1920 to offer some support for
ratification. 563 Most importantly, he answered one of Catt’s final calls for assistance. At
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her request, he telegraphed the governor of Tennessee, successfully urging him to
convene a special legislative session to consider ratification of the amendment. 564 For
this study which is principally concerned with how and why Wilson came to support the
federal amendment and with his role in pushing the measure through Congress, the story
largely ends with the decisive vote in the Senate in June 1919. Still, the events
surrounding the actual certification of the 19th Amendment by Secretary of State
Bainbridge Colby in August 1920 illustrate some of this study’s larger points.
Colby certified the federal woman suffrage amendment in the privacy of his own
home in Washington, D.C. at eight o’clock in the morning on August 26, 1920. The
signing took place without any ceremony or spectators, despite the request of the
National Woman’s Party to send a delegation and to have the event filmed by movie
cameras. Miffed at the denial of their request, an NWP spokesperson later told reporters,
“It was quite tragic. This was the final culmination of the women’s fight and women,
irrespective of factions, should have been allowed to be present when the proclamation
was signed.” 565 Colby’s rejection of the NWP demands to be represented at the signing
ceremony was no fluke. According to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, NAWSA
leaders had explicitly asked Wilson’s cabinet members to ban the NWP from any signing
ceremony. Daniels recorded in his diary on August 25, “Mrs. Helen Gardener [NAWSA
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Specifically, Wilson wrote letters to urge ratification upon Democratic leaders in West
Virginia, Louisiana, Delaware, and North Carolina. See Wilson to Julius Edgar Frazier and Milton Burr
(March 1, 1920), Wilson to Jared Young Sanders (April 10, 1920), Wilson to John Milliken Parker (May
18, 1920), Wilson to John J. Mulvena (June 1, 1920), Wilson to Thomas Walter Bickett (June 24, 1920),
LWWP. Ratification was defeated in all four of these states.
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Wilson to Albert Houston Roberts (June 23, 1920), LWWP. For Roberts’ reply, see Roberts to
Wilson (June 25, 1920), LWWP.
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Abby Scott Baker, quoted in “Colby Proclaims Woman Suffrage; Signs Certificate of
Ratification at His Home Without Women Witnesses,” New York Times, August 27, 1920, 1.
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Corresponding Secretary] phoned that she had asked Colby not to have any of the
Picketting [sic] crowd of women present.” 566
While the NWP received a cold shoulder from Wilson Administration
representatives, Catt and NAWSA were afforded their customary warmth from the White
House. President and Mrs. Wilson invited Catt and Gardener to the White House on the
afternoon of August 26. In reporting on Catt’s visit to Wilson, the New York Times noted
that the NWP, “known as the militants, and a rival organization to that headed by Mrs.
Catt, was not represented.” 567 The President accepted a memorial appreciation book
from the two NAWSA leaders. He informed them that he would not be physically able to
attend their jubilee meeting that night but had given Secretary Colby a message to read
on his behalf.
Later that night, Colby told the NAWSA members who had assembled for the
jubilee at Poli’s Theatre, “There never was a man more deeply or profoundly convinced
of the justice of the suffrage cause than Woodrow Wilson. And there never was a party
leader who held his party with more stern, austere and unbending insistence to the

566

Cronon, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921, 552. Daniels apparently thought
Gardner was being catty. The next sentence in his diary reads, “The female of the Species . . .” One can
almost see him shaking his head at the fact that – even in what should have been one of the suffrage
movement’s most glorious moments – bitter factionalism persisted. Colby appears to have made a
conscious decision to avoid the potential fallout from inviting NAWSA but not the NWP. When
questioned by reporters, Colby explained, “It was decided not to accompany this simple ministerial action
on my part with any ceremony or setting. This secondary aspect of the subject has regretfully been the
source of considerable contention as to who shall participate in it and who shall not. Inasmuch as I am not
interested in the aftermath of any of the friction or collisions which may have been developed in the long
struggle for the ratification of the amendment, I have contented myself with the performance in the simplest
manner of the duty devolving upon me under the law.” “Colby Proclaims Woman Suffrage; Signs
Certificate of Ratification at His Home Without Women Witnesses,” New York Times, August 27, 1920, 3.
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performance of a duty dictated by high principle.” Colby went on the relay the following
message from Wilson:
Will you take the opportunity to say to my fellow citizens that I deem it one of the
greatest honors of my life that this great event, the ratification of this amendment,
should have occurred during the period of my administration. Please say also that
nothing has given me more pleasure than the privilege that has been mine to do
what I could to advance the cause of ratification and to hasten the day when the
womanhood of America would be recognized by the nation on the equal footing
of citizenship that it deserves. 568
Paul and her NWP followers were not involved in NAWSA’s jubilee at Poli’s Theatre.
Earlier in the day, though, Paul had released a press statement heralding final certification
and predicting that, “August 26th will be remembered as one of the great days in the
history of the women of the world and in the history of this republic.” 569 She also
announced that the NWP headquarters would remain open for the time being while the
leaders planned a convention to determine the organization’s future.
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Ibid.
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Ibid. Paul’s prediction of the lasting significance of August 26th did not come to pass. Within
both public memory and the historical profession, the history of the woman suffrage movement quickly
became a footnote to the overall narrative of American political history. Some of this is due to what
historian William O’Neill called “the failure of feminism” – the fact that women did not do as many
suffragists promised and use their vote to reform society. Additionally, he argues, they failed to use the
ballot as a launching pad to improve their own status in society. Describing the post-suffrage decade,
O’Neill writes, “The women’s rights movement expired in the twenties from ailments that had gone
untreated in its glory days. Chief among them was the feminists’ inability to see that equal suffrage was
almost the only issue holding the disparate elements of the woman movement together. Once it was
resolved, voters who happened to be female were released from the politically meaningless category of
‘woman.’ This allowed their basic allegiances to come into play.” O'Neill, Everyone was Brave: A History
of Feminism in America, 264. Nancy Cott disputes the idea that feminism lost steam in the 1920s. Instead,
she argues that what happened in the 1920s was the emergence of a broader feminist agenda: “What
historians have seen as the demise of feminism in the 1920s was, more accurately, the end of the suffrage
movement and the early struggle of modern feminism.” See {{8 Cott, Nancy F. 1987/s8-10;}} I would
argue that there is more to this story of historical exclusion than women’s failure to “do anything” with the
vote. The history of woman suffrage was initially ignored and later relegated to the fields of women’s
history and/or social history because political historians did not see gender politics as real politics. One of
the chief aims of this study, building on the work of a generation of suffrage scholars, has been to show just
how much gender politics played a crucial role in the broader political developments that took place during
Wilson’s two terms. By integrating suffrage history with the standard political histories of Wilson, I have
attempted to answer the call made by Victoria Bissell Brown for political historians to take gender politics
more seriously. See Brown, Did Woodrow Wilson's Gender Politics Matter?, 153-154.
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The events of August 26, 1920 serve as a metaphor, to some extent, for the final
years of the suffrage battle. From the newspaper accounts, it is clear that Wilson was a
staunch advocate of the federal amendment. Colby’s speech at the jubilee – and the
message that he relayed from the President - illustrates the desire of Democrats to claim
responsibility for the passage of the amendment, indicating the way in which woman
suffrage had developed into a key issue between political parties. It is also clear that Catt
and NAWSA maintained a positive and mutually supportive relationship with Wilson and
his administration while Paul and the NWP remained antagonistic to the end. Gardener’s
note to Daniels highlights the depth of the rift between NAWSA and the NWP. All of
these issues – Wilson’s conversion to suffrage in the midst of his larger turn toward
progressivism, his increasing tendency toward national solutions, the amendment’s rising
stock as an issue of political value for both parties, and the different political strategies of
NAWSA and the NWP – have served as the basis of this study.
Few scholars disagree with one of this study’s fundamental points: Wilson was
converted to supporting the cause of the federal suffrage amendment early in his second
term. Exceptionally, Victoria Bissell Brown dates his conversion even earlier, arguing
that Wilson’s affirmative vote for suffrage in the New Jersey state referendum in October
1915 signaled his acceptance of the fact that women were in public life to stay. Brown
argues:
The story of Wilson and suffrage, between his vote in the New Jersey referendum
in the fall of 1915 and his support for a federal amendment in January 1918, is not
a story about whether the president believed in woman suffrage . . . The post-1915
story is about method, timing, and tactics; it is about deference to the racial and
gender politics of the South and the direction of the Democratic party; and it is
about war and protest and the rage Wilson felt at suffragists who were unwilling
to keep the home fires burning and his loyalty to those suffragists who were. 570
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I could not agree more with Brown’s eloquent assessment of what the post-1915 story is
really about. But implicit in her argument about the significance of the October 1915
vote is the idea that once Wilson voted yea in New Jersey, his transition from a states’
rights suffragist to federal amendment advocate was a foregone conclusion. I disagree.
Wilson was unwilling to advocate for the federal amendment as President and the
leader of the Democratic Party until he was convinced that a majority of Americans
wanted woman suffrage and that it would hurt his party to stand in the way of its eventual
passage. And he only became convinced of those things once NAWSA and its state
affiliates began to win more states in 1917. In other words, there appears to be a
misplaced sense of inevitability in this part of Brown’s argument. 571 Regardless of the
timing, the real disagreement among scholars begins with the questions of what brought
about Wilson’s conversion and what effect his advocacy had on the amendment’s
eventual passage. This study has attempted to answer both of those questions.
Prior to the 1918 mid-term elections, suffrage was not an issue with enough
power to swing a significant number of voters in one direction or the other. With only
minor concessions to the suffrage movement, Wilson was able to win re-election in 1916.
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This may seem like quibbling, but there is a larger point here about the danger of suggesting
that anything associated with the federal woman suffrage amendment was inevitable. Remember that the
final roll call in the Senate in 1919 only passed by one vote. And remember, too, that ratification turned
into a larger and closer battle than many anticipated. Only 13 out of 48 states needed to reject ratification
in order for the amendment to fail and when the nine states of the solid South almost immediately did so,
suffragists were left with a margin of only four states. My point is that getting a federal women suffrage
amendment during Wilson’s administration was a close call at every turn. Without engaging in too much
counterfactual history, it is probably not unreasonable to suggest that – should the amendment have failed
under Wilson – the largely pro-suffrage Republican Party that swept the 1920 elections would have quickly
facilitated passage and ratification of the federal amendment. Still, that is impossible to know for certain.
And even if it is a valid assumption, delaying woman suffrage for another presidential election cycle would
certainly have brought with it important second and third order effects. Any suggestion of inevitability
obscures the Herculean challenges faced by – and more importantly, overcome by - the suffragists.
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His vote for the New Jersey suffrage referendum, his support for the states’ rights plank
in the 1916 Democratic platform, and his proclamation of openness to a federal
amendment at the Atlantic City NAWSA Convention in September 1916 were enough to
convince most pro-suffrage Democratic voters that he was an ally. Those same actions
were moderate enough to not alienate anti-suffrage elements within the Democratic Party,
especially Southerners fearful of the federal amendment’s potential to undermine white
supremacy in their states.
In a direct rebuke to the NWP campaign strategy in 1916, enfranchised women in
the West demonstrated that they were not single-issue voters. Evaluating Wilson and
Hughes across the spectrum of their policies and beliefs, the majority of women voted in
line with their traditional party affiliations. Those who broke ranks tended to support
Wilson because of his efforts to keep the United States out of the war in Europe and his
increasing support for a number of progressive measures.
What changed between the November 1916 election and the start of the 1918
mid-term election campaign season that made suffrage a more powerful political wedge?
First, and perhaps most importantly, the United States became directly involved in the
war in Europe. NAWSA leaders, following Catt’s guidance, made a critical decision to
commit their organization to war service alongside suffrage work. Their contributions to
national defense through home front service strengthened the arguments they had been
making for decades that equal sacrifice deserved equal citizenship. This is not to say that
they explicitly altered the basis of their demand for suffrage. They continued to ask for
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suffrage on the basis of natural rights, but they were not above using women’s reform
work and/or patriotism as an additional reason. 572
Helen Gardener articulated this dual reasoning to Wilson in a letter sent a few
months before the first vote in the Senate. She explained:
We do not ask, and do not want [suffrage] given as a ‘reward’ for war work and
war sacrifice. Those are our loyal duty and pleasure to give even under the
humiliation of disfranchisement, but how much more whole-heartedly, cheerfully,
joyfully we can and will make those duties our first thought and pleasure when we
can feel that we are a part of the government which we gladly sacrifice so much to
protect and to make safe! I doubt if even you can grasp how deep that feeling is
in women. 573
Whether women wanted suffrage as a reward or not, that is certainly part of the reason
why male elected officials decided to grant it to them. Wilson increasingly emphasized
women’s contribution to the war when he urged members of Congress to support the
federal amendment. Likewise, the Congressional debates on the amendment are filled
with pro-suffrage Congressmen heaping accolades on the sacrifices of women engaged in
war service.
The other significant change during 1917 was the increase in the number of
suffrage states. Eight more states had granted women either full or partial suffrage, and it
was clear to both parties that, unlike in 1914 and 1916, enfranchised women would make
a significant difference in the 1918 mid-term elections. The increase in the number of
suffrage states was in no small way connected to Wilson’s support. In close coordination
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For an excellent discussion of how the argument for suffrage evolved from one based on
natural rights (the argument from justice) to the claim that woman suffrage would benefit society (the
argument from expediency), see Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920, 43-74.
Importantly, Kraditor notes that both types of argument persisted throughout the suffrage struggle: “The
claim of women to the vote as a natural right never disappeared from the suffragist rationale, but the
meaning of natural right changed in response to new realities, and new arguments enumerating the reforms
that women voters could effect took their places alongside the natural right principle that had been the
staple plea of the suffragists in the early days of the movement.” Quote from p. 44-45.
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with NAWSA - the only suffrage organization still working on state campaigns - Wilson
encouraged state legislatures across the country to pass suffrage referenda. Shedding his
hesitance to become involved in internal state affairs, he wrote letters, gave statements to
the press, and encouraged individual legislators and governors to extend the franchise to
women.
Members of the NWP, and the revisionist scholars who emphasize the importance
of the NWP strategy, would argue that the other significant change in 1917 was the
militant picketing campaign and subsequent publicity surrounding the pickets’ arrest and
imprisonment. The actions of the NWP, they insist, made it impossible for Wilson to
continue to talk about fighting a war for democracy abroad while denying democracy at
home. According to this argument, the civil disobedience of the pickets was so
embarrassing to the Wilson Administration that the President realized the only way he
could remove the NWP thorn from his side was by supporting the federal amendment.
This study challenges that revisionist position. Wilson was troubled by the
pickets mostly because of the embarrassment that they caused to the suffrage movement
as a whole. His correspondence with members of Congress, NAWSA leaders, and the
press all indicate that he hoped the general public’s distaste for the pickets would not
create irreparable harm to the suffrage cause, which he increasingly supported.
Moreover, press coverage of the pickets, especially outside of New York and
Washington, D.C., was primarily negative. Only a tiny minority of Americans pressured
Wilson to stop the arrests, imprisonments, and forced feedings of NWP members.
Despite the pickets’ willingness to suffer injustice at the hands of the government, there
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was no great public outcry at their mistreatment. Wilson’s conversion over the course of
1917 came largely in spite of the actions of the militants.
Once Wilson for the first time asked Congress to pass the federal amendment in
January 1918, he never wavered from that position of support. Illustrating the limits of
executive influence, though, the amendment failed to pass in the Senate two times before
finally succeeding under a Republican-controlled Congress in June 1919. This study has
established two factors that constrained the President’s ability to influence Congress.
First, he had to wrestle with the thin line between executive interest and executive
interference. Senatorial courtesy required him to tread carefully on the sensitivities of
those he sought to influence. In addition, the solid base of the Democratic Party was
located in the South where woman suffrage seemingly posed a threat to white supremacy.
Wilson recognized that Southern Democrats were under immense pressure from their
constituents to protect white supremacy at all costs. 574 The reality of the situation was
that woman suffrage posed little threat to the Southern political system. In fact, as even
some suffragists unfortunately argued, had black women been as disfranchised as easily
as black men had been, the power of white voters would have doubled when women were
given the vote. Nonetheless, fear outweighed fact. Anti-suffragists convinced voters that
woman suffrage would destroy white political hegemony. Public perception mattered
more to Southern Senators than the political reality. Despite his best efforts, Wilson was
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Wilson, himself, was no champion of black civil or political rights. A southerner by birth and
by ideology, he held similar views of the need for white supremacy in the South as did the members of his
party in Congress. Still, his work on behalf of the federal suffrage amendment indicates that he felt
confident that white supremacy was not threatened by granting women the right to vote.
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largely unable to overcome their fears of losing future elections by supporting the federal
amendment. 575
Paul repeatedly argued that Wilson was not pushing his party hard enough. Her
rationale for targeting the President, first in the 1916 election and later with the picketing
campaign, was that he had the power to compel his party, which up until 1918 controlled
both houses of Congress, to support the federal suffrage amendment. Close scrutiny of
Wilson’s actions as an advocate of the amendment from 1918 all the way through final
ratification in 1920, though, indicates that Paul failed to grasp Wilson’s limitations on
this particular issue with Southern Democrats in the Senate. Owing more to the white
constituents that elected them, those Senators were immune to pressure from the
President. Wilson’s efforts to swing their votes in favor of the federal amendment - and
he indeed expended great effort with these men - were ultimately in vain.
In many ways, the contrasting approaches of NAWSA and the NWP represent
two very different understandings of the nature of federal authority – and, in a broader
sense, the national state – in the early 20th century. By 1916, NAWSA and NWP leaders
alike recognized the need for federal action if all women were to be enfranchised. And
this was in keeping with the post-Civil War trend for citizenship to be determined at the
national rather than the state level. But NAWSA leaders remained more realistic about
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In a telling exchange that illustrates this dynamic, Senator Lee Overman (D – NC) sent the
following response to a Wilson entreaty for him to urge ratification upon the members of the North
Carolina state legislature: “Now, Mr. President, as you know, I have been loyal to you and supported you
in everything, except upon the question of woman suffrage . . . If you were fully acquainted with the
conditions as they prevail in this state I am sure you would understand my position and not request of me to
exert my influence for ratification of the amendment. I went before the people [in a primary election in
early June 1920], being opposed by a gentleman who was a most ardent suffragist who advocated the
ratification of the amendment. The result of the primary was that I received 94,000 and my opponent only
23,000 – the largest majority any man ever received in this state. My position was endorsed by the people;
therefore, I cannot, in justice to myself and to my people, take a contrary position so soon after the primary,
all of which I know you will fully appreciate.” Overman to Wilson (June 25, 1920), LWWP.
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the persistence of states’ rights ideology and more aware of the limits of federal power
and authority. Paul and her followers built a strategy more based on how things ought to
be than on how they actually were. The interaction among local, state, and federal
authorities has received considerable attention in recent works of political history. 576
While this study does not directly dialogue with those works, the experience of the
suffragists has much to offer as historians continue to grapple with the evolving nature of
the state in the 20th century.
Why did Wilson eventually become willing to push for a national solution to the
issue of woman suffrage? In the end, his personal acceptance of the principle involved
coupled with party politics and simple electoral math made suffrage an issue worthy of
Wilson’s attention and devotion. His transition on suffrage paralleled his principled yet
expedient transition on other progressive measures such as the Adamson Act and the
Keating-Owen Child Labor Bill. Under Catt’s leadership, NAWSA played the bipartisan
political game more effectively than the NWP. Without alienating the Republican
support that would be required to win in Congress and, later, in the state ratification
campaigns, Catt endeared NAWSA to the President and gained his support in critical
battles for state referenda, the creation of a separate House Suffrage Committee, and,
finally, the federal amendment itself. NAWSA wisely decided to continue pursuing state
referenda. Additionally, they distanced themselves from the actions of the NWP and
simultaneously engaged in war service and suffrage work. As a result, NAWSA leaders
576

For an example of this approach, see Thomas J. Sugrue, "All Politics is Local: The Persistence
of Localism in Twentieth-Century America," in The Democratic Experiment (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2009), 301-236. See also, Meg Jacobs and Julian E. Zelizer, "The Democratic
Experiment: New Directions in American History," in The Democratic Experiment (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2009), 1-19. For a summary of recent work that reconsiders the state, see Margot
Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2009), 4-7.
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put the suffrage movement in a position to secure the federal amendment before the end
of Wilson’s second term.
A political analysis of the suffrage movement leads to a version of the story that
sometimes lacks inspiration. Wilson, more often than not, acted out of cold political
reality rather than out of a sense of justice. Catt, seeking all expedient means to further
her cause, was more than willing to ignore the civil rights violations committed by the
government against the NWP pickets. Paul wrongly pursued a policy of militant
harassment of the President even while he was exerting his utmost influence to secure the
federal amendment. Perhaps most egregiously, both the President and the two suffrage
organizations were willing to sacrifice the rights of black citizens in order to gain
suffrage for white women. Fortunately, history is not necessarily concerned with
identifying heroes and villains. As one historian explains, historical judgment “requires
attention to the nuances of context and to an awareness of limits.” 577 Without excusing
or ignoring any of the less-than inspiring aspects of the suffrage struggle, this study has
sought to deepen our understanding of the context in which these historical actors made
their decisions.

577
Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue:
The Depression Decade (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 329. Sitkoff offers this insight in the
midst of his assessment of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s record on civil rights for African Americans
during the New Deal. On the Roosevelt Administration’s failure to do more to improve race equality,
Sitkoff writes, “[Their failures] stain the record of the Roosevelt Administration, as well as that of every
individual and organization that should have done more to seek to alter the situation. The odds against their
succeeding do not constitute a sufficient excuse for their timidity, half measures, and concessions. In moral
terms, the horror of racism makes a mockery of lauding anyone as a humanitarian who compromised with
its existence, as Roosevelt did repeatedly.” This is a scathing indictment – and one that could easily be
tweaked to apply to Wilson on his hesitant approach to woman suffrage. But Sitkoff goes on to discuss the
context in which FDR sought to make even minor positive changes in the status of blacks, specifically
noting that “For three centuries racism had infected the national mind as well as the body politic.” ( p. 330).
He does not offer excuses for FDR, but does provide sufficient context to help understand why FDR made
the decisions that he did. Sitkoff’s assessment is an outstanding model for balanced historical judgment
and I have done my best to emulate his approach in this study.
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Even without actively seeking heroic figures, though, one cannot help but come
across them when studying a movement that was, at its most grassroots level, about
political liberty and democratic principles. I continue to find myself inspired by letters
like the one from a young suffragist campaigning alone in Montana who wrote back to
the NWP headquarters, “Often I ride all night from one town to the next. It is very uphill
work here in Montana. Every place I go seems harder. Sometimes I wonder if it is worth
all the money and effort, but Miss Burns said it was one of the most important states so I
suppose it is worth while.” 578 Likewise, one cannot help but be moved by the report from
another suffragist that she was sure a certain senator had told her he would vote “yea” on
the amendment, but that she could not remember any of the specifics of their
conversation because he was just one of 14 members of Congress she had interviewed on
that particular morning. 579
Even if it was the result of political compromises and pressures and capitulation
to racism in many cases, that magical day that Beulah Amidon imagined when writing to
her comrades in jail in 1917 did come to pass. Her words, meant to inspire those unjustly
imprisoned for petitioning their government for a redress of legitimate grievances, travel
through the years to remind us of the true basis of the battle: “Can you imagine how it
will be when that amendment actually passes? Sometimes, when I am too tired to think, I
just take a long breath and try to dream of a whole nation politically free --- and then
there is nothing too hard to do to make the dream come true.” 580
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